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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Exploring the Role of United States Legal Discourse in Creating, Sustaining, and Disrupting
Vestiges of Slavery
By
Hanif M. Bey
Kutztown University Millersville University, 2018
Kutztown, Pennsylvania
Directed by Dr. Juliana Svistova
This exploratory study starts from the proposition that the use of the racialized names “negro,”
“colored,” “black,” and “white” represent vestiges of slavery that were socially and legally
constructed, maintained, and perpetuated to validate a superior position for descendants of
Europe in the United States, while assigning an inferior status to descendants of Africa in the
United States. I further suggest that the use of these racialized names appear to resemble what
Noonan (1976) described as a legal mask: a legal construct that veils the humanity of participants
in the legal process. Informed by Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Post-Colonialist Theory, this
exploratory study aimed to explore the role of law and legal discourse in creating and sustaining
racial differences between 1705-1857 and 1986-2017, and explore counter-hegemonic narratives
in historic and contemporary legal texts as tools for dismantling vestiges of slavery. Utilizing the
techniques of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this exploratory study explores and compares
the legal discourse for the use of racial names and ways of constructing race and racial
differences. I discovered in the historic legal texts that legal actors often used hostile, “white
supremacist” hegemonic legal discourse to create and maintain racial differences. Although the
legal discourse today is much less overt and more nuanced, I found that many contemporary
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legal actors use their platform to disrupt racial hegemony as they attempt to remedy the mistakes
of the past. This exploratory study breaks new ground by demonstrating that social workers can
engage in sophisticated transdisciplinary research and enter a more active role in deconstructing
and eliminating barriers of structural racism. My research has implications for social work
research, leadership, and education.
Key words: racialized names, racial difference, legal mask, legal discourse
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Exploring the Role of United States Legal Discourse in Creating, Sustaining, and Disrupting
Vestiges of Slavery
Introduction
Problem Statement
Despite post-Civil Rights efforts to establish and consolidate a racial, cultural identity
that promoted inclusion, equality, and pride, the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,”
and “black” remain pejorative terms grounded within a socio-historical context that created and
assigned an inferior status to many descendants of Africa in the United States, while those
classified as “white” benefit from their position of superiority. Although considerable research
has concentrated on the racial identity shift from negro to colored to black and now to African
American, much of this work tends to focus on the perceptions of and attitudes toward these
names and their shift over time. However, missing from the scholarship is the potential legal
significance the use of these racialized names may have on many descendants of Africa in the
United States. Specifically, the gap exists in relation to how the use of the racialized names
“negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” represents vestiges of slavery that were socially and
legally constructed, maintained, and perpetuated to validate a superior position for descendants
of Europe in the United States, while assigning an inferior status to descendants of Africa in the
United States.
Correspondingly, the literature seems to suggest that the reason why these racialized
names were affixed upon many descendants of Africa in the United States was to create a
distinctly inferior legal status to justify their mistreatment under the law. Therefore, I infer that
the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” attached a non-human legal
status to many descendant of Africa in the United States, different from a natural person.
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Because of this distinct legal personality created by law, I opine that the use of the racialized
names may represent legal masks (Noonan, 1976) that conceal the humanity of many
descendants of Africa in the United States, circumscribe their identity, and perhaps construct the
lens through which many descendants of Africa in the United States are viewed and treated in
law today. Furthermore, I consider the continued use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,”
“black,” and “white” as legal masks a subtle form of neocolonialism and is a human rights issue.
Ultimately, these unreconciled remnants of slavery, racism, privilege, and power, which continue
to plague and haunt our society, must be deconstructed, abandoned, and eliminated.
The primary focus of this exploratory study is the role of law and legal discourse in
constructing racial differences between 1705-1857 and 1986-2017. The term discourse is
applied in this work to refer to words that may be used to assert power, ideology, and control, as
well as for resistance and disruption (Fairclough, 2010). Those who are in control convey words
that carry power. Words also carry precise meaning that can influence historic, social, and
political conditions. As a nation of laws, legal discourse plays an important part in shaping
social discourse because it has the power of the state to establish what is considered legitimate
discourse (Fairclough, 2010). Therefore, exploring legal discourse may reveal how words that
appear ordinary to some, may construct unequal power relations and portrayals among others.
For this reason, I am interested in how legal actors used legal discourse in creating, sustaining,
and disrupting vestiges of slavery.
Unlike the comprehensive works by Higginbotham (1978; 1996) that examined the role
of the American Colonial era in creating and sanctioning chattel slavery, and the consequential
work entitled White by Law by Haney-Lopez (2006), the focus of my work is different because I
explore the creation, maintenance, and disruption of racial differences and hegemony in law. For
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the purposes of this exploratory study, I first explored the historic legal texts describing the legal
discourse that legal actors used during 1705-1857 to create racial differences and compared them
with selected modern legal cases. Second, I explored the counter-hegemonic narratives that legal
actors used to disrupt the status-quo of racial differences in the historic and modern legal texts.
Third, I explored whether and how these legally constructed racial differences influenced legal
treatment.
In this introductory chapter, I explain how my interest in these racialized names
developed; describe the institutional context of racial differences with special attention to the
racialized names; present a definition of terms; and give a brief outline of the analytical
frameworks on which I draw. Last, I discovered in the historic legal texts that legal actors often
used hostile, “white supremacist” hegemonic legal discourse to create and maintain racial
differences and hegemony. Although the legal discourse today is much less overt and more
nuanced, I found that many contemporary legal actors use their platform to disrupt racial
hegemony as they attempt to remedy the mistakes of the past.
Race is a relatively new ideology grounded upon the unequal hierarchal ranking of
individuals based on their physical differences, which are deeply engrained in the consciousness
of people (Golash-Boraza, 2016; Smedley & Smedley, 2005; Winant, 2000). My own interest in
disrupting this unjust and immoral ideology emanated from my concern over the current
disparate legal treatment of many descendants of Africa in the United States. Specifically, my
passion over finding a way to eliminate racism in the United States quickly took form when I
became a member of the Moorish Science Temple of America (M.S.T.A.). Through my
exposure to the official teachings of the M.S.T.A., I discovered that the racial categories “negro,”
“colored,” and “black” appeared to determine how individuals are treated in society. This basic
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understanding was illustrated in the following excerpt by Noble Drew Ali (1928), the founder of
the M.S.T.A.,
The citizens of all free national governments according to their national
constitution are all of one family bearing one free national name. Those
who fail to recognize the free national name of their constitutional
government are classified as undesirables, and are subject to all inferior
names and abuses and mistreatments that the citizens care to bestow upon
them (p. 1).
Moreover, the M.S.T.A. considered the “inferior names” “negro,” “colored,” and “black” “marks
of slavery” that were forced on enslaved descendants of Africa in the United States (Drew Ali,
n.d.). Therefore, it was from my experience with the M.S.T.A. that I learned that race, more
precisely the use of racialized names, became the predominant strategy implemented by the
colonizers to account for their usurping the place of nationality. As a result, Noble Drew Ali
(1928) announced:
There is not a nation on earth today that will recognize them
[descendants of Africa in the United States] socially, religiously,
politically, or economically, etc., in their present condition of their
endeavorment [sic] in which they themselves try to force upon a civilized
world, they, will not refrain from their sinful ways of action and their
deeds have brought [jim-crowism], segregation, and everything that
brings harm to human beings on earth (p. 7).
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Ultimately, it was from these declarations that I developed my preliminary interest in exploring
the possible link between racial differences, racialized names, hegemony, and their cultural and
legal significance.
Informed by a substantial body of work on the racial names shift from negro to colored to
black to African American, but also on racial disparities in legal proceedings, I sought to explore
how these vestiges of slavery were legally constructed to create and maintain an inferior image
of descendants of Africa in the United States, while sustaining a superior image of descendants
of Europe in the United States.
To help formulate my initial concepts for this exploratory study, I reviewed the pertinent
literature on racial identity, racialized names, and racial disparities in legal proceedings. First,
Noonan (1976) demonstrated that some aspects of legal analysis can dehumanize individuals
using “conceptual legal masks” (p. 21-22). To illustrate how these legal masks functioned, he
showed that the early slave laws of Virginia that permitted chattel slavery, reduced Africans to
property. According to Noonan (1976), this legal process not only masked Africans as property,
it also suppressed the humanity of the “white” property-owners. Ultimately, these legal masks
had two objectives: to enforce the social order, which was the institution of slavery; and to instill
social control. As a result, this type of legal reasoning also masked the inferred valuation of the
legal process: that “whites” were in control, and “blacks” were the object of control. While the
work of Noonan (1976) informed my exploratory study, he overlooked the use of racialized
names as potential legal masks. Therefore, I turned towards the consequential work of legal
scholar Ian Haney Lopez (2006) for more insight into the potential link between law, legal
masks, racialized names, and differential legal treatment.
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In his comprehensive work, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (2006),
Haney-Lopez examined several historic United States’ Supreme Court cases that ruled on who
could be classified as a citizen of the United States. These “prerequisite cases” were essentially
based on the racial prerequisite of being deemed “white” by law to be considered a citizen of the
United States. Also, through his detailed examination of these cases, Haney-Lopez (2006)
showed that racial categories were created, defined, and regulated in and by law. Moreover, he
contended that as the law and legal actors propagate these racial categories, they become socially
and legally acceptable realities of society. Although his work also played a crucial role in how I
formulated my exploratory study, White by Law omitted the role that the law and legal actors had
in producing “negro” and “black” categories. Consequently, I focused my attention on the works
of Pimienta-Bey (1995; 2002) for guidance on the role of law in producing racialized names.
Nearly twenty-five years ago, Pimienta-Bey (1995) examined the racialized names
“negro,” “colored,” and “black” applying the disciplines of history, psychology, and African
American studies. In this study, he explored the historical development of these racialized
names and how they were used in law to affect the legal status of descendants of Africa in the
United States. Most importantly, his research helped (re)establish the historic link between
many descendants of Africa in the United States and their Moorish ancestry. While the works of
Pimienta-Bey (1995; 2002) were invaluable, particularly as they helped me develop my
understanding of how these racialized names were grounded within a socio-historical and legal
context, his works focused on solely historical legal cases. This dissertation is a more detailed
study looking at various legal texts over a longer period of time, in order to show how such
racialized color names have continued to be used in reinforcing hegemony by those identified as
“whites.”
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Despite post-Civil Rights efforts to secure equal justice under the law, scholars of race
and law overwhelmingly suggest that “blacks” encounter different treatment in criminal
processing (Miethe & Moore, 1986); in courtroom juror perceptions (Sommers & Ellsworth,
2000); in implicit criminal association (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004; Smith,
Levinson, & Robinson, 2015); in sentencing (ACLU, 2014); and in police charging decisions
(Sommers & Marotta, 2015). All this evidence culminates in what Alexander (2012) refers to as
“the new Jim Crow,” a thorough and veiled system of racialized social control operating within
the United States legal system. Therefore, considering all these points, it seemed to me that here
was a context in which my own initial findings on the role of law and legal discourse in
constructing and maintaining racial differences through time might be of some value.
Definition of Terms
The following terms were used throughout this work. The definitions were derived from
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) and Black’s Law Dictionary: Definitions
of the terms and phrases of American and English jurisprudence, ancient and modern ninth
edition (2009):
1. Afro-American: a noun; also called African American: black Americans of African
ancestry. The term Afro-American is not found in Black’s Law Dictionary.
2. Black: an adjective; opposite to white, of the color of coal or pitch; designating or of
any of the dark-skinned traditional inhabitants of sub-Saharan Africa, Australia, or Melanesia or
their descendants in other parts of the world. The racial term “black” is not found in Black’s
Law Dictionary.
3. Colored: an adjective; having color, of a specified color; of a group other than the
Caucasoid; specifically, black. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), the term, in such
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phrases as “colored persons”, “the colored race”, and “the colored men”, is used to designate
negroes or persons of the African race, including all persons of mixed blood descended from
negro ancestry.
4. Descendant: Those persons who are in the blood lineage of their ancestors.
5. Juristic person: According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), a nonhuman entity that is
created by law and is legally different owning its own rights and duties. This also relates to a
“non-person”, which Webster’s (2002) defined as someone whose personhood has been legally
expunged.
6. Legal personality: According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), the sum total of an
individual’s legal advantages and disadvantages. Defined as the lawful characteristics and
qualities of an entity.
7. Moor: a noun; a member of a Muslim people of mixed Arab and Berber descent living
in North West Africa. A member of a group of this people that invaded and occupied Spain in
the 8th century.
8. Natural person: According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), a human being, naturally
born, versus a legally generated juristic person.
9. Negro: a noun; a member of any of the indigenous, dark-skinned people of Africa,
living chiefly south of the Sahara, or a person having some African ancestors; a black.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), the word “negro” means a black man, one
descended from the African race, and does not commonly include a mulatto.
10. Race or Racial: any of the different varieties or populations of human beings
distinguished by physical traits such as hair, eyes, skin color, body shape, etc. Traditionally, the
three primary divisions are Caucasoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid.
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11. Slave: derives from the Old Slovene term Slav, which was first used for the captives
of Slavic origin. A human being who is owned as property by and is absolutely subject to the
will of another; bond servant divested of all freedom and personal rights. A person who is
completely dominated by some influence.
12. Status: Black’s Law Dictionary (2009) defines the status of a person as his or her
legal position or condition. The term is chiefly applied to persons under disability or persons
who have some peculiar condition which prevents the general law from applying to them in the
same way as it does to ordinary persons.
13. White: an adjective; having the color of pure snow or milk; opposite to black; of
controlled by, or restricted to Caucasoid; derives from notions of racial superiority.
14. White persons: as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), the term was first used
in the United States Naturalization Act of March 26, 1790; members of the Caucasian race as
distinct from the Negroid and Mongoloid races.
Therefore, I suggest that although the terms “Afro-American” and “African American”
are nouns and have significant historical and cultural relationship to the continent known as
Africa, they do not adequately specify a national designation that is legally recognized. But,
neither does “white.” Also, the racial names “black” and “colored” are simply adjectives.
“Black” and “colored” do not suggest a nationality, and therefore should not be applied to a
group of people. Further, the racial name “negro” is a derogatory label that was first used by the
Portuguese in the 15th century to characterize the physical appearance of Africans and to later
designate them as a “non-human” entity for the purposes of enslavement (Moore, 1960).
Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “descendants of Africa in the United States” as a
substitute for the racialized names and terms used for this group.
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Correspondingly, throughout this dissertation I use the term “descendants of Europe in
the United States” as a substitute for the racialized term “white,” which denotes racial
superiority. Notably, my linguistic choice for the terms “descendants of Africa in the United
States” and “descendants of Europe in the United States” is not meant to minimize or disparage
the experiences and viewpoints of those who rather self-identify as negro, colored, black, African
American, and white. Additionally, I understand that simply discussing these racialized names,
which are deeply entrenched in the social fabric of the United States, rather than deconstructing
their roots in slavery may be potentially contentious. However, individuals and organizations
committed to eliminating racial inequities and dismantling the system of racism in the United
States, should remain receptive to fully understanding the social, historical, and legal roots of the
racialized terms “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white.” Therefore, I hope this work offers an
honest, scholarly dialogue on the use of outdated, inaccurate, and divisive racialized names based
on racial differences that continue to breed worldwide discord, hatred, and violence.
Overview of the Study
The aims of this exploratory study were: (1) to explore the role of law and legal discourse
in creating and sustaining racial differences through 1705-1857 and 1986-2017; (2) to compare
historic and contemporary use of racialized names in legal discourse; (3) to explore whether and
in what way racial differences influenced legal treatment; and (4) to explore counter-hegemonic
narratives in historic and contemporary legal texts as tools for dismantling vestiges of slavery.
This exploratory study was founded on several premises that I derived from the literature
review and theoretical foundations. First, I suspected that the use of the racialized names
“negro,” “colored,” and “black” represented vestiges of slavery that were socially and legally
constructed to create an enduring inferior image of descendants of Africa in the United States
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and the use of the racialized name “white” as an enduring superior image of descendants of
Europe in the United States. Second, I considered that the use of the racialized names “negro,”
“colored,” “black,” and “white” resembled what Noonan (1976) described as a legal mask that
suppresses the humanity of many descendants of Africa and Europe in the United States. Last, I
also believed that these legal masks may have circumscribed the identity of, and perhaps
constructed the lens through which, many descendants of Africa in the United States are viewed
and treated in law today. Therefore, informed by previous literature review and the gaps that
overlooked the role of law and legal discourse in creating and sustaining racial differences,
specifically using racialized names, and the theoretical foundations used in this work, I
formulated two research questions: 1) What legal discourse did legal actors use between 17051857 to create racial differences in the United States and what similarities and differences exist
in modern times? 2) What are the counter-hegemonic narratives that sought to disrupt the racial
hegemony and racial differences in the historic and modern legal texts?
In my work, I relied upon two theoretical frameworks, Critical Race Theory (CRT) and
Post-Colonialist Theory, to shed light on this complex phenomenon that intersects racism,
slavery, racial names, human rights, and law. While CRT substantiates the prominent role that
the law commands in perpetuating the entrenched and unfair racial system in the United States
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2012), Post Colonialist Theory offers a distinct perspective that views
remnants of slavery as post-colonialist efforts to maintain historically colonized people in the
United States oppressed within an internal colony (Allen, 1990; 2005). More precisely, Post
Colonialist Theory critically examines and deconstructs how several structural institutions in
society, such as the legal, penal, and educational systems, today act as instruments for
perpetuating oppression and domination (Allen, 2005).
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To gain insight into some of the ideological meanings behind racial differences and to
explore the ways in which these differences were and are perpetuated in law, I utilized a Critical
Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach as I analyzed historic and contemporary legal texts for this
study. CDA allowed me to focus in on ways in which power and hegemony are discursively
produced and practiced (Fairclough, 2010; van Dijk, 2004). The application of the CDA
techniques helped me identify textual silences (Huckin, 2002) and omitted facts from discourse
and texts. Informed by CDA, I also used intertextual analysis (1992) to explore the ways in
which prior discourses are reproduced textually. In sum, both CRT and Post-Colonialist theory
offer a theoretic lens through which to understand and disrupt hegemonic societal structures
through counter-hegemonic narratives (Solorzano, 1998).
To reiterate, I discovered in the historic legal texts that legal actors often used hostile,
“white supremacist” hegemonic legal discourse to create and maintain racial differences.
Although the legal discourse today is much less overt and more nuanced, I found that many
contemporary legal actors use their platform to disrupt racial hegemony as they attempt to
remedy the mistakes of the past. Interestingly, I uncovered that while the racialized names for
many descendants of Africa in the United States fluctuated between 1705-1857 and 1986-2017,
the racialized name “white” remained the fixed racial designation for all descendants of Europe
in the United States over this same time. Pimienta-Bey (1995) states “English history reveals
that ‘white’ was customarily used by royalists (the aristocratic caste/class) to symbolize
themselves,” and “was understood to designate purity as well as God-given authority” (p. 263).
This study also suggests that “white” was deliberately used analogously for those with European
features, as a clever psychological means of reinforcing legal and cultural superiority over those
who were classified as “negroes” and “blacks.” Based on the findings of this exploratory study
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and critical social work perspective (MacKinnon, 2009), I propose that descendants of Africa
and Europe in the United States should critically examine and explore the continuing need to
apply these racialized names that reinforce the hegemonic status-quo that holds one race superior
and another inferior.
Outline of Dissertation
I organized the dissertation as follows: Chapter I offers a background on the construction
of racial differences in history and its constitution-in-reality. I present how legal actors
constructed through law, and intentionally stripped many descendants of Africa in the United
States of their nationality and imposed the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black.” I
discuss the institution of slavery, the nature of “white supremacy,” and the legacy of slavery and
permanency of white supremacy. Subsequently, I discuss the relevance and implications of this
work for social work.
Chapter II presents Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Post-Colonialist Theory as the
theoretical frameworks that I utilized to help develop research questions, analyze data, and
understand the role of law and legal discourse in constructing, perpetuating, and disrupting
vestiges of slavery.
Chapter III introduces the literature review that informs this dissertation. In this chapter,
I introduce the cultural role of names, the studies of racial names and perceptions, and racial bias
within a criminal justice context. I also present the key works that spurred this dissertation and
explain how the literature overlooked the role of law and legal actors, specifically using
racialized names to create, maintain, and contest differential legal treatment.
In chapter IV, I describe the research design, methodological procedures, and research
questions that guided this exploratory study. I discuss my application of Critical Discourse
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Analysis (CDA) for the purposes of this work. Additionally, I share my positionality as the
researcher and explain ethical considerations taken to ensure that this study complies with ethical
procedures. Lastly, I describe my sampling procedures, data collection, and data analysis
process.
Chapter V presents my findings of the historic and contemporary legal texts. I share
intertextual narratives summarizing the similarities and differences that were found in the
analyzed texts and explain how they connect with my research questions and objectives. I also
present what words or terms and facts were omitted from the legal texts that pointed to how
racial differences were and are maintained. Additionally, I share some of the counter-hegemonic
narratives that emerged from the historic and contemporary legal texts. More precisely, I
discovered that historic legal actors used many racial descriptors to differentiate the slave from
the slave-holder to maintain clear boundaries of power and privilege. Also, while some
contemporary legal actors relied on prior rulings that used racialized names and racial
descriptors, I uncovered that the legal discourse today is much less overt and more nuanced.
Lastly, I found that many contemporary legal actors used their platform to disrupt racial
hegemony as they attempted to remedy our racist past and present.
Finally, in Chapter VI, I discuss what I discovered in the historic and contemporary legal
texts as they relate to the use of racialized names and the construction and perpetuation of race,
racial differences, and hegemony in legal discourse. I present the limitations of my research, its
implications to social work research, education, leadership, and action. I also make
recommendations for future social work research, education, and leadership. Lastly, I share my
contributions to the literature, such as how utilizing CRT with CDA may amplify how social
workers study and respond to the institutional injustices of racism. Additionally, how
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implementing a Post-Colonialist theory, as put forward by Allen (1990; 2005), may augment
how social workers examine the modern, more nuanced forms of racism today in the United
States.
In conclusion, there is no question that our country has made some positive changes,
specifically in terms of racial differences and legal discourse, however no one can diminish or
minimize the deleterious psychological impact these racial differences have had on many
descendants of Africa in the United States. In fact, recently even the executive branch of this
government used vulgar and belligerent discourse aimed directly at vulnerable groups.
Therefore, social workers can no longer remain silent as discourses of discrimination,
marginalization, division, hate, and racism resurface. For these reasons, I embarked on this
exploratory study to create a space for future dialogue as we seek to eliminate and dismantle the
vestiges of slavery known as the racialized names “negro,” “black,” and “white.”
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Chapter I. Background
In this chapter, I introduce how racial differences were created in history and its
constitution-in-reality, which set the stage for how dominant groups manipulate ideology and
discourse to maintain their position of power and control over marginalized groups.
Construction of Racial Difference in History and Its Constitution in Reality
While race is a relatively new construct (Golash-Borza, 2016; Smedley & Smedley,
2005; Winant, 2000), the establishment of a society based on human differences did not exist in
history until the founders of the American Republic created the distinctive races white, black,
and free others (U. S. Census, 1790). Historically, people were often distinguished by their
religion, language, and ethnic group (Smedley & Smedley, 2005). However, during the age of
exploration and colonialism, physical features, particularly skin pigmentation, were used as a
tool to separate and divide people into a caste system (Morning, 2011; Smedley & Smedley,
2005). Scholars of history agree that the only way the American founding fathers could morally
justify the enslavement of another group of human beings, while declaring “all men free and
equal” (Declaration of Independence, 1776), was to strip descendants of Africa in the United
States of their names and heritage. This systematic process that violently punished descendants
of Africa in the United States for speaking their native languages, using their birth-names, and
barring them from practicing their religion, also sanctioned a racial hierarchy with “whites”
(descendants of Europe in the United States) in control. This systematic process also classified
“blacks” (descendants of Africa in the United States) as non-human, and the object of complete
control, was also codified within United States legal discourse. As a result, one of the
underlying principles sustaining pervasive inequality in the United States today is a racist
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ideology known as “white supremacy,” which views “whites” as superior and “blacks” as
inherently inferior (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993).
Although the genesis of colonial exploitation and its accompanying European worldview
of superiority began during the Enlightenment (Ife, 2012), racial ideology has its roots in early
colonial America (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Higginbotham, 1978; 1996). To secure the
economic enterprise of slavery and keep intact the privileged status of the wealthy, Jefferson’s
Notes on the State of Virginia (Jefferson, 1785) introduced the social construct known as “white
supremacy.” Essentially, Jefferson (1785) wrote, “blacks are inferior to the whites in the
endowments both of body and mind.” Accordingly, since Jefferson’s racist thesis, some scholars
within the science (Rushton, 1995) and academic community (Herrnstein & Murray, 1996; Rowe
& Cleveland, 1996) have labored to validate “white supremacy” in modern times. Today, this
racist ideology continues to have destructive effects, particularly on the lives of many
descendants of Africa in the United States (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress Welsing, 1989;
Wilson, 1990; 1993).
Yet, this oppressive concept known as race, which separates human beings into
hierarchical categories based on the socially constructed notion that biological and physiological
differences exist (Golash-Borza, 2016; Richeson & Sommers, 2016; Smedley & Smedley, 2005),
has precise implications. Racism is a structural system based on the subordination of one or
more groups by another who holds a superior position, usually by threat of violence and/or
physical force (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Wilson, 1993). Accordingly, descendants of Europe in the
United States self-described as “whites” (Allen, 1994; Ignatiev, 2003) seized the position of
authority and power, while many descendants of Africa in the United States called “negro,”
“colored,” and “black” were systematically forced into a position of inferiority. In short, the use
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of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” which served to perpetuate the racial
hierarchy of “whites” at the top, was supported by a complex network of ideologies, institutions,
and policies, all designed to maintain many descendants of Africa in the United States socially
dead in-law (Brown, 2009; Cacho, 2012; Dayan, 2011; Patterson, 1985). More precisely,
Patterson (1985) referred to how the law ascribed a legal identity or status to the enslaved
descendants of Africa in the United States that acknowledged, to a certain degree, their physical
body, but as one that was dispossessed of all civil rights. Patterson (1985) names this condition
“social death,” which fundamentally deprived many descendants of Africa in the United States of
their human and civil rights.
One salient element of social death is its psychological effect. Specifically, many
descendants of Africa in the United States were physically forced to relinquish their identities
and accept the names denoting their inferior status within the government. From a historical
standpoint, this violent process that stripped many descendants of Africa in the United States of
their names and nationality created a condition of social and cultural isolation (Brown, 2009;
Patterson, 1985). This condition known as natal alienation (Patterson, 1985) and social
exclusion (Brown, 2009) prohibited many descendants of Africa in the United States access to
their social and cultural memories, which is equivalent to denied nationality. According to
Brown and Brown (2010), “cultural memories refer to the discourses, texts, and artifacts that
shape how we conceptualize and imagine a social context or a group’s experience” (p. 142).
Therefore, this systematic, complex process to create a socially dead person in law relied not
only on physically punishing and killing many descendants of Africa in the United States who
attempted to access and utilize their social and cultural memories. This systematic, complex
process also implemented and enforced an ideology based on “white supremacy” (Bonilla-Silva,
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1997; 2014; Cress Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993), with a comprehensive legal structure
that maintained, and ensured the perpetual subordinate status of many descendants of Africa in
the United States.
Institution of Slavery
Numerous scholars have asserted that the vestiges of slavery continue to afflict our
society today (Alexander, 2010; Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011; De Gruy, 2005; Fosten, 2016;
Lake, 1997; Noble, 2013; Wacquant, 2002). In fact, as recent as 2008, members of the United
States Congress recognized slavery’s long-term impact on United States Americans when
Representative Steve Cohen, a Democratic from Tennessee put forward House Resolution (H.R.)
194 as a step towards reconciliation and healing of the nation as a whole (U.S. House of
Representatives, 2008). Although H.R. 194 was constructed as an official apology for the United
States government’s participation in and support for the institution of slavery and did not receive
sufficient legislative support, it asserted the distinct characteristics of slavery in the United
States, one that seized Africans, sold them at auctions “like beast or goods,” and robbed them of
their humanity. Specifically, H.R. 194 (2008) affirmed that the insidious institution of slavery
intentionally stripped many enslaved descendants of Africa in the United States of their names
and heritage. Since the antebellum period in North American history marks the point in which
descendants of Africa in United States were essentially stripped of their nationality and forced to
use the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” it merits further review.
Essential to the development of the early union was the preservation of the single most
important economic institution in America: slavery (Patterson, 1985). However, faced with a
political dilemma, the founding fathers, many of whom were attorneys (Haney-Lopez, 2006),
developed artful ways to incorporate within the fabric of the United States the complete and total
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denial of citizenship to many descendants of Africa in the United States (Alexander, 2010;
Dayan, 2011; Higginbotham, 1996). The drafters of the United States Constitution (1787), while
claiming “all men free and equal,” carefully avoided political hypocrisy when they excluded
from the legal discourse the words “slave,” “negro,” and “black.” Instead, to preserve this
hierarchical system of race (Alexander, 2010) the drafters framed the “three-fifths clause” within
the Constitution. To illustrate, the United States Constitution (1787), Article I, Section 2 states:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according
to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to
the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service
for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of
all other persons.
Notably, the drafters of the Constitution were deliberately cryptic when they developed this
ambiguous legal term “other person.” In fact, this “anomaly of law” (Dayan, 2011, p. 135) was
never seen before in history. Patterson (1985) described this anomaly as a legal identity or status
that acknowledged, to a certain degree, the physical body of enslaved descendants of Africa in
the United States, but as one that was dispossessed of all civil rights.
To clarify, because of chattel slavery, many descendants of Africa in the United States
were not only considered a commodity, something that can be bought, sold, and discarded like a
piece of property, they were also now legally classified as an “other person.” In other words,
many descendants of Africa in the United States were transformed in law into a non-human
entity or a juristic person (Black, 2009) and categorized and registered in law as “negro,”
“colored,” and “black.” This process further marginalized many descendants of Africa in the
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United States to a position of civiliter mortuus, meaning dead in law (Dayan, 2011). Because of
this legally imposed inferior status, many descendants of Africa in the United States were not
only denied basic civil and human rights, they were designated to a permanent, non-human
classification (Pimienta-Bey, 1992; 1995; 2002). Therefore, this systematic, complex process to
create a socially dead person relied not only on violence, such as whipping, burning, raping, and
murdering the enslaved African, but a legal structure that maintained and ensured the inferior
legal status of descendants of Africa in the United States.
Several legal scholars and researchers determined that slavery could not exist without the
United States legal system that preserved, codified, and enacted laws to sustain and maintain
“white” hegemony at the expense of “black” inferiority (Armstrong, 2012; Coates, 2003; HaneyLopez, 2006; Higginbotham, 1996; Middleton, 2007; Noonan, 1976; Patterson, 1985; Sharfstein,
2003; Williams, 2005). Further, research shows that slavery spawned an entire system of
institutions, such as the legal and educational system, that advanced euro-centric supremacy,
contributing to the permanent inferiority of many descendants of Africa in United States
(Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Brown, 2009; Alexander, 2010). At the root of this bifurcated legal
structure (Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011) was a phenotypical hierarchy (Pimienta-Bey, 2002)
with “whites” at the top and “blacks” at the bottom. This “precept of inferiority”
(Higginbotham, 1996, p. 10) was inscribed in the legal discourse of the Notes on the Debates of
the Articles of Confederation (1777). In this document, John Adams, this country’s first vicepresident and second President of the United States, affirmed that the word “white” should be
inserted in the Notes and “that negroes are wealth and negroes are a species of property, personal
estate” (Adams, 1776, page unspecified). As a result, this racist declaration was supported by
the emerging science on race as a bio-genetic construct (Golash-Borza, 2016; Morning, 2011;
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Sharfstein, 2003) and given legitimacy in Supreme Court Chief Justice Taney’s legal opinion in
Scott v Sandford (1857) as an undisputed fact. Hence, racial differences appear to have been
legally specified and cleverly encoded within this nation’s social and political reality.
To justify converting natural persons (Black, 2009) into slaves, the law devised a “legal
mask” (Noonan, 1976) in the form of the legal term “other persons” in the United States
Constitution. This precise legal term was further characterized in the racial names “negro,”
“colored,” and “black,” which concealed the nationality of many descendants of Africa in the
United States. This legal action was further illustrated when the future sixth President of the
United States John Quincy Adams debating in front of the United States Supreme Court as the
attorney for one of the plaintiffs in the Amistad case asserted America’s cryptic role in slavery,
when he stated: “The words slave and slavery are studiously excluded from the Constitution...
circumlocutions are the fig-leaves under which these parts of the body politic are decently
concealed” (Adams, 1841, page unspecified). In other words, the framers of the United States
Constitution, denied and suppressed from this nation’s paramount legal document its original sin:
slavery.
Many founding fathers engaged in what may be considered legal duplicity (Haney-Lopez,
(2006) by omitting the words “slave” and “slavery” from the United States Constitution and
creating a new legal term known as “other person” to describe slaves. Therefore, it may not be
considered a stretch to infer that the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” were
deliberately imposed on many descendants of Africa in the United States to disguise their
humanity and national identity. Moreover, I suggest that these forced “legal masks” (Noonan,
1976), specified in the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” appear to be
more complex than the physical nature of slavery. Therefore, I believe critically exploring the

31

CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY
role of law and legal discourse in constructing racial differences through time and how it may
have constructed the lens through which many descendants of Africa in the United States are
viewed and treated today in law, represents a social justice and human rights issue.
Indeed, the act of deliberately suppressing by physical force and concealing the identity
of many descendants of Africa in the United States by way of the legal system was an integral
tool of domination and control (Osagie & Owiny, 2015). In fact, research by Lake (1997) and
Pimienta-Bey (1992; 1995; 2002) established that the imposed racialized names “negro,”
“colored,” and “black” did not correspond to any historically grounded nomenclature. That is to
say, no pre-African enslavement era, or that such terms correspond to no historical “nation”
which defines itself as such. These racialized names implied something bestial, savage, and
inherently subservient (Moore, 1960). Moreover, this process of destroying identity and
obliterating memories is what wa Thiong’o (1986) aptly cited as nothing more than dropping a
“cultural bomb” (p. 15) on a people. These references may seem controversial to some within
the social work profession, but the unprecedented annihilation of a people’s history and legacy,
which left many descendants of Africa in the United States with, what De Gruy (2005) called, a
“vacant esteem” (p. 125), should spark outrage and encourage a call to action.
To clarify, De Gruy (2005) described this “vacant esteem” as the absence of a basic sense
of self, one that breeds negative self-perceptions, self-hatred, and what Wilson (1990) explained
as a possible contributing factor for some of the self-destructive behaviors exhibited by many
descendants of Africa in the United States in the service of “white” domination. As a result, the
systematic socio-cultural destruction of many descendants of Africa in the United States by
forcibly imposing the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” as an
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instrument of control (Baird, 1970) allowed descendants of Europe in the United States to benefit
from this new-found sense of racial superiority and privilege as “white persons” (Black, 2009).
The Nature of “White Supremacy”
Research shows that the use of the racialized term “white” is also a relatively new racial
designation (Allen, 1994; Ignatiev, 2003; Jordan, 2012; Skogan, 1995). Notably, Allen (1994)
and Jordan (2012) indicated that the use of the racial term “white” first appeared around 1680,
shortly following Bacon’s rebellion in colonial Virginia. According to most accounts, Bacon’s
rebellion was a remarkable moment in colonial North American history (Allen, 1994; Jordan,
2012). For the first time, and probably the last time in North American history, poor farmers,
laborers, and indentured descendants of Europe in the United States joined forces with some
enslaved descendants of Africa in the United States to challenge the authority of Governor
Berkeley (Allen, 1994; Jordan, 2012). Frightened by this event, the wealthy, ruling class decided
that amalgamating all the various descendants of Europe in the United States under the racial
banner of “white” was in their economic and political self-interest (Allen, 1994; Jordan, 2012).
Because of this centralization of power, descendants of Europe in the United States from all
pedigrees and social ranks institutionalized “whiteness” by designating a socio-political
hierarchy with “whites” in control, and “negroes” and “blacks” as the subjects of control.
The consolidation of descendants of Europe in the United States as “whites” or “white
persons” was clearly not based on skin pigmentation, because as both Allen (1994) and Jordan
(2012) noted, many European groups, like Spaniards, Italians, and French, had swarthy
complexion because of their Moorish blood. To be sure, the deliberate formation of this new
racialized category called “white persons” or “whites” was and remains a socio-political,
economic enterprise of domination and colonization (Cress Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993).
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This new social order required a systematic, hegemonic ideology that maintained and preserved
“white” superiority at the expense of “black” inferiority. This ideology that developed during
the late seventeenth century is known as “white supremacy” (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress
Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993). Furthermore, I suggest that a comprehensive legal
structure that sustained and gave legitimacy to “white supremacy” at the expense of “black”
inferiority also requires further examination.
The Legal Construction of the Slave
Unlike other forms of slavery in history, such as those found in ancient Greece and Rome
(Patterson, 1985), the brand of slavery in the United States represented an intricate, dynamic
process sanctioned by and reinforced in law. As noted earlier, many of the founding fathers,
who were lawyers, like Thomas Jefferson (Forbes, 2012), constructed within the United States
Constitution (1787) the ambiguous term “other person”1. To reiterate, Patterson (1985)
described the enslaved African’s legal identity as analogous to essentially being dead in law
(Dayan, 2011). A necessary response to the “Law of Nations” foundation for most “Western”
European countries (Vattel, 2008). Because of this socially imposed and legally enforced
inferior status, many descendants of Africa in the United States were not only denied basic civil
rights, they were denied their humanity. In other words, when descendants of Africa in the
United States were forced into chattel slavery, stripped of their names and heritage, and
classified as “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” they unknowingly assumed a legal personality
(Black, 2009) that relegated them to an inferior legal status. I suspect this legal position or
condition that dehumanizes many descendants of Africa in the United States may be connected
to the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black.” Therefore, I suggest that the

1

Refer to the Definition of Terms-page 16 for additional information.
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use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” represent vestiges of slavery that
were socially and legally constructed to create an enduring inferior image of many descendants
of Africa in the United States and can even be seen to justify their mistreatment under the law.
The Legacy of Slavery and Permanency of White Supremacy
To eternalize “white supremacy” as a hegemonic ideological philosophy, descendants of
Europe in the United States required the initiation of four crucial actions. Higginbotham (1998)
outlined these actions as:
First, convince the white colonists, regardless of their social or economic
status, that they are superior to the black colonists. Second, convince
blacks that they are inferior to all others. Third, enforce the inferiority of
blacks and the superiority of whites in the most open and public manner.
Fourth, explain the inferiority of blacks and the superiority of whites by
reference to Christianity (p. 25-26).
For the sake of this exploratory study and this section, I will discuss how some of these crucial
actions, may have influenced the lens through which many descendants of Africa in the United
States are viewed and treated today in law. First, to convince the “white” colonists of their
“superiority” over “blacks,” the ruling elite created a distorted account of history that
strategically placed “whites” at the center of civilization (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995; Nobles,
2013; Wilson, 1993; Woodson, 1933). As a result, this type of “education,” which situates
“whites” at the center of everything significant in the world, not only seems to instill a false
sense of inferiority within the consciousness of many descendants of Africa in the United States
(Nobles, 2013; Wilson, 1993; Woodson, 1933), it breeds a pathological (Wilson, 1993)
consciousness in “whites” (Allen, 1994) and masks their humanity (Noonan, 1976). Naturally,
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once this ideology is embedded in society, it becomes the dominant social and political reality
for its citizens.
Interestingly, in the Papers of Benjamin Franklin (1751), Mr. Franklin noted that “the
number of purely white people in the world is proportionately very small…I could wish their
numbers were increased” (p. 234). He expressed his growing concern over the “eventual,
worldwide encroachment of dark-skinned people.” In like manner, Long in his Candid
Reflections (1772) articulated his fear of miscegenation as followed:
The lower class of women in England are remarkably fond of the
blacks;… by these ladies they generally have a numerous brood.
Thus, in the course of a few generations more the English blood
will become…contaminated with this mixture…this alloy may
spread so extensively as even to reach the middle, and then the
higher orders of the people, till the whole nation resembles the
Portuguese and the Moriscos in complexion of skin and baseness
of mind. This is a venomous and dangerous ulcer that threatens
to spread its malignancy far and wide, until every family catches
infection from it (p. 82).
When taken together, the fears expressed by Franklin (1751) and Long (1772), correspond to the
theory on “white supremacy” offered by the late Dr. Francis Cress Welsing (1989). As a trained
psychiatrist, Dr. Cress Welsing focused on what could motivate a group of people, in this case
“whites” to establish themselves as the “superior” race. According to Dr. Cress Welsing (1989),
“whites” understood that “color always annihilates-phenotypically and genetically speaking-the
non-color white” (p. 35). Indeed, when Dr. Cress Welsing first offered her Theory of Color-
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Confrontation and Racism (1989) to the social science community, it was viewed as flawed and
even considered ‘reverse racism’ (Finn, 2014). However, her theory seems vindicated when the
statements by Franklin (1751) and Long (1772) are combined, because they substantiated the
concern “whites” shared over their numerical inadequacy and color inferiority. It seems like
these underlying fears and concerns may contribute to how many “whites” may consciously and
unconsciously perceive “blacks” as their enemy. Moreover, as the presumed fear of “whites”
losing their privileged position of power to “blacks” grew, an oppositional and often violent
relationship ensued between “blacks” and “whites.
Although the Thirteenth Amendment formally abolished the institution of slavery in
1865, the entrenched institution of racism morphed into a ubiquitous system. Shortly after the
United States Congress ratified the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, commonly known as the
Reconstruction Amendments, former slave states passed many laws that further subordinated
many descendants of Africa in United States. These discriminatory laws were known as the
‘Black Codes’ (Alexander, 2010; Armstrong, 2012; Chambers, 2013; Higginbotham, 1996).
Notably, these oppressive codes instituted a sub-set of equally severe laws such as the convict
laws and vagrancy laws, which essentially authorized any “white person” the legal right and duty
to apprehend any descendant of Africa in United States perceived to be violating the law (Allen,
1994). Indeed, the unrestricted power that “white persons” wielded over many descendants of
Africa in the United States during Reconstruction bears some striking similarity to the recent
tragic death of Trayvon Martin by a “white” citizen patrolling a neighborhood (Keyes, Smyke,
Middleton, & Black, 2015). Although the Court noted that Trayvon was not committing any
crime at the time of his death, the shooter simply “believed” his life was at risk and killed the
unarmed youth (Keyes et al., 2015). Unfortunately, too many young, unarmed descendants of
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Africa in United States are killed because they are perceived to be a threat to many descendants
of Europe in United States (Graham & Lowery, 2004). For this reason, I sought to examine how
the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” were used in the historic and
contemporary legal texts.
Shortly following the ‘Black Codes’, despite opposition from President Andrew Johnson,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The expressed purpose of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 was federal protection and guaranteed minimum due process to former slaves.
Furthermore, this Act of 1866 granted “full benefits of all the laws…to any persons …as are
enjoyed by white citizens” (Civil Rights Act of 1866). This provision represents another
example, in which lawmakers made a clear and specific distinction between “any persons” and
“white” citizens. The question remains, what type of benefits were “any persons” entitled to
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866? Were these benefits under the law the same as those
“enjoyed by white citizens?” Why did the writers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 exclude the
term “former slaves”? Accordingly, I believe that one of the residual effects of slavery,
specifically the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” as legal
masks, may represent an overlooked phenomenon that requires further analysis.
Therefore, despite the efforts of Congress to establish some appearance of fair treatment,
many descendants of Africa in the United States encountered countless acts of violence. For
instance, Williams (2005) noted that over thirty thousand documented accounts of lynching
occurred in the South alone. Unfortunately, for 100 years under Jim Crow, many descendants of
Africa in the United States endured unprecedented violence. For many descendants of Europe in
the United States, the notion that descendants of Africa in United States could be transformed
from former objects of property to citizens by the stroke of a pen was too much to fathom.
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Additionally, the research shows that many descendants of Europe in the United States,
especially in the Southern states, publicly denounced and condemned granting civil rights to
descendants of Africa in the United States (Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011; Fosten, 2016).
Consumed by this pathological fear of losing their position of power (Wilson, 1990), many
descendants of Europe in the United States resorted to violent acts of terror such as lynching,
cross-burnings, and unprovoked murders to bar many descendants of Africa in United States
from gaining equal access under the law (Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011).
Consequently, from 1865-1965, Jim Crow legislation not only further disenfranchised
many descendants of Africa in United States (Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011), it granted to many
descendants of Europe in the United States the moral right to commit individual and collective
acts of indiscriminate violence on many descendants of Africa in the United States (Wacquant,
2002; Williams, 2005). With impunity, many descendants of Europe in the United States
resorted to a reign of terror (Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011; Fosten, 2016) because they believed
it was their intrinsic right and duty to maintain this “inferior group of beings” (Scott v Sandford,
1857) completely subdued and controlled. Sadly, many of those responsible for many of the
violent acts committed against many descendants of Africa in the United States by “whites” were
not prosecuted under the law (Alexander, 2010; Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011).
Like no other point in history, the Civil Rights era marked a monumental time, in which
descendants of Africa in the United States garnered international attention and widespread
support (Clarke, 1994) to create enough pressure to force President Johnson to sign the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Despite the country’s general support for civil rights in the 1960s, a large
portion of the “white” population still vehemently opposed it. During the 1920’s, Drew Ali
spoke of the “granted privilege” which had been bestowed upon the freed descendants of Africa
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in the United States following the Civil War (Drew Ali, 1928). Feeling betrayed by their
government, this discontented group, commonly called the ‘silent majority’ (Mayer, 2002),
turned to politicians who were willing to give voice to their concerns and fears. While several
outright racist politicians like Alabama Governor Wallace were considered outliers, a new breed
of cunning politicians emerged. Starting in 1971 with President Nixon, his War on Drugs
declaration exploited racial fears and tensions through racially coded language and policies
(Haney-Lopez, 2014; Mayer, 2002). During an interview in 1994, President Nixon’s domestic
policy chief John Ehrlichman disclosed:
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that,
had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand
what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either
against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the
hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing
both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest
their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them
night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about
the drugs? Of course we did (as cited in Baum, 2016, p. 3).
Unfortunately, these veiled, racist policies primarily targeting many descendants of
Africa in the United States continued through Republican and Democratic administrations.
Notably, during a 1980 campaign speech in Mississippi, then presidential-candidate Ronald
Reagan stated: “I still believe the answer to any problem lies with the people…I believe we have
distorted the balance of our government today by giving powers that were never intended to be
given in the Constitution to that federal establishment” (Reagan, 1980). As Mendelberg (2001)
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noted, Reagan’s speech at the Neshoba County Fair in Philadelphia, Mississippi, where only
sixteen years earlier Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner, three civil rights workers were
murdered for promoting voting rights, was clearly an appeal to the racial sentiments of many
“whites” who took exception to the Civil Rights Act. Reagan’s attempt to galvanize “white”
southern voters, while carefully exploiting racial fears and emotions about losing power to
“blacks,” is known as the “Southern Strategy” (Mendelberg, 2001). Conversely, politicians
promoting economic policies designed to reduce poverty, such as public assistance and Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), were often perceived by many “whites” as providing
handouts to undeserving, lazy “blacks” and many of these policies were used as a tool to
disparage and categorize abusers of the system as criminals (Haney-Lopez, 2014).
In the mid-1980’s during the Reagan Administration’s War on Drugs, the Zero Tolerance
Policy was defined as a practice of punishing relatively minor drug possession incidents harshly
(Skiba, 2000). This value-based policy attempted to curb the ravaging effects that the crackcocaine epidemic created in the inner cities of the United States, which eventually seeped into
suburban society. One of the major effects of this epidemic was the rise in violent crimes,
policies of mandatory sentencing, and incarceration to control primarily urban communities.
Moreover, the tidal wave of violent crimes eventually crept into the school system, forcing many
politicians and the public at-large to urge for a “get tough” policy to address the crime problem
(Astor, 1995). Therefore, in the late 1980’s, during a rise in juvenile violent crimes and gangs,
the tragic and deadly Columbine shooting, and other violent school incidents, the Gun Free
Schools Act of 1994 was signed into law (Skiba, 2000).
Today, many descendants of Africa in the United States encounter unrelenting stop-andfrisk, random searches, racial profiling, and police brutality at a disproportionate rate than any
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other group (APA, 2014). This has transformed the current criminal justice system into an
upgraded model of Jim Crow (Alexander, 2010). As a result, far too many descendants of Africa
in the United States are unemployed, legally prohibited from voting, unable to access public
benefits, and barred from jury duty (NAACP, 2017). Accordingly, crucial to this study is the
exploration of the legal discourse and the deconstruction of the oppressive ideology known as
“white supremacy” (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993), that
is deeply entrenched in the United States and which deserves serious attention.
Relevance to Social Work and Education
There is no question that structural racism permeates every aspect of society. As a social
worker, I acknowledge that the responsibility of the social work profession is to promote and
advocate for the well-being of our clients, this includes social problems like structural racism
(NASW, 2008). As my literature review will demonstrate, structural racism is a complex issue,
grounded within a socio-historic context. Therefore, it is incumbent that social workers
interested in contesting oppression as they advance social justice, understand that along with the
legal system, the United States’ educational system represents another complex network of
institutions that advances the ideology of “white supremacy” (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress
Welsing, 1989; Glocke, 2016; Traore; 2004; Wilson, 1990; 1993). Almost eighty-five years ago,
Woodson (1933) signaled out the school’s role in conserving racial inequity when he noted:
The same educational process which inspires and stimulates the
oppressor with the thought that he is everything and accomplished
everything worthwhile, depresses and crushes at the same time the
spark of genius in the Negro by making him feel that his race does
not amount to much and never will measure up to the standards of
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other peoples (p. xiii).
At the core of the American educational system is a subtle philosophy rooted in
maintaining and perpetuating discursive practices of euro-centric dominance (Carruthers, 1999;
Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995; Woodson, 1933). One significant example of how the American
educational system preserves its euro-centric ideology is through textbooks (Brown & Brown,
2010; Glocke, 2016). For instance, most school textbooks used in the United States’ educational
system willfully embrace slave history, but intentionally exclude the legacy of contributions to
civilization by descendants of Africa (Chapman-Hilliard & Adams-Bass, 2016; Ladson-Billings
& Tate, 1995; Woodson, 1933) and reinforce racial stereotypes (Sever & Grillo, 2015). To
illustrate, research by Chapman-Hilliard and Adams-Bass (2016) and El-Amin, Seider, Graves,
Tamerat, Clark, Soutter, Johannsen, and Malhotra (2017) suggested that when the United States
educational system obfuscates the glorious civilizations of Egypt (Clarke, 1994) and conceals the
contributions of the Moorish empire (Pimienta-Bey, 1992), it often fosters a sense of
psychological and educational disconnect among many students who are descendants of Africa
in the United States and reinforces “white supremacy” among many descendants of Europe in the
United States. Additionally, many school textbooks also use the racialized names “negro,”
“colored,” “black,” and “white,” thereby perpetuating these remnants of slavery and reproducing
the inferior racial lens through which many descendants of Africa in the United States are seen.
As a result, this system of “miseducation” (Woodson, 1933) appears to propagate through text
and talk a false-sense of exceptionalism in many descendants of Europe in the United States,
while sustaining an equally inaccurate sense of inferiority in many descendants of Africa in the
United States.
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Moreover, this distorted account of history “conceptually incarcerates” (Nobles, 2013, p.
232) many descendants of Europe in the United States to the extent that they refuse to accept
ideas and concepts that challenge and threaten their position of privilege in history. This can be
further illustrated when Congressman from Iowa, Steve King proclaimed that Western
civilization had made the most contributions to human civilization as a whole (Bond, 2016).
In contrast, this historical fallacy and dominant ethnocentric public discourse appears to
instill a “fractured identity” (Nobles, 2013, p. 232) in the psyche of many descendants of Africa
and Europe in United States. The psychological damage inflicted on the minds of many
descendants of Africa in United States students often produces in them low self-esteem
(Chapman-Hilliard & Adams-Bass, 2016), which all too often leads to student-teacher conflict
and increased school discipline (Warren, 2014). Hence, I believe that this vicious cycle of racial
differences is perpetuated by the United States’ educational system that is advanced by many
“conceptually incarcerated” (Nobles, 2013, p. 232) “white” and even “black” social scientists,
who unwittingly promote a one-sided perspective and construction of history (Akbar, 1984).
This one-sided perspective that often is accepted as social reality and left unchallenged becomes
what Freire (1970) coined a “culture of silence.” Therefore, as an aspiring educator, I take it as a
goal of this exploratory study to disrupt and hopefully uproot this ‘culture of silence’ (Freire,
1970).
From a critical social work perspective (MacKinnon, 2009), I propose that the racialized
names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” embody stigma, while the use of “white” bestows
inherent privilege, which often define how these groups respectively are perceived and treated
today in society. While social workers speak out against social injustice, they usually do not
challenge the structural sources of racism (Gil, 1998; Jeyapal, 2016). Social work practice is
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often politically nonpartisan, and partly due to fear of reprisal, advancing these issues produces
some reservation within the profession (Gil, 1998; Jeyapal, 2016). To illustrate, over a decade
ago, the NASW (2007) published a call to address structural racism. However, since that work
was released, the social work profession advanced hardly any novel approaches to explain and
address the ongoing disparate legal treatment of many descendants of Africa in the United States
(Harvey, 2004; Jeyapal, 2016). It appears that many within the profession seem more interested
in pursuing legislative support for licensure (Hui, 2015) and advancing international issues
(Caragata & Sanchez, 2002) than addressing complex, lasting social and human rights problems
and dismantling the deeply racist system of “white supremacy” in the United States.
In summary, despite Constitutional amendments and other landmark legislative actions to
mend historic iniquities, the question remains how then can perpetual racial disparities be
explained? Therefore, the core purpose of this exploratory study is to explore the role of law and
legal discourse in constructing racial differences through time and to infer how it may have
influenced, if at all, how descendants of Africa in the United States are viewed and treated in law
today. I suggest that this dissertation deserves careful consideration, and fills a gap in the
existing research, particularly in the field of social work.
By virtue of our core values, social workers engage in social justice and human rights
work every day. Therefore, considering the plight of many descendants of Africa in the United
States, I look towards a post-modern human rights paradigm that moves beyond understanding
reality through theoretical frameworks and offer ways to transform it. While I recognize that the
issues facing many descendants of Africa in the United States are vast and complicated, I posit
that the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” remain an underestimated
topic within the human rights struggle, and one that merits further analysis. I would suggest that
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the social work profession consider a post-modern human rights approach that advances a social
change discourse (Barten, 2015; Ife, 2012; Mooradian, 2010), one that struggles for new
practices to reveal the prospect of better forms of human interaction through acts of microresistance, and the restructuring of social relations in a morally inclusive manner.
Furthermore, I suggest that social workers should be concerned about exposing and
resolving this problem which is of critical importance for individual and group psychological
integrity, stability, and unity. For many descendants of Africa in the United States the issue of
racialized names represents a means of individual and collective self-determination and a
pathway towards justice. This ongoing struggle for identity, identification, and recognition as
full citizens under the law represent an unfilled dream for many descendants of Africa in United
States. Ultimately, these unresolved remnants of slavery, racism, privilege, and power, which
continue to plague and haunt our nation, must be abandoned, dismantled, and eliminated.
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Chapter II. Theoretical Framework
The goal of this exploratory study is to examine how the use of the racialized names
“negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” may act as legal masks, which create, sustain, and
reinforce negative perceptions, stereotypes, and images of many descendants of Africa in the
United States, while reinforcing and reproducing the destructive ideology of “white supremacy.”
Specifically, this work critically examines how the law, through time, consolidated in legal
doctrine the permanency of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” as
remnants of slavery. With this focus, I use two prominent theories to comprehend how the law
may have devised a “legal mask” (Noonan, 1976), that obscured the humanity of many
descendants of Africa and Europe in the United States.
Considering this complex phenomenon that intersects racialized names, identity, slavery,
and law, and paucity of research on this issue, I adopt a two-prong theoretical framework that
incorporates Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Post-Colonialist Theory.
Critical Race Theory
CRT emphasizes that racism is an inherent and indispensable characteristic of U.S.
society (Bell, 1992; Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012).
Above all, CRT sets race at the core of euro-centric hegemony (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado
& Stefancic, 2012). At the heart of this analysis is the concept of property. As Bell (1992) noted,
the main objective for the American government was and is the protection of property for
“whites.” Property included land taken from Native Americans and the forced conversion of
former inhabitants of Africa into enslaved property. What sets CRT apart from other critical
theories is how it isolates the law’s role in socially constructing and institutionalizing this
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oppressive arrangement known as race. I seek to explore how the law may have created, framed,
and constituted the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white”.
In 1970, dynamic legal scholars formulated a method of critical analysis to expose the
role that United States’ jurisprudence played in preserving structural racism (Crenshaw et al.,
1995). Following the Civil Rights era, these legal scholars labored to clear up the belief that the
United States suddenly became a racially impartial nation. By challenging whiteness (Crenshaw
et al., 1995) as the barometer for reality, CRT denounces the socially constructed categories of
race (Smedley & Smedley, 2005). More importantly, CRT considers counter-hegemonic
discourse a crucial strategy for disrupting hegemony (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Thus, CRT
represents a useful tool for exploring the historic legal documents and contemporary United
States Supreme Court cases for this dissertation.
Additionally, CRT examines the socio-political and cultural forces that frame how
individuals and groups experience racism (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Markedly, CRT
considers legal documents as proof of America’s collusion in upholding a racist system that
favors one group, in this case “whites,” while discriminating against “blacks.” CRT reveals the
systemic nature of racism by delineating its origins within United States institutions (Crenshaw
et al., 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012), while it attempts to eliminate racism at its source in
several ways.
First, CRT advances counter narratives as an essential method for confronting and
eliminating “white supremacy” (Solorzano, 1998). I apply Gramsci’s (1971) definition of
hegemony as the social, cultural, and ideological power manipulated by dominant groups. Also,
counter-hegemony focuses on dismantling state mechanisms that manipulate, coerce, and
produce hegemonic narratives (Gramsci, 1971). To illustrate, Solorzano (1998) indicated that
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“counter-storytelling represents a method for telling the stories of those people whose
experiences are not often told” (p. 94). Counter-storytelling demonstrates resistance discourse,
one that challenges the prevailing hegemonic discourse. Counter-storytelling also represents the
deconstruction of hegemonic or master narratives (Tate, 1997) and demonstrates the power to
contest dominant discourses. This aspect of CRT signifies an excellent feature that may enhance
my examination of legal documents for this work.
Second, CRT opens a space for marginalized groups to label or name their own reality
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2012) as opposed to using names imposed by the dominant group. This
feature of CRT appears to be beneficial for studying the historical and contemporary legal
documents for this work. For instance, naming one’s unique experiences within a legal context
challenges the hegemonic legal structure in the United States (Crenshaw et al., 1995). Also,
naming, as a form of counter-hegemonic resistance (Gramsci, 1971) and the reconstruction of
reality for marginalized groups, serves as a transformative healing social practice (Delgado &
Stefancic, 2012). This is particularly relevant when the process of making a slave created
“psychic terror and spirit damage” (Nobles, 2013, p. 239) on many descendants of Africa in the
United States. Furthermore, the dissemination of resistance discourse may offset the prevailing
racially dominant discourse that is serving as social reality in the United States.
To summarize, Critical Race Theory (CRT) establishes race at the center of white
supremacy in the United States. Unlike the other theories presented, CRT identifies the legal
system’s indispensable function in preserving, and enacting laws in the United States that sustain
the socially constructed ideology known as race and “white supremacy.” Moreover, CRT
positions counter narratives as a crucial strategy for deconstructing euro-centric hegemonic
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discourse and the deconstruction of the other, while promoting reconstructive narratives that
reaffirms the humanity of the oppressed.
Despite the scholarship on how slavery continues to afflict our society (Alexander, 2010;
Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011; De Gruy, 2005; Haney- Lopez, 2006; Higginbotham, 1978,
1996; Lake, 1997; Noble, 2013; Wacquant, 2002), the general public’s response is often to
trivialize and minimize its enduring legacy. For this reason, I also use Post Colonialist Theory
because it places slavery within a context that seeks to challenge the status-quo of postcolonialist structures and strategies.
However, before I present Post Colonialist Theory, defining colonialism is in order. As it
refers to the United States, colonization, in its traditional sense, refers to the process in which the
invader or conqueror establishes through force, a system of self-ascribed superiority (Cesaire,
2000; Fanon, 1961; Memmi, 1965; wa Thiong’o, 1986). This self-ascribed superiority
manifested when Europeans first adopted the racial label “white persons” (Black, 2009) and
forced the dehumanizing labels “negro,” “colored,” and “black” onto many descendants of
Africa in the United States. This violent act established the boundaries and legitimacy of the
master and the subordinate position of the slave.
Post-Colonialist Theory
Post Colonialist Theory explores issues of power, politics, culture, and religion (Fanon,
1961; Memmi, 1965; wa Thiong’o, 1986). The premise behind Post Colonialist Theory is the
permanency of subordination (Cesaire, 2000; Fanon, 1961; Memmi, 1965; wa Thiong’o, 1986).
It is at this point, that two schools of thought emerge. The first approach to Post Colonialism is
the humanist lens, in which the colonizer assigns the concept of other to the colonized (Cesaire,
2000; Fanon, 1961). For the colonizer, the most prominent feature of the other was clearly their
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physical characteristics, for example, skin pigmentation. However, the different skin
pigmentation of the other was not enough for the colonizer; religion and culture were also
devalued, and the humanity of the other was disparaged. This concept of otherness is paramount
to understanding the use of the racialized names “negro,” “color,” and “black” and creation of
racial differences in law.
Post Colonialist Theory proposes that the colonizing culture deliberately distorts the
inherent humanity of the colonized and brands the colonized with a mark of inferiority (Cesaire,
2000; Fanon, 1961). To paraphrase Cesaire (2000), the colonized have always been human, but
were deformed in discourses. In other words, the institution of slavery not only forced men and
women into physical bondage, it devised a socially constructed ideology known as “white
supremacy” and “black” inferiority. This racially motivated fear or psycho-racial neuroses
(Cress Welsing, 1995) stemmed from “white” people’s deep-seated sense of inferiority to the
dark-skinned Africans, especially the Moors (Pimienta-Bey, 1992; 2002).
Additionally, this dehumanizing process stripped many descendants of Africa in the
United States of their nationality and culture through an intricate web of institutions that
perpetuated “white supremacy” and reinforced “black” inferiority. Consequently, one of my
objectives for this study is to present how some historic and contemporary legal actors used their
judicial platform to articulate counter-hegemonic discourse that called into question “white
supremacy” versus “black inferiority.” These counter-hegemonic examples may prove to be
valuable for the future in terms of establishing a path towards dismantling hegemonic discourse
and offering a counterargument.
Post Colonialist Theory denounces dominant forms of knowledge and discourse (Cesaire,
2000; Fanon, 1961; Memmi, 1965; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988; wa Thiong’o, 1986). At the heart
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of Post Colonialist Theory is the creation of intellectual spaces for the colonized to share their
narratives of resistance and humanity (Spivak, 1988). In fact, it is within these sacred spaces that
the colonized struggles against oppression to condemn the cruel acts of the colonizer. These
sacred spaces are where Memmi (1965) advocated for national solidarity, Cesaire (2000)
advanced his viewpoint on Negritude, Nkrumah (1970) championed Pan-Africanism, and Fanon
(1961) called for the recreation of a “new man” beyond the confines of racist euro-centric
psychological control to one that firmly re-establishes the African mind.
Furthermore, while the early concepts of Post-Colonialist Theory can be credited to the
works of Fanon (1961), Nkrumah (1970), and Cesaire (2000), I regard the efforts of Allen (1990)
especially relevant for my study. To illustrate, in the late 1960’s, Allen (1990) identified a new
form of colonialism taking place within the United States designed to neutralize the
revolutionary efforts by some “black” organizations such as the Black Panther Party. Allen
(1990) noted that the United States changed its tactics from racial segregation to a “coloniality of
power” (Grosfoguel, 2003). In other words, the United States, similar to the European nations,
who controlled many former African colonies, used the legal system to maintain its hegemonic
structures of domination and subordination (Allen, 1990). For instance, Allen (1990) pointed to
the hyper-incarceration of many descendants of Africa in the United States, police militarization
in many urban communities, and the re-segregation of many public schools throughout the
United States as examples of internal forms of neo-colonialism. For these reasons, I consult
Allen’s (1990) version of Post Colonialist Theory to help inform this study.
As a doctoral social work student, my commitment to social justice compels me to
advance the discourse beyond theoretical frameworks, and suggest a way to transform routine
oppressive narratives. Hence, to offset this process of ideological and discursive neo-
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colonialism, I embrace the concept of self-determination offered by Malcolm X (1965).
Malcolm X was one of the first activists to identify and call out the United States as a postcolonialist nation. Therefore, as part of the aims and objectives to the Organization of AfroAmerican Unity (OAAU), Malcolm X (1965) stressed the importance of self-determination by
declaring that “Afro-Americans have the right to direct and control our lives, our history, and our
future rather than to have our destinies determined by American racists and…to again become a
free people” (page unspecified). Consequently, I suggest that the continued use of the racialized
names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” may pose problematic for many descendants of Africa in
the United States in being considered a people under national and international law.
Lastly, I believe this theoretical approach will illuminate this complex phenomenon that
intersects racial names, identity, slavery, law, and legal discourse. To conceptualize this
complex phenomenon, I devised the visual in chart 1 below to help show how Critical Race
Theory and Post-Colonialist Theory interact to help explain how the center circle in the visual
representation intends to show the main premise that the racialized names “negro,” “colored,”
“black,” and “white” represent vestiges of slavery that were socially and legally constructed,
maintained, and perpetuated to validate a superior position for descendants of Europe in the
United States, while assigning an inferior status to descendants of Africa in the United States.
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Chart 1.
Visual representation of theoretical frameworks.

Post Colonialist
Theory
* Addresses the
permanency of
subordinations-the
creation of the
“other”.
* Denounces
dominant forms of
knowledge and
discourse.
* Creates spaces for
narratives of
resistance and
humanity

The use of the
racialized names
“negro,” “colored,”
“black,” and
"white" represent
vestiges of slavery
that were socially
and legally
constructed to
validate a superior
position for
descendants of
Europe in the
United States, while
assigning an
inferior status to
descendants of
Africa in the United
States

Critical Race
Theory
* Racism is an
indispensable
characteristic of
the United States.
* Isolates the law’s
role in socially
constructing &
institutionalizing
race.
* Advances
counter narratives

The circles to the left and right of the central premise are the two theoretical frameworks
-- CRT and Post-Colonialist Theory -- that contribute to and help understand the role the law
played in creating racial differences through hegemonic discourse and the significance that
counter-hegemonic narratives confer in advancing resistance and re-establishing humanity of the
descendants of Africa in the United States.
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Furthermore, I posit that the enduring inferior image and perception of many descendants
of Africa in the United States appears to be rooted in the maintenance of the racist ideology of
“white supremacy.” This oppressive ideology known as “white supremacy” is also embedded
within the United States through the legal system. Acknowledging and recognizing the
instrumental role the law played and plays in socially constructing and institutionalizing race and
racial differences in the United States, I put forward that the ideology of “white supremacy” must
be denounced and deconstructed by advancing counter narratives of resistance that re-affirm the
humanity of all of Africa’s descendants within the United States.

55

CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY
Chapter III. Literature Review
This chapter presents the literature review that informed this exploratory study. In this
chapter, I put forward the role of names in terms of culture and how they may influence identity
formation. Also, I present studies of racial names and perceptions, as well as how racial names
are observed from a legal perspective. Also, since the core purpose of this exploratory study is
to explore the role of law and legal discourse in constructing racial differences through time, I
presented a section on racial names and racial bias within a legal context.
The Cultural Role of Racial Names
There is no question that prior to slavery in the United States, many descendants of
Africa in the United States had clearly identifiable national names that denoted a historical
legacy (Baird, 1970; Pimienta-Bey, 1992; 1995; 2002; Carmichael, 1969; Lake, 1997) and a
legal identity connected by international law and treaties (Drew Ali, 1928; Pimienta-Bey, 1995;
2002). Notably, one salient aspect of culture that was particularly unique to Africans was
individual and group names. For many Africans, a name went beyond an ordinary identification;
it was an indispensable component of the spirit that fashioned the path of a person (Nefer Amen,
1990).
Moreover, many Africans performed elaborate naming rituals to ensure that the
individual name of a new-born embodied the values and virtues of their ancestors (Mbiti, 1969).
This interconnected awareness or paradigm stemmed from a central philosophical foundation
that considered the inherent nature of human beings to be divine (Mbiti, 1969; Nefer Amen,
1990). For this reason, for many Africans, an individual’s name and their group name or
nationality corresponded to an unbroken link to land, ancestors, and God. Hence, I view the act
of depriving many descendants of Africa in the United States of their names and nationality as
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tantamount to what Nobles (2013) described as nothing short of “psychic terror and spirit
damage” (p. 239). This “spirit damage” (Nobles, 2013, p. 239) may represent a reason why
many descendants of Africa in the United States tend to internalize racial trauma (De Gruy,
2005) and often react destructively towards one another (Wilson, 1990).
Names also function as indicators of one’s psychological integrity (Aksholakova, 2014;
Allport, 1961) and self-identity (Cross, 1971; Erikson, 1964; Osagie & Owiny, 2015). Notably,
Allport (1961) acknowledged that one of the most important defenses to self-identity is our
name. Names often mirror the qualities and character of an individual; it conjures certain
images, perceptions, and sets the person apart from others (Allport, 1961). Furthermore, the
correct name of an individual or group is crucial for precise identification. For instance,
improper identification of an alleged suspect may lead to an unnecessary stop by the police, an
erroneous arrest, and even false imprisonment.
Additionally, names that denote negative qualities and characteristics often resemble
racial micro-aggressions (Pierce, 1974), which instill feelings of shame, self-doubt, and
internalized inferiority (Robinson-Wood, 2016). Since names play a serious role in the
psychological health of an individual or a group (Aksholakova, 2014; Allport, 1961), it is
reasonable to infer that the use of the names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” may
provoke negative emotions in group members and on non-group members. Likewise, inaccurate
names may also lead to low self-esteem, self-hatred, and resentment among group members (De
Carlo, 2005). Therefore, exploring how the use of names may influence cognition may shed
light on how differential legal treatment may occur.
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Studies of Racial Names and Perceptions
Bogardus (1925) advanced one of the first quantitative studies on racial preference. After
examining the racial attitudes of 39 racial and national groups, he (1925) discovered that in terms
of preference, “negro” consistently ranked at the bottom when compared to other racial and
national groups. Ten years later, Katz & Braly (1935) postulated that racial names invoked
certain racial attitudes. Primarily utilizing an attitude measurement tool, they queried over 100
university undergraduates of European descent over their attitudes about the racial labels
“black,” “negro,” and “Afro-American.” Their research demonstrated that the racial names
“negro” and “Afro-American” produced general stereotypes and reinforced prevailing negative
attitudes for both terms. Katz & Braly’s (1935) study had significant implications for future
scholarship on race names. Since the studies conducted by Bogardus (1925) and Katz & Braly
(1935), the discourse on group nomenclature for the descendants of Africa in the United States
remained relatively silent until the 1960’s.
Williams (1966) researched the connotations of racial concepts with racial names.
Specifically, he (1966) questioned Caucasian and Negro psychology students from separate
universities located in the southeastern part of the United States. Interestingly, he substantiated
the hypothesis that color connotations are rooted in American society. For instance, subjects
from both races perceived the racial name “white” as good, while “black” was seen as bad.
While prominent civil rights leader Dr. King embraced the label “negro” (Neal, 2001),
and organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) publicly adopted “colored” as their organization’s moniker (Neal, 2001), the thorough
work of Moore (1960) on the origin of the word “negro” sparked discussion among the grassroot folks to examine language as an instrument of control and oppression. Moore (1960)
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uncovered that the Portuguese first used the word “negro” in the 15th century to characterize the
physical appearance of Africans and to later designate them as a “non-human” entity for the
purpose of enslavement. As a result of Moore’s (1960) investigation on the disparaging word
“negro,” some descendants of Africa in the United States began questioning its use as a group
name. At the height of the Civil Rights era, vanguards like Malcolm X and Stokley Carmichael
proclaimed “black” and “African” to foster pride and unity among many descendants of Africa in
the United States (Carmichael, 1969; Lake, 1997; Neal, 2001). While many descendants of
Africa in the United States embraced the unifying message of black pride and power (Neal,
2001; Smith 1992), for the most part, many were more concerned with their personal safety and
inclusion into mainstream United States society as a whole (Wilkinson, 1990) and did not want
to be associated with what was considered a militant term (Martin, 1991).
However, approximately sixteen years after the Black Power Movement, Reverend Jesse
Jackson and others called for the new group name “African American” (Martin, 1991; Neal,
2001). Driven by a quest to establish cultural integrity, Reverend Jesse Jackson believed the
term “African American” reconnected many descendants of Africa in the United States to the
continent of Africa (Martin, 1991). Subsequently, two quantitative researchers examined race
names and attitudes (Fairchild, 1985) and social perceptions on the racial names “black,” “AfroAmerican,” “mixed,” “colored,” and “negro” (Jewell, 1985). Both studies affirmed that certain
racial names elicit distinct racial attitudes, perceptions, and prejudices (Fairchild, 1985; Jewell,
1985). For example, the research by Fairchild (1985) revealed that white student subjects
attributed the term “black” to someone who was lazier, louder, and ruder than someone described
as “Afro-Americans.”
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Interestingly, Jewell (1985) found that 73.5% of descendants of Africa in the United
States still identified themselves as “black”, even though the term seemed to imply alienation
and insufficient connection with the larger culture. Also, he discovered that almost 70% of
descendants of Africa in the United States surveyed were not exposed to black history in high
school. Other researchers suggest that providing adequate historical education framed from an
African-centered perspective may alleviate the problem of navigating racial encounters in
schools (Chapman-Hilliard & Adams-Bass, 2016; Glocke, 2016). Additionally, creating an
educational environment that facilitates the recognition and analysis of systems of inequality
may stimulate academic motivation among many descendants of Africa in the United States
students (El-Amin, Seider, Graves, Tamerat, Clark, Soutter, Johannsen, & Malhotra, 2017).
On the subject of racial names, images, and perceptions, De Carlo (2005) randomly
selected over 100 African American adolescents in order to investigate the relationship between
racial names and racial identity. De Carlo (2005) revealed that these African American
adolescents, who were subject to higher rates of imprisonment and more aggressive, generally
had immature identity formation. To a certain degree, these findings appear to reflect
Higginbotham’s (1996) concept of “precept of inferiority” and parallel Wilson’s (1990)
reference to the internalized oppression exhibited by many adolescent descendants of Africa in
the United States. As I noted in the next section on racial names and racial bias within a legal
context, the perceived psychological link between race and law, appears to have its roots in the
antebellum era of the United States, and its residual effects seem to be impacting the present.
Racial Names and Racial Bias within a Legal Context
Another key point often overlooked in terms of group names is its apparent relationship
to law. As noted earlier, name or nationality is a condition or status of belonging to a nation or
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state (Black, 2009). This condition or status is generally known as citizenship. Hence, the legal
classification of a group determines and affects what rights they possess (Barten, 2015). In this
regard, since citizenship implies membership within a political body (Chambers, 2013), and
many of the framers of the United States Constitution were divided in their views of how to
incorporate descendants of Africa in the United States into the political fold of this country, then
it is unclear what was the lawful status of many descendants of Africa in the United States.
Wacquant (2002) offered some insight into this matter when he stated:
For lack of a recognizable national affiliation, they were shorn of
ethnic honor, which implies that, rather than simply standing at the
bottom of the rank ordering of group prestige in American society,
they were barred from it ab initio….The negroes do not, like the
Japanese and the Chinese have a politically organized nation and
an accepted culture of their own outside of America to fall back
upon. Unlike the Oriental, there attaches to the negro a historical
memory of slavery and inferiority (p. 53).
To put it another way, the continued use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and
“black” reflect a “historical memory of slavery and inferiority” (Wacquant, 2002, p. 53).
Additionally, the terms “negro,” “colored,” and “black” have no valid scientific basis (Ghee,
1990) and their use disconnects many descendants of Africa in the United States from their rich
socio-cultural, spiritual legacy (Lake, 1997; Pimienta-Bey, 1995; 2002). As a result, this
detachment from their past often places many descendants of Africa in the United States,
especially adolescent males, at-risk for an assortment of pathological conditions (Ghee, 1990).
For example, Wilson (1990; 1993) posited that the slave identity created by “whites” to control
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many descendants of Africa in United States produces maladaptive attitudes in many
descendants of Africa in the United States, such as self-destructive behaviors. Moreover, these
maladaptive attitudes and behaviors (Wilson, 1990; 1993) in response to “white supremacy”
(Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993) feed “white fear” of
“blacks.” Consequently, I propose that the stereotypical images, perceptions, and biases of the
“black” criminal, which are perpetually reinforced by the media, become embedded as social
reality and may influence how many descendants of Africa in the United States are viewed and
treated in law today.
Research by Hall, Phillips, and Townsend (2015) extended the notion that racial names
influence self-perception and negative stereotyping by employing archival and experimental
methods, to demonstrate how racial labels may have serious social consequences, such as
positive or negative stereotyping, higher or lower competence, and perceived lower or higher
socioeconomic status. Their research noted that labels, in this case racial names, assigned to
groups and used by others, influence perception and reaction towards those groups.
Additionally, Hall and colleagues (2015) conducted a LexisNexis search on the terms ‘violent
crime’ and ‘crime suspect’ and discovered the racial label “black” was used more frequently than
any other racial name. Notably, they found that while the racial label “African American”
evoked images of someone possessing higher socioeconomic status and higher competence, it
did not yield positive emotions in terms of criminal suspicion. They suggested that the selection
of racialized labels employed in a legal action, may influence a jury’s decision. In effect, the use
of the racialized name “black” affixed to a defendant may lead to higher conviction rates than the
use of the term “African American,” although the APA (2009) indicated that these terms are
utilized interchangeably.
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There is no question that racial disparities pervade the criminal justice system in America
(Alexander, 2010; Armstrong, 2012; Fosten, 2016; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Hutchinson, 2014;
NAACP, 2017; National Urban League, 2016; Smith, Levinson, & Robinson, 2015; Wacquant,
2002). Yet, a missing link that may help explain one of the many factors that contribute to racial
disparities in the American criminal justice system, is implicit or unconscious racial bias
(Abrams, Bertrand, & Mullainathan, 2012; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Goff, Eberhardt, Williams,
& Jackson, 2008; Goff, Jackson, Di Leone, Culotta, & Di Tomasso, 2014; Smith et al., 2015).
First, the scholarly legal research by Smith and colleagues (2015) presented that individual actors
within the criminal justice system, such as legislators, police officers, jurors, correction officers,
clerks, and the legal professionals, all hold and exercise some form of implicit racial bias, which
can influence their perceptions, decisions, and behaviors. Markedly, their research revealed that
a compelling implicit connection may exist between the racial term “black” and the concept of
“guilty” than the racial term “white” and the concept of “guilty” (Smith et al., 2015). This may
have serious implications for the many descendants of Africa in the United States, and supports
my view that the use of racialized names matter.
Further, research shows that a disproportionate number of juvenile (age 10-17)
descendants of Africa in the United States are incarcerated in the United States (Jones & PoeYamagata, 2000; McCord, Widom, & Crowell, 2001). To help understand racial disparities
within the juvenile justice system, Graham and Lowery (2004) examined implicit racial
stereotypes displayed by police officers and juvenile probation officers. The research by Graham
& Lowery (2004) subliminally exposed or primed these police officers and probation officers to
the racial category “black” or to racially neutral words. Subsequently, they presented two
hypothetical accounts of an adolescent who engaged in a property crime or an interpersonal
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crime. In these two hypothetical accounts, they intentionally withheld the race of the adolescent
and the causes of the crimes. Consequently, their research revealed that the officers exposed to
the racial priming, displayed more negative trait measures and proposed severe penalties to the
adolescent racially categorized as “black” than the officers in the racially neutral trial.
Accordingly, the research by these scholars seems to suggest that once unconscious stereotypes
are put into action, racial bias frequently plays a decisive role in the punishment of many
descendants of Africa in the United States.
In addition to being perceived as “black” and “guilty” (Smith et al., 2015), further
research showed that the dehumanization faced by many descendants of Africa in United States
is grounded within a socio-historical context. For instance, the archival research by Goff et al.,
(2008) uncovered that the cognitive association between “blacks” and apes not only has a
historical basis, they found many contemporary news stories contained ape-like references when
describing “blacks” suspected of a crime. Additionally, the ape-like references were further
associated with “black” boys. Further research by Goff et al., (2014) demonstrated that when
“black” boys were cognitively perceived as “ape-like,” they were also viewed as less “childlike”
than their “white” peers. As a result, they suggested that these dehumanizing perceptions often
subject many young descendants of Africa in the United States to much harsher punishment than
young “whites.” Hence, when these dehumanizing perceptions are coupled with discretionary
punishment in schools, such as those documented by the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination where they found profound systematic racial inequality in
the United States education system (Brittain & Kozlak, 2007), they often place far too many
young, school-aged descendants of Africa in the United States onto a direct pathway to prison.
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Wacquant (2001) attributed the over-representation of incarcerated descendants of Africa
in the United States to the deadly symbiosis, in which the ghetto and prison converge as a device
for caste control. Nogera (2003) challenged this notion indicating that the relationship between
urban environments and prisons represents a pattern of punishment and criminalization that has
historical roots stemming from slavery. I suggest this symbiosis appears to shape the social
reality of many descendants of Africa in the United States. This pattern of punishment and
criminalization leads to far too many young descendants of Africa in the United States into the
criminal justice system.
To a certain extent, my study parallels some of the work commenced by Pimienta-Bey
(1992; 1995; 2002) in that it is rooted in the official teachings of the Moorish Science Temple of
America (M.S.T.A.) established in 1913 by Noble Drew Ali. Also, much like Pimienta-Bey
(1995; 2002), I too was exposed to official M.S.T.A. literature, specifically, What shall we call
him? (Drew Ali, n.d.) and A divine warning by the Prophet for the nations (Drew Ali, 1928).
Essentially, these two documents raised the question as to why many descendants of Africa in
the United States were still using the racial names “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” when they
had a historically and legally recognized name. In fact, almost four decades before Moore
(1960), Noble Drew Ali (1928) stated that using the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and
“black,” “subjected them to all…mistreatment and abuses that the citizens cared to bestow upon
them” (page unspecified).
However, as a result of being exposed to the official teachings of the M.S.T.A.,
particularly the idea that the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” may
have a harmful legal effect on many descendants of Africa in the United States, I elected to
distinguish my work from the “elephantine work” of Pimienta-Bey (1992: 1995; 2002) in a
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number of areas. First, my work explores the role of law and legal discourse in constructing the
racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” between 1705-1857 in British
Colonial North America and the United States. Notably, what makes this exploratory study
different is that I also explore the legal discourse in United States Supreme Court legal texts from
1986-2017 to determine how these racialized names may be utilized today and the role of law in
perpetuating racial differences and hegemony today.
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Chapter IV. Methodology
In this chapter, I describe the research methodology for this dissertation and the research
questions that evolved from my literature review, which guided this exploratory study. I also
discuss my application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to explore the discourse found in
the historic and contemporary legal texts. Additionally, I share the ethical considerations taken
to ensure that this exploratory study complied with ethical procedures and describe my values,
biases, and understanding in relation to this study. Lastly, I introduce the data sources collected
for this exploratory study and my data analysis procedures.
Research Questions and Goals
To reiterate, the core purpose of this exploratory study was to explore the role of law and
legal discourse in constructing racial differences between 1705-1857 and 1986-2017, and to
examine the link between historic and contemporary usage of racial names in legal discourse.
The following exploratory questions steered this exploratory study:
1) What legal discourse did legal actors use during 1705-1857 to create racial differences
in the United States and what similarities and differences exist in modern times?
2) What are the counter-hegemonic narratives that sought to disrupt the status and racial
differences in the historic and modern legal texts?
Description of Research Design and Methodology
To conduct this exploratory study, I embraced a research perspective that recognized that
names, particularly the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” are
stationed within a precise socio-historical and legal context. Although quantitative research is
the favored method in the academy (Staller, 2012) and helps compress numerical data in a userfriendly manner for policy makers (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013), I believe this approach lacks
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depth when tracing the socio-historical and legal origins of the use of the racialized names. For
example, Mason (2002) noted that utilizing a qualitative approach permits researchers to delve
into a variety of social phenomena, which often incorporates the manner that social institutions,
discourses, and social practices unfold to produce meaning.
Qualitative methodologies generate nuanced, complex, and multi-dimensional narratives
that may often be edited out and excluded when researchers use a quantitative approach (Mason,
2002). The manner in which qualitative research attempts to share the particular accounts and
essence of the human experience (Carey, 2012) seems to resemble how effective social work
practice respects human dignity and casts a light upon the particular needs and stories of the
vulnerable (NASW, 2008).
Although qualitative methods restrict researchers from making a conclusion about a
phenomenon (Creswell, 2013) and may produce unintended subjectivity (Creswell, 2013), this
laborious approach may advance theory formulation (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013). For instance,
Mason (2002) suggests that when qualitative researchers offer their analysis and discussion of
unedited narratives and accounts of participants, they have the potential of describing how
certain phenomenon operates within a particular context. Also, an important factor of qualitative
research is its non-linear approach to the research process (Carey, 2012).
Therefore, I believe that qualitative methodology not only resembles how effective social
workers enhance the sensitive needs and concerns of their clients, it appears to be one of the
most appropriate approaches to explore how the social phenomena such as names, racism,
slavery, and the legal discourse are interpreted, comprehended, created, and established
(Creswell, 2012). Consequently, I used a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to explore the role
of law and legal discourse in constructing racial differences through time.
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Ethical Considerations
To ensure that this exploratory study complied with ethical procedures, I contacted the
Director of Grants and Sponsored Projects at Kutztown University. After reviewing my email
describing my study, the Director determined that this work did not require Institutional Review
Board (IRB) review and approval. The data for this exploratory study are publicly accessible
documents, and the identity of the parties selected is not a concern since many are deceased.
Role of the Researcher and Reflexivity Statement
It is generally understood that in qualitative research, the researcher is unquestionably an
instrument and the prominent tool for gathering information (Creswell, 2013). During
qualitative research, which involves the subjective experiences and knowledge of the researcher,
qualitative researchers should insert their stance or position within the focus of study (Bourke,
2014). This conscientious practice, known as positionality, which should be adopted by both
quantitative and qualitative researchers, averts implicit insider bias (Creswell, 2013). Since
qualitative research is primarily an iterative process (Carey, 2012), it behooves the qualitative
researcher to remain responsive to the research journey. For example, a lengthy document
selected for analysis may not yield any substantial information, which may cause an unintended
delay in the research, and may force the researcher to modify the data selection. For instance, I
found several more documents from the State of Georgia that were related to race and slavery,
however, after reading the legal texts, I soon realized that the legal texts did not fit the time
period for my study. I surmised that trustworthy qualitative research demands that the researcher
behaves with integrity and remains as objective as possible. Therefore, I aspired to conduct
myself with sincerity, and present the data in a respectful and scientific manner.
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The driving impetus for this exploratory study emanated from my deep commitment to
social justice, specifically, my concern over the disparate legal treatment of many descendants of
Africa in the United States. As a result, in 1994, I became a member of the Moorish Science
Temple of America (M.S.T.A). Founded in 1913 by Noble Drew Ali, the M.S.T.A. is a national
religious organization whose mission of uplifting fallen humanity through love, truth, peace,
freedom, and justice resonated with my principles. The M.S T.A. was the first Islamic
organization in the United States, to give descendants of Africa in the United States a historical
reason to love and embrace their Moorish identity (Drew Ali, n.d.). The M.S.T.A provides
members with the forum to acquire knowledge of self-identity, nationality, history, religion, and
civics. The M.S.T.A teaches that the systematic process of slavery stripped many descendants of
Africa in the United States of their language, culture, and religion. Notably, the M. S. T. A.
teaches their members to reclaim and proclaim their nationality as Moorish Americans in order
to be recognized within the government and be considered citizens of the United States of
America.
Shortly after joining, I quickly rose through the ranks to become the head of the local
temple in Queens, New York. However, I realized that much of the internal historical
information disseminated by the M. S. T. A. to the public lacked corroboration, analysis, and
cross-referencing. One specific historical document, a 1790 petition made by four enslaved
Moors to the South Carolina House of Representatives requesting clarification of their legal
status, and the historic statement of Noble Drew Ali (1928), formed the basis of this exploratory
study, and my quest to establish if a link actually existed that distinguished one group classified
as slaves, and another seen and treated as free because of their name. Consequently, as I brought
my values, biases, and understanding to this project, my role was not to validate an external
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agenda, but to explore how the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and
“white” as possible legal masks may have practical relevance that the past may contain to
understand the present and possibly change the future.
Considering the extent of this exploratory study and my aspiration to present the data in a
respectful and scientific manner, I used the following validation strategies to provide accurate
findings. First, I used diverse and influential legal texts (Seawright & Gerring, 2008) and varied
theories to support the findings. To illustrate, I examined historic legal texts during the
antebellum era from Virginia, North and South Carolina (refer to Table 1-page 73).
Additionally, I examined contemporary United States Supreme Court cases. Coupled with my
theoretical framework of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Post-Colonialist, as well as a CDA
approach, my hope is that this first step towards validation may have allowed me to triangulate
the information (Creswell, 2013).
My second validation strategy for this exploratory study was to explain from the outset
researcher bias (Creswell, 2013). For this reason, I presented my role as the researcher, my
positionality, and my reflexivity statement, as I took account and guarded against my previous
experiences and biases, which may have influenced my perspective on this exploratory study.
Additionally, I used my committee as impartial examiners for this exploratory study to spot for
any problems that may have emanated from this work such as, overemphasized points, vague
descriptions, and any assumptions made by me (Creswell, 2013).
Last, I provided thick, rich descriptions and specific details from the historical and
contemporary legal texts. As noted in Creswell (2013), qualitative researchers who write in a
detailed manner, allow readers to “transfer information to other settings and determine whether
the findings can be transferred” (p. 252). In this way, using thick, rich descriptions and specific
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details, the qualitative researcher may provide a certain level of credibility and plausibility to
their study (Tracy, 2010). I hope these validation strategies offered a worthy study that is
rigorous, trustworthy, and provides a contribution to the existing literature.
Data Collection and Sample
The data samples collected for this study reflected the core purpose of this exploratory
study: to explore the role of law, specifically the legal discourse in constructing racial differences
through time, and to examine the link between historic and contemporary usage of racial names
in legal discourse. For this reason, I selected historic legal texts starting from 1705 to 1857,
because it was in 1705 that colonial Virginia enacted this country’s first slave code. As I applied
a purposeful sampling strategy for this study (Creswell, 2013), I focused my attention to colonial
Virginia, South and North Carolina, and the Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) decision. Purposeful
sampling is often utilized in qualitative research because it yields information-rich examples that
are relevant to the research interest (Creswell, 2013). For this reason, I selected diverse and
influential historic and contemporary legal texts because they may allow me to make some
inferences related to the construction of racial differences.
Also, I selected the year 1986 to commence the data collection for contemporary United
States Supreme Court decisions because my literature review showed that shortly after 1985 the
preferred racialized name for many descendants of Africa in the United States became “African
Americans.” As a result, I sought to explore if the United States Supreme Court adapted to the
change in this group’s racial designation. Also, I chose to explore the contemporary legal texts
from 1986-2017 to ascertain how contemporary legal actors framed legal discourse around race.
Sample selection criteria. I included in my sample the 1705 Act concerning servants
and slaves in Virginia, because it was in Virginia that colonial governments first codified and
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instituted this country’s first slave codes. Additionally, I included as part of my data the United
States Naturalization Act of 1790, because it spelled in law who was originally authorized to
become a citizen of the United States. Also, included is an 1806 Supreme Court decision from
Virginia because that decision relied almost exclusively on the 1705 Act concerning servants and
slaves in Virginia. I also incorporated an 1838 North Carolina Supreme Court decision from
North Carolina, because it discussed the 1705 Act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia, as
well as who was considered a citizen of the State of North Carolina. Lastly, I incorporated the
majority and dissenting opinions on Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), because it is considered by
most legal scholars and historians a consequential legal case in slavery and racial structure in the
United States. The sample of the historic legal texts is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.
Historic Legal Texts
Date

Title of Document

Pages

1705

An act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia

4

1740

An act for the better ordering and governing negroes and other

21

slaves in this province-South Carolina
1790

United States Naturalization Act of 1790

1

1806

Hudgins v. Wright

11

1838

State v. Manuel

25

1857

Scott v. Sandford-Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion

41

1857

Scott v. Sandford-Justice Curtis’ dissenting opinion

51

1857

Scott v. Sandford-Justice McLean’s dissenting opinion

42
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Second, I explored eight United States Supreme Court decisions from 1986-2017 for the
potential link between historic and contemporary usage of racialized names in contemporary
legal discourse. For my preliminary search, I used the free online legal research engine known
as FindLaw.com to search the racialized term “negro” in contemporary United States Supreme
Court cases. Although I initially included the racialized terms “colored,” “black,” and “white” to
my search, these specifics terms included individual names, corporations, and other non-related
cases. Therefore, my preliminary search of the racialized term “negro” within the United States
Supreme Court cases from 1986-2017 in FindLaw.com yielded 79 legal texts. From this
preliminary search, I incorporated a diverse sample of legal texts from each decade that I
analyzed, because they may allow the reader to make plausible generalizations (Creswell, 2013)
about the legal discourse. From these 79 legal texts, I excluded those that appeared irrelevant to
my research questions.
After carefully reading approximately 2,789 pages of United States Supreme Court
decisions from 1986-2017, I deliberately selected from the 79 contemporary legal texts, 8 diverse
and influential legal texts. These contemporary legal texts involved decisions related to jury
selection, housing discrimination, equality, intimidation, and voting rights. I also strove to
incorporate some contemporary legal texts that did not involve racial matters, but where the
racialized terms “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” still appeared. These legal texts may
explain why it was significant to use these racialized terms in some non-racial cases, which may
enhance the rigor of my analysis.
In table 2 below, I presented the eight contemporary United States Supreme Court legal
texts selected for analysis. These contemporary legal texts included both the majority and
dissenting opinions.
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Table 2.
Contemporary Legal Texts
Date

Title of Document

Pages

1986

Batson v. Kentucky

38

1987

Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji

7

1992

United States v. Fordice

25

2000

Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Board

57

2003

Virginia v. Black

34

2006

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District

18

2013

Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al.

38

2015

Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive

75

Communities Project, Inc.

Data Analysis: Critical Discourse Analysis
Data analysis is the complex process of extracting meaning out of the information to
answer the research questions (Carey, 2012). CRT and Post-Colonialist Theory informed and
steered my analysis of the collected data. In this section, I present and explain CDA as the
analytic technique used to analyze the data. Also, I offer my analytic process that consisted of
four phases: deductive approach, analysis of the legal texts, exploring textual omission, and
intertextuality. Lastly, I discuss the limitations of my research design.
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) surfaced during the early 1990’s, led by a number of
prominent critical linguists like Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, and Ruth Wodak (Wodak,
2001). One of the primary objectives of CDA is to “investigate critically social inequality as it is
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expressed, signaled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)”
(Wodak, 2001). Discourse is constructed by those in power, is stationed within a continuum, and
generally considered axiomatic (Wodak, 2001). CDA seeks to go far below the surface of
commonly used descriptions and language that sustain power, control, and hegemony
(Fairclough, 2010; van Dijk, 1993). To locate the descriptions and language that sustain
hegemony, Fairclough (2010) suggested asking the following questions as part of the CDA
process: 1. What is the role of the ideology or dominant discourse? 2. Why do specific aspects
of dominant discourse sustain the problem? and 3. What are some potential counter narratives to
the dominant discourse? Therefore, I use these questions offered by Fairclough (2010) to assist
me with identifying critical aspects of the hegemonic as well as counter-hegemonic discourse
found in the legal texts.
CDA helps reveal the complex process of racism that otherwise would be challenging to
establish (van Dijk, 1993; 2004). van Dijk (1993) postulated that a detailed examination of
historical texts, such as those found in law, may bring to light micro and macro racist discourse
that he defined as “a form of discriminatory social practice that is evident in text, talk, and
communication” (p. 351). He also noted that racist discourse takes two significant forms. First,
racist discourse targets the ethnically different “other.” Second, racist discourse unequivocally
expresses the inferiority of the “other,” while explicitly expressing the superiority of the
dominant group. An example of racist discourse was illustrated in some of the historic legal
texts from Virginia, South Carolina, and in Chief Justice Taney’s opinion on the Dred Scott
decision.
Additionally, van Dijk (2004) suggested that racist discourse details the difference of the
“other” by portraying them as less intelligent or deviant. As polarizing forms of racist discourse
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(van Dijk, 2004) become reproduced within society, they become embedded in social reality. In
other words, “racist societies and institutions essentially produce racist discourse, and racist
discourses reproduce the stereotypes, prejudices, and ideologies that are used to defend and
legitimize “white” dominance” (van Dijk, 2004, p. 354). Therefore, I considered CDA a crucial
qualitative research tool that assisted me in identifying and exposing the ideology and discourse
contained in some of the historic and contemporary legal texts.
Legal discourse is considered fundamentally different from usual social discourse
(Niemi-Kiesilainen, Honkatukia, & Ruuskanen, 2007). Because legal discourses convey the
power of the state, they can impact and often shape social discourses and relations (NiemiKiesilainen et al., 2007). As a result, CDA tackles legal discourse by exploring how the courts
devise socially constructed categories like race and how dominance and inequality are replicated
and defied. Therefore, the central focus of CDA is examining and evaluating written documents
and spoken words to uncover the discursive basis of power, dominance, and inequality, and how
these sources are developed, sustained, reproduced, and transformed within precise social,
political, legal, and historical contexts (van Dijk, 2004).
Discourse is often formed by prior discourse, and routinely influences future discourse
(Wodak, 2001). Within the legal system, when legal actors rely on prior discourse to resolve
legal matters, they apply the doctrine that is commonly known as stare decisis or legal precedent
(Black, 2009). However, this Latin phrase is an abbreviation for stare decisis et non quieta
movere, meaning “to stand by decisions and not to disturb settled matters” (Black, 2009). Given
the court’s authority in all legal issues in our society, repeating dominant discourse can
perpetuate, even in the subtlest manners, a legal system of discrimination and injustice. For this
reason, my analytic focus for this exploratory study is on the legal discourse. While some of the
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legal discourse found in both the historic and contemporary legal texts may contain hegemonic
and counter-hegemonic discourses, the decisions or outcomes for these legal texts may diverge
from the discourse. Therefore, in my findings, I will present the nature of the legal discourse, as
well as the legal outcome.
Lastly, discourses may also be produced to assert resistance and critique by the
marginalized “other.” CDA deems discourse, particularly dominant discourse, as an instrument
for substantiating and preserving an ideology of inequitable power interactions (Wodak, 2001).
Therefore, CDA is often regarded by some researchers as a tool for social justice because it is
equipped to uncover the subtle forms of dominant discourse (Wodak, 2001). Notably, CDA
exposes how some words can gain power and create injustices if left undisturbed. Moreover,
when discourse is used to counteract dominant discourse, they may have a restorative impact.
For these reasons, I considered CDA a crucial tool for analyzing the data sources for this
exploratory study.
Although there are many ways to do CDA (Fairclough, 2010), my analysis consisted of
four phases, each led by methods recommended by scholars who employ critical discourse
analysis to respond to questions of discourse, context, power, and dominance.
Phase one: deductive approach. Once I collected the historic and contemporary legal
texts that shaped the foundation for this exploratory study, I incorporated them into a Microsoft
Excel table using detailed descriptive categories such as the date, title of the document, and
length in chronological order (Creswell, 2013). Creating this table allowed me to maintain an
orderly, visual illustration for examining the legal texts (see Tables 1 and 2). Maintaining this
categorical aggregation provided an opportunity to detect any issue-connected content that may
have surfaced (Creswell, 2013), such as legal texts not meeting my sampling criteria.
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I used a deductive approach as each paragraph within the legal texts was carefully
examined for any and all phrases that could fit within the following categories: racialized names,
racial differences, legal status, hegemonic discourse, and counter-hegemonic discourse.
Throughout this process, I transferred my initial ideas from my notebook into a memo. I
maintained this memo during each stage of the analysis process to mark my impressions,
reflections, and potential biases. Memoing may capture substantive, theoretical, methodological,
and even personal ideas that have emerged from the codes (Creswell, 2013). For instance, after
reviewing the legal texts, I recorded in my memo how I planned to narrow down the parameters
of my initial framework, and wrote down in the memo what questions and ideas developed to
help me make sense of the data that assisted with interpreting my findings.
Phase two: analysis of legal texts. The first phase in my analysis involved reading the
legal texts in an undiscriminating manner (Huckin, 1997). Next, I critically read the texts with a
more discerning eye (Huckin, 1997), utilizing the questions offered by Fairclough (2010) as a
guide: 1. What is the role of the ideology or dominant discourse? 2. Why do specific aspects of
dominant discourse sustain the problem? 3. What are some potential counter narratives to the
dominant discourse?
While I read the legal texts I made notations, observations, and remarks in the margins of
the document. This detailed process of recording relevant notes is called coding (Carey, 2012;
Creswell, 2012). Therefore, I first utilized open coding (Carey, 2012; Creswell, 2013), because
assuming a receptive stance as I read the legal texts allowed me find additional meaning in a
word or paragraph, which may be relevant to my research questions.
Carey (2012) described this practice of aggregating the open codes that offer relevant
meaning to answering the research questions as axial coding. He noted that the axial coding
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process may produce many categories, which the researcher will need to sort and condense into
some form of database. Although, Leech & Onwuegbuzie (2011) affirmed the benefits of using
a software program such as NVivo for handling large amounts of data expeditiously and soundly,
particularly for help with coding, I did not employ a computer software tool for this exploratory
study, because from the initial sampled legal texts, the final sample contained approximately 600
pages which was manageable without the use of a software.
Phase three: exploring textual omissions and silences. Huckin (1997) suggested that an
equally important component of discourse is textual omission or silence. He described textual
silence as “the omission of some piece of information that is pertinent to the topic at hand” (p.
348). Since the primary focus of this exploratory study involved legal discourse and how racial
differences were created and sustained over time, considering the legal concept known as stare
decisis or precedent is key to identifying textual omission or silence. Therefore, I closely
analyzed what was missing from the historic and contemporary legal texts to determine its
relevance to my research questions. However, to properly identify textual silence and omission
required that I compare across legal texts, which led me to the final phase of analysis.
Phase four: intertextuality. CDA researchers use intertextuality as a way of identifying
potential associations and comparisons between legal texts. Fairclough (2003) noted that
intertextuality allows researchers to inspect how the practices of discourse relates with the larger
social and cultural milieu. This element of intertextuality allowed me to recognize that much of
the historic and contemporary legal texts appeared to have been influenced by societal changes,
such as slavery, emancipation, Jim Crow segregation, and Civil Rights legislation. Moreover, he
considers the process of exploring intertextuality an indispensable component of analyzing vis-àvis critical discourse analysis. Therefore, I employed intertextuality to my analysis of the
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historic and contemporary legal texts because it allowed me to explore and compare the
relationships between these documents.
Limitations
While every effort was made to present a complete and thorough examination of the
collected legal texts, there were still several limitations that must be recognized. First and
foremost, the sample size and analytic process were limited to CDA. This limited the
representation of meanings used and produced by different legal discourses. Much more indepth analysis is needed that incorporates a deep exploration of the context, cross-comparison of
discourse and history, and many more legal texts from the century’s in-between. As a result, this
research design does not produce a chain of causality between the legal discourse and the
creation of racial differences through time. Therefore, I was only able to make analytic
connections and inferences, not claims of causality. The practical goal is to use this analysis to
explore the role of law and legal discourse in constructing racial differences during the
antebellum era and continuing through modern history in the United States.
Consequently, a comprehensive exploration of the legal discourse for its use of racialized
names and portrayals of descendants of Africa and Europe in the United States will remain a
subject for subsequent study. Nevertheless, the design of this exploratory study was devised to
shed light on the richness of the data, stimulate dialogue, provoke change, and advance the
research on the use of racialized names as a social justice and human rights concern. In the
following chapter, the findings that emerged through my critical analysis of the historic and
contemporary legal texts are presented.
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Chapter V: Findings
I begin this chapter by presenting a table showing the racialized names found in the
historic and contemporary legal texts I collected and analyzed in this exploratory study. This
table shows the ways in which some legal actors used racialized names during 1705-1857 to
create racial differences in the United States, which answered my first research question: what
legal discourse did legal actors use during 1705-1857 to create racial differences in the United
States and what similarities and differences exist in modern times? This is followed by my
findings of the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic narratives that emerged from the historic legal
texts. Then, I present a table of the racialized names found in the contemporary legal texts. This
is followed by the presentation of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic narratives that emerged
from the historic and contemporary legal texts. In the final section of this chapter, I share
intertextual narratives summarizing what similarities and differences were found in the historic
and contemporary legal texts, and how they connected with my research questions and
objectives. I also present the words, terms, or facts that were omitted from the historic and
contemporary legal texts that pointed to how racial differences were maintained. Lastly, my
thematic and comparative critical discourse analysis revealed instances in which the law created,
sustained, and disrupted vestiges of slavery.
Drawing from my literature review, I suspected that the use of the racialized names
“negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” represented vestiges of slavery that were socially and
legally constructed, maintained, and perpetuated to validate a superior position for descendants
of Europe in the United States, while assigning an inferior status to descendants of Africa in the
United States. I found that in the historic legal texts racial differences were discursively created
through two socially and legally distinct racial categories: “white” and “negro” and “black.”
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Additionally, I opined that the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and
“black” resembled what Noonan (1976) described as a legal mask that suppresses the humanity
of many descendants of Africa in the United States. What I discovered from the six historic legal
texts from 1705-1857 was that a person classified as a “negro” and “black” was deemed a slave
unless they could prove the contrary. I identified in my intertextual analysis of the historic and
contemporary legal texts that some historic and contemporary legal actors used hegemonic
narratives, while others challenged hegemonic narratives by advancing counter-hegemonic
narratives, and at times, remained silent to the dominant social realities. Notably, through my
analysis of the historic and contemporary legal texts, I uncovered several counter-hegemonic
narratives that worked to disrupt the socially and legally constructed racial differences. These
findings helped answer my second research question: what are the counter-hegemonic narratives
that sought to disrupt the status and racial differences in the historic and modern legal texts?
The Use of Racialized Names in the Historic Legal Texts
To explore the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” and
the construction of racial differences during the antebellum era and today, I first analyzed six
historic legal texts from 1705-1857 in British Colonial North America and the United States.
Then, I analyzed eight United States Supreme Court legal texts from 1986-2017. For the findings
that emerged from the analysis of the historic legal texts, I developed Table 3 below, which I
arranged in chronological order of the racialized names that were found in the historic legal texts.
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Table 3.
Racialized Names in Historic Legal Texts
Date

Title of Document

Racialized Names

1705

An act concerning servants and

Negroes, white women, Mulattos, white man

slaves in Virginia
1740

An act for the better ordering and

Negroes, mulattos, [mustizoes], white person

governing negroes and other slaves
in this province-South Carolina
1790

United States Naturalization Act of

Free white persons; textual silence toward other

1790

groups, specifically no mention of descendants
of Africa in the United States

1806

Hudgins v. Wright

Free Indian woman, blacks, negro, white,
African, mulatto, European white people

1838

State v. Manuel

Free negroes, free persons of color, free men of
color, white man

1857

Scott v. Sandford-Chief Justice

Negro, negroes of the African race, Indian race,

Taney’s majority opinion

white race, free negro, mulatto, white man, white
woman, enslaved African race, black race, white
person, free white citizens, white inhabitants

1857

Scott v. Sandford-Justice Curtis’

Negro of African descent, negro, Africans, free

dissenting opinion

persons, persons of color, free colored persons,
white male citizens, white persons, African race,
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white race, colored persons, Mexican, North
American Indians, white man
1857

Scott v. Sandford-Justice McLean’s

Negro of African descent, persons of color,

dissenting opinion

colored race, white men, free colored persons,
negro, mulatto, free people of color

My findings seem to suggest that from 1705-1857 the use of the racialized name “negro”
appeared to be the preferred designation for many descendants of Africa in the United States
because it appeared more frequent in the legal texts over other terms. In contrast, the findings
also seem to suggest that the use of the racialized name “white” appeared to be the main
designation for descendants of Europe in the United States because it was used almost
exclusively in reference to them. The findings suggest that although the use of the racialized
name “negro” remained relatively consistent for many descendants of Africa in the United
States, there were some differences. For instance, in Hudgins v. Wright and State v. Manuel, the
racialized names “black” and “colored” were also used to designate many descendants of Africa
in the United States. Additionally, the adjective “free” was often used to further describe
someone designated as “negro,” “colored,” and “black.” Also, I found that at least once, the
term “free” was placed in front of the racialized name “white” to describe descendants of Europe
in the United States. Based on my literature review, the term “free” was utilized for some
“whites” during this era because some were indentured servants until the events after Bacon’s
Rebellion when all descendants of Europe coalesced and changed their legal designation and
status to “white” (Allen, 1994; Jordan, 2012).

85

CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY
Another finding that emerged from my analysis of the historic legal texts is that other
names were also used to designate many descendants of Africa in the United States. For
example, the term “African,” “freemen,” and “mulatto” were also applied. Additionally, the
nationality “Moors” was also found in the historic legal texts. Yet, what remained consistent is
the use of the racialized name “white” as the sole designation for all descendants of Europe in
the United States. Moreover, my analysis of the historic legal texts also raised several questions
as it relates to racial differences in the United States. First, if the Declaration of Independence
(1776) declared “all men free and equal,” then why distinguish men into racial categories and
labels? Second, what meaning did the legal actors give to these racialized names?
I discovered that while there was some minor distinction to the racialized names such as
“mulattos,” “[mustizoes,]” “African,” and “free person of color,” the States explored in my study
primarily used “negro” and “black” to categorize most descendants of Africa in the United
States. Moreover, while the racialized names used to differentiate one group from another in the
historic legal texts were evident in my findings, the racialized names on their own did not offer
any significant meaning in terms of historical legacy and culture like the nationality Moors or
Turks. Therefore, in the next section, I explore the legal discourses that some legal actors used
to create racial differences that relegated many descendants of Africa in the United States to an
oppressive legal status.
Hegemonic and Counter-Hegemonic Discourses in the Historic Legal Texts
To fully explore and answer my first research question, specifically what legal discourse
was used to create racial differences during 1705-1857, I share a narrative of the historic legal
texts, which included some contextual background, the emerging hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses, and a summary of the findings.
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Before presenting these narratives, reiterating Gramsci’s (1971) definition of hegemony
and counter-hegemony seemed appropriate. According to him, hegemony is the social, cultural,
and ideological power wielded by dominant groups. For example, “whites” not only exclusively
used this racial term as a racially distinct and superior designation for themselves, but every
social and cultural idea that emerged from “whites” was viewed as exceptional. While at the
same time, “whites” stripped many descendants of Africa in the United States of their nationality
and imposed upon them the vastly inferior social and legal designation “negro” and “black.”
Contrastingly, counter-hegemony directs attention to challenging the prevailing and coercive
hegemonic discourses (Gramsci, 1971). Particularly noteworthy are the hidden counter-stories
(Solorzano, 1998; Tate, 1997) offered by the marginalized to contest the dominant discourses.
In this section, I present the hegemonic discourses that seemed to influence the social,
cultural, and ideological power by and for the benefit of descendants of Europe in the United
States, which appeared to reinforce the inferior position of many descendants of Africa in the
United States. Additionally, I share the counter-hegemonic discourses offered by some historic
legal actors, which represented the discussions that questioned and sought to eliminate the
predominant narratives and power structures. I provide a narrative of the historic legal texts that
consisted of state laws delineating the status and treatment of its slaves, the first Naturalization
Act in the United States, and two state Supreme Court decisions concerning legal status. Last, I
explore the majority and dissenting opinions for the Scott v. Sandford (1857) United States
Supreme Court decision for its role in creating, maintaining, and disrupting racial differences in
law.
An act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia-1705. Since 1619, when the first
enslaved Africans set foot in Jamestown, the Virginia legal system wrangled in how to specify
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their legal status (Higginbotham, 1978). However, by 1705, as the first established English
colony in the 17th century, Virginia enacted the first slave statues that defined the legal condition
of descendants of Africa in the United States. An example of this legal condition is set forth in
this first hegemonic transcript extract found in an Act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia
(1705):
Their servants, they distinguish by the names of slaves for life,
and servants for a time. Slaves are the negroes, and their posterity
[children], following the condition of the mother, according to the
Maxim, partus sequitur ventrem. They are called slaves, in respect
of the time of their servitude, because it is for life.
This first hegemonic extract showed that while a servant worked for a specific period, slaves not
only served for life, they apparently were distinguished by “the names of slaves…the negroes.”
Additionally, their “posterity” (children) followed the condition of the mother. In other words,
children were born into slavery because their mother was enslaved.
In the next excerpt, the legislature in Virginia further defined the legal classification of
slaves. For example,
That all servants imported and brought into this country by sea or land,
who were not Christians in their native country, (except Turks and Moors
in amity with her majesty, and others that can make due proof of their
being free in England, or any other Christian country, before they were
shipped, in order to transportation hither) shall be accounted and be slaves,
and as such be here bought and sold not withstanding a conversion to
Christianity afterwards…
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In this passage, slaves were considered a commodity that could be imported, and due to their
non-Christian status were also considered slaves, unless they were “Turks and Moors in amity
with her majesty.” These findings revealed that racial differences were also based on religious
superiority. Another example of hegemonic discourse found in an Act concerning servants and
slaves in Virginia 1705 is the following passage:
Sufficient distinction is also made between the female-servants, and slaves;
for a white woman is rarely or never put to work in the ground, if she be
good for anything else; and to discourage all planters from using any
women so, their law imposes taxes upon female-servants working in the
ground, while it suffers [allows] all other white women to be absolutely
exempted; whereas on the other hand, it is a common thing to work a woman
slave out of doors; not does the law make any distinction in her taxes, whether
her work be abroad [outside] or at home.
The contents of the findings seem to suggest that, in general, racial differences contained several
associated layers. First, the use of the racial name “negro” seem to clearly distinguish who the
Act classified as a slave. Second, “negroes” were treated as chattel property. Third, the legal
condition of slavery was matrilineal. Third, skin color, racial identification, and gender was
attached to being enslaved. Fourth, the element of religion, specifically Christianity, was used to
set apart the “negro” from “whites.” The literature tends to support this finding because most
enslaved descendants of Africa in the United States arrived from non-Christian countries
(Clarke, 1994), the individual conversion to Christianity did not remove the condition of
enslavement (Wiecek, 1977), and certain portions of the Christian bible were applied to justify
the enslavement process (Clarke, 1994). As a result, “whites” viewed most “blacks” as an
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uncivilized heathen who were made into slaves for their benefit (Jefferson, 1785). Therefore, the
findings in an act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia (1705) signaled one of the first
laws that constructed explicit racial differences between the “negro” slave and the “white”
property owner.
In contrast, I considered the excerpt related to proof of freedom counter-hegemonic
because the Act permitted Turks, Moors, and others not to be categorized as “negro” slaves.
While the Act’s reference as to who the “others” were was not clear from the data, the reason
why Turks and Moors were distinguished as being free is clear. My literature review
demonstrated that Morocco was the first country to officially recognize the newly independent
United States and established the 1786 Treaty of Peace and Friendship (Pimienta-Bey, 1992;
2002). This counter-hegemonic extract revealed that the burden of proving one’s freedom
resided with descendants of Africa in the United States who availed themselves of this legal
opportunity.
Despite the minor counter-hegemonic reference, an Act concerning servants and slaves in
Virginia 1705 had clear hegemonic consequences because it systematically constructed racial
differences that excluded many descendants of Africa in the United States from any fundamental
notion of humanity under the law, while securing the economic and social continuity of the slave
industry in the United States (Higginbotham, 1978).
An act for the better ordering and governing negroes and other slaves in this provinceSouth Carolina-1740. South Carolina represented the largest British slave-holding colony
(Wicek, 1977). Shortly following the Stono Rebellion, South Carolina required a comprehensive
slave code to maintain control over their property. In this first hegemonic extract, the South
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Carolina legislature codified the status of the enslaved descendant of Africa in the United States.
To illustrate:
Slavery has been introduced and allowed, and the people commonly
called negroes, Indians, mulattoes and mustizoes, have been deemed
absolute slaves. It shall be always presumed that every negro, Indian,
mulatto, and mestizo, is a slave, unless the contrary can be made appear[sic].
That all negroes…remain forever hereafter, absolute slaves, and…to be
chattels personal.
This hegemonic extract suggested that those referred to as “negroes” were regarded and
suspected to be slaves and personal property, unless they could prove the opposite. In other
words, this hegemonic extract appears to be creating the racial difference that negroes were
considered the property of their owners, something that could be bought, sold, and discarded like
a piece of furniture or livestock.
In the next hegemonic extract, the South Carolina legal system delineated further the
status for many descendants of Africa in the United States. For example,
That if any slave who shall be out of the house or plantation…
without some whiter person in company with such slave…
it shall be lawful for any such white person to pursue, apprehend,
and moderately correct such slave; and if any such slave shall assault
and strike such white person, such slave may be lawfully killed.
This hegemonic piece appeared to demonstrate how “negroes” were powerlessness over those
classified as “white persons” and those deemed “whiter” than the slave. Moreover, this
hegemonic extract revealed how racial difference constructed in law not only affirmed that
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“negroes” had no legal rights to even secure their own body, it showed how the law masked the
humanity of descendants of Africa in the United States.
Also, most of this act contained provisions that delineated the various orders governing
how negroes were to be treated under the law. For instance, slaves charged with a crime
received “some convenient method and form of trial…determined by any two justices assigned
to keep the peace, and any number of freeholders.” In other words, “negroes” deemed as
“slaves” who were charged with a crime were not tried by a jury composed of their peers, but by
justices and freeholders or those who were all “white” and held title to real property (Black,
2009). In contrast, racial differences constructed in law recognized that while “whites” held the
legal right to be judged by a jury of their peers, meaning other “whites,” those classified as
“negroes” in law were not afforded the same rights as “whites.”
Another example of how the 1740 South Carolina act codified how “negroes” were to be
treated under the law was illustrated in section VIII:
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that if any person
shall be maimed, wounded or disabled, in pursuing, apprehending, or
taking any slave that is runaway or charged with any criminal offense,
or in doing any other act, matter or thing, in obedience to or in
pursuance of the direction of this Act, he shall receive such reward
from the public, as the General Assembly shall think fit; and if any
such person shall be killed his heirs, executors or administrators, shall
receive the like reward.
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The contents of this finding exposed the hegemonic control that “whites” in South Carolina
exercised over all “negroes.” Another excerpt discovered in the 1740 South Carolina act
revealed how “negroes” were treated under this law; section XXIV delineated the following:
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that if any slave
shall presume to strike any white person, such slave, upon trial and
conviction before the justice or justices and freeholders, aforesaid,
according to the directions of this Act, shall, for the first and second
offense, such punishment as the said justice and freeholders, or such
of them empowered to try such offense, shall in their discretion, think
fit, not to extending to life or limb; and for the third offense, shall suffer
death. But in case any such slave shall grievously wound, maim or bruise
any white person, though it be only the first offense, such slave shall suffer
death.
These hegemonic discourses point to how South Carolina statutes legally created racial
differences by dehumanizing and treating many descendants of Africa in the United States as
inferior and under a completely different set of legal standards from “whites.”
Contrastingly, the counter-hegemonic excerpts of the act illustrated the apparent legal irony that
many descendants of Africa in the United States encountered in antebellum South Carolina. For
instance,
If any negro, Indian, mulatto or mestizo, shall claim his or her freedom,
it shall and may be lawful for such negro, Indian, mulatto or mestizo,
or any person or persons whatsoever, on his or her behalf, to apply to
the justices of his Majesty’s court of common pleas, by petition or motion.
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In other words, while the South Carolina antebellum legal system afforded some descendants of
Africa the means to prove their freedom, the 1740 Act also punished those who failed to meet the
legal burden of proof, revealing the discrepancy between the letter and the spirit of the law.
Also, it is possible that only a relatively small number of descendants of Africa in the United
States were aware of this provision to the law. These reasons may explain the fact that I only
found two South Carolina petitions submitted by descendants of Africa in the British Colonies
and later in the United States (one in 1753 and the other in 1790), which may be an area for
future research to explore if there are other similar existing documents.
While the 1740 South Carolina act for the better ordering and governing negroes and
other slaves in this province contained few instances of counter-hegemonic narratives, which
appeared to be a measure taken by the South Carolina legislature to minimize future slave
rebellions, it represented one of the most broad slave codes in the colonies (Higginbotham,
1978). Specifically, this act constructed and maintained clear racial differences in law between
the vulnerable “negro” who appeared to be considered dead in-law and at the mercy of “whites.”
Additionally, this act even illustrated that persons of “Indian” ancestry could still be considered
“white” under the law because “recognized Indians” were often viewed as a “nation” (Barten,
2015). Moreover, the racial differences created in the 1740 South Carolina act further illustrated
how many descendants of Africa in the United States were marginalized by law and how the law
obscured and masked their humanity.
United States Naturalization Act of 1790. In 1790, the 7th Congress of the United States
enacted the United States Naturalization Law. The Naturalization Act reads as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That any
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Alien being a free white person, who shall have resided within
the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the
term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof
on application to any common law Court of record in any one of
the States wherein he shall have resided for the term of one year
at least, and making proof to the satisfaction of such Court that
he is a person of good character, and taking the oath or affirmation
prescribed by law to support the Constitution of the United States,
which Oath or Affirmation such Court shall administer, and the Clerk
of such Court shall record such Application, and the proceedings thereon;
and thereupon such person shall be considered as a Citizen of the United
States. And the children of such person so naturalized, dwelling within the
United States, being under the age of twenty one years at the time of such
naturalization, shall also be considered as citizens of the United States.
And the children of citizens of the United States that may be born
beyond Sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered
as natural born Citizens: Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not
descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United
States: Provided also, that no person heretofore proscribed by any States,
shall be admitted a citizen as aforesaid, except by an Act of the Legislature
of the State in which such person was proscribed.
As noted in Black (2009) the term “white person” is defined as a member of the Caucasian race
distinct from the Negroid and Mongoloid races. This term “white person” represented a
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hegemonic example of the creation of racial hierarchy in law. In this case, whiteness (HaneyLopez, 2006) was legally constructed as the measure for “good character” and the legal
precedent for citizenship in the United States. What this finding suggests is that some American
Indians and many descendants of Africa in the United States were excluded from attaining
citizenship and thus constructing racial differences.
In contrast, when it came to counter-hegemonic discourse, the United States
Naturalization Act of 1790 demonstrated textual silence as I found no counter-hegemonic
narratives in relation to the status of the descendants of Africa in the United States. Also, textual
silence was illustrated because the legal term “free white person” did not provide clear reference
to anything phenotype-based. However, the extensive work conducted by Haney-Lopez (2006)
showed that citizenship in the United States was and is an evolving and fluid concept. As a
result of the hegemony that was legitimized through the United States Naturalization Act of
1790, it took seventy-eight years before those descendants of Africa who had been legally
defined as “negroes” and “blacks” in the United States, were granted citizenship (U.S.
Constitution, Amendment XIV, 1868).
Hudgins v. Wright-1806. In this landmark Virginia Supreme Court case, the appellants
(the Wrights), upon discovering that their slave-owner (Hudgins) planned to sell them further
South, asserted that they were entitled to their freedom because they claimed maternal descent
from a free Indian woman. The appellee (Hudgins) contended that the Wrights descended from a
negro woman. In his ruling, Judge Tucker concluded that based on the Wrights’ physical
features, they were of American Indian descent and not of African descent. Therefore, the
Wrights were entitled to their freedom because Hudgins could not prove the contrary.

96

CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY
In the first hegemonic extract, the appellants Attorney K. Taylor asserted that because the
Wrights descended from a free Indian woman, they were entitled to be considered “persons
perfectly white, and not a common case of mere blacks suing for their freedom.” I considered
this extract hegemonic because individuals perceived to be “white” in law appeared to benefit
from different legal standards than those classified as non-white. This first extract also
suggested a discretion to interpret racial belonging that although physically the Wrights
possessed “long black hair” and “copper color” skin, they were not “mere blacks,” but “persons
perfectly white.” This extract pointed to an example of how racial differences were not only
based on physical appearance and skin color, but, being free, was associated with the use of the
term “white.”
In the next excerpt, Judge St. George Tucker shared the following:
Though I profess not an intimate acquaintance with the natural history
of the human species, I shall add a few words on the subject as connected
with the preceding laws.
I included this excerpt by Judge Tucker because he not only relied on legal precedent that used
racial differences in law, he offers comments on an unfamiliar topic based on preceding laws
referencing racial differences. The laws, Judge Tucker alluded to are the 1679 Act, and its repeal
in 1691, from which he drew his conclusion “that all American Indians are prima facie (on its
face) free.” However, Cover (1975) and Higginbotham (1978) both noted that Judge Tucker
probed the presumption of freedom for all men, specifically towards descendants of Africa in the
United States and opposed the lower court’s ruling that the birthright of every human being,
except descendants of Africa in the United States, was freedom. What this finding shows is how
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a legal actor may unintentionally use a legal precedent that maintains racial differences. To
illustrate Judge Tucker’s hegemonic legal discourse, the following excerpt is offered:
Nature has stampt upon the African and his descendants two characteristic
marks, beside the difference of complexion, which often remain visible
long after the characteristic distinction of color disappears or becomes
doubtful; a flat nose and woolly head of hair…Suppose three persons, a black
or mulatto man or woman with a flat nose and woolly head; a copper
colored person with long [jetty] black, straight hair; and one with a fair
complexion, brown hair, not woolly or inclining thereto, with a prominent
Roman nose, were brought together before a Judge upon a writ of Habeas
Corpus, on the ground of false imprisonment and detention in slavery:
How must a Judge act in such a case?....He must discharge the white person
and the Indian out of custody….and he must redeliver [into slavery] the black
or mulatto person, with a flat nose and woolly hair to the person who claiming
to hold him or her as a slave, unless the black person or mulatto could…
produce proof of his descent, in the maternal line, from a free female ancestor.
While Judge Tucker’s position illustrated hegemonic discourse, it appears that he based his
ruling on the 1705 Act of Virginia. What Judge Tucker’s decision reveals is that the Virginia
based descendants of Africa who were known as “negroes”/”blacks,” were held to a different set
of legal standards than Indians and “whites.” This further explains how racial differences were
created and maintained through law.
Judge Roan also applied the 1705 Act of Virginia when he indicated that:
In the case of a person visibly appearing to be a negro, the presumption
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is, in this country, that he is a slave; but in the case of a person visibly
appearing to be a white man…the presumption is that he is free, and it is
necessary for his adversary to [shew] that he is a slave.
This finding points to an example of how the legal status of being free in Virginia was linked to
being considered “white” even though, in the case of the Wrights, their complexion was
considered “copper-colored.” This legal discourse points to the development of racial
differences based on the gradation of complexion, which is supported by the work of Jordan
(2012).
With regard to the counter-hegemonic discourse and intertextuality of legal cases, both
Judge Tucker and Judge Roane relied upon the 1705 Act by reiterating that “proof of descent…is
incumbent…to freedom.” I suggest that such “proof of descent” may easily be taken to mean
proof of “nationhood” or “nationality.” As seen with the “Turks” or “Moors” for example.
Comparing the counter-hegemonic discourse found in Hudgins v. Wright to the 1705 Act
concerning servants and slaves in Virginia showed that a legal recourse was available to those
who could prove their freedom and it appeared that those designated as “Turks and Moors in
amity with Great Britain” received favorable treatment under the law. However, I had
insufficient data to explore examples of how those classified as “Turks and Moors in amity with
Great Britain” were actually treated under the legal system in the United States and if they
availed themselves to this legal opportunity.
Lastly, Judge Tucker and Judge Roane, both slaveholders (Cover, 1975), used prior legal
precedent, specifically the 1705 Act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia, to reach their
decision on Hudgins v. Wright (1806). The judges’ decision seems to have expanded the law’s
reach to include their hegemonic views, because 1705 Act concerning servants and slaves in
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Virginia does not mention the physical appearance of descendants of Africa in the United States.
Thus, while the final ruling in Hudgins v. Wright (1806) was in favor of those claiming Indian
lineage, the legal discourse contained in this case appeared to perpetuate the prevailing
hegemonic views towards many descendants of Africa in the United States living in Virginia:
that persons classified as “negro” were slaves, unless they were able to provide proof of their
freedom.
State v. Manuel-1838. In this North Carolina Supreme Court case, the appellant
(Manuel), a manumitted slave was convicted of assaulting a “white man,” and fined twentydollars, but did not have the money to pay the fine. The lower court decided that the sheriff
should hire out Manuel to anyone who would pay the outstanding fine for his services. In the
appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, Manuel’s attorney maintained that under state law,
Manuel was not allowed to plead insolvency from imprisonment for the debt and should hence
be free to locate employment in order to pay off his own debt.
In his 18-page opinion, Judge Gaston reviewed the concept of imprisonment for debt, the
nature of citizenship in Great Britain and the United States, and the Constitution rights and duties
of citizens. In his ruling, Judge Gaston determined that Manuel, as a free black, was a legal
citizen of North Carolina entitled to all the rights and privileges afforded under the Constitution,
including the right to declare insolvency. Judge Gaston referenced the State Attorney General’s
hegemonic assertion:
that persons of color, whether born free or emancipated from slavery,
were not originally members of that political body and never since
have been incorporated into it. Slaves were not in legal parlance persons,
but property.
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It is important to note that while the “political body” referenced by the State Attorney General
indicated the constituent members of the State of North Carolina, Judge Gaston recognized that
“free persons of color” were citizens because, at the time the Articles of Confederation, free,
native-born descendants of African slaves in many states-including North Carolina, were
citizens. While this transcript contained hegemonic discourse that illustrate how racial
differences were characterized by the State Attorney General, it allowed Judge Gaston to contest
these views by allowing the appellant (Manuel) to declare insolvency and noting that Manuel
was a citizen of the State of North Carolina protected under the State Constitution .
To illustrate, Judge Gaston described that:
The very Congress which framed our Constitution was chosen by
freeholders. That Constitution extended the elective franchise to
every freeman who had arrived at the age of 21, and paid a public tax,
and it is a matter of universal notoriety that under it free persons without
regard to color claimed and exercised the franchise until it was taken from
free men of color a few years since by our amended Constitution.
The content of this finding suggested that at some point “free men of color” exercised the
elective franchise. In other words, prior to the amended State Constitution of North Carolina,
which Judge Gaston referenced to in the excerpt above, free men of color were considered
freeholders, who possessed land, property, and exercised the right to vote prior to the
Revolutionary War. This finding appeared to challenge the established notion that all
descendants of Africa in the United States were slaves. Although it is not clear from the
available data what name these “free men of color” used to identify themselves under the law, it
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demonstrated how racial differences seemed to have taken form during the establishment of
United States Constitution (Higginbotham, 1996).
Scott v. Sandford (1857)-Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion. After losing twice in
the lower courts, the plaintiff, Dred Scott and his wife and children, brought their claim to the
United States Supreme Court averring that they became free when their former slave-owner took
them into Illinois and into the Territory of Louisiana north of Missouri. The defendant, John
F.A. Sandford, a citizen of New York and the new slave-owner for the Scotts, argued that the
plaintiff was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, but a negro of African descent, and therefore
did not have jurisdiction to sue in a court of the United States. It is at this point that Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney raised the question in his controversial majority, hegemonic opinion:
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country
and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community
and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States,
and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and
immunities, guaranteed by that instrument?
To this question above, Judge Taney concluded, “we think they are not, and that they are not
included, and were not intended to be included.” This hegemonic finding points to how Judge
Taney established and reinforced racial differences in law for those categorized as “negro.”
In the next hegemonic excerpt, Chief Justice Taney immediately clarified at the outset of his
opinion that the “plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the
African race, and imported into this country and sold and held as slaves.” In terms of
intertextuality, this finding appeared to correspond with some of the findings previously shown
in An act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia 1705 and An act for the better ordering and
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governing negroes and other slaves in this province South Carolina 1740, in which the use of the
racialized name “negro” implied slavery and a non-human status in society.
In the third hegemonic excerpt, Chief Justice Taney further answered his own question by
stating that he thinks,
they are not, and that they are not included, and were not
intended to be included, under the word “citizens” in the Constitution,
and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.
On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate
and inferior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant race,
and whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority,
and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and
the Government might choose to grant them.
In this next hegemonic excerpt, Chief Justice Taney applied his interpretation of history and how
racial differences were socially and politically created to bar “negroes” from obtaining any legal
rights that “whites” enjoyed:
… for more than a century before been regarded as beings of
an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race
either in social or political relations, and so far inferior that they had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect, and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise
and traffic whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that
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time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race.
I presented the above hegemonic excerpt as an example of how Justice Taney applied a
hegemonic and racist recount of history to help him reach his hegemonic ruling in Scott v.
Sandford (1857).
In the next passage found in the legal text, Chief Justice Taney believed that the founding
fathers were careful in their language as they seem to acknowledge and condone racial
differences in law. Justice Taney referred to the framers position to help him craft his
hegemonic ruling when he noted:
Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men…high in
literary acquirements, high in their sense of honor, and incapable of
asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting.
They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and
how it would be understood by others, and they knew that it would not
in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race,
which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized Governments
and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery. They spoke and acted
according to the established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary
language of the day, and no one misunderstood them. The unhappy black race
were separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before
established, and were never thought of or spoken of except as property,
and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed
to need protection.
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When viewed together, the legal opinion presented by Chief Justice Taney in Scott v Sandford
illustrated perhaps the strongest and most consequential hegemonic narratives by any legal actor
at the time in United States history. These findings suggest that not only did his hegemonic
narratives construct and sustain racial differences in legal discourse and affirm the ideology of
“white supremacy,” they seem to portend how today many descendants of Africa in the United
States are treated under the law.
Yet, despite the overwhelming number of hegemonic discourses articulated by Chief
Justice Taney, he offered one counter-hegemonic narrative when he indicated that “the term free
inhabitant, in the generality of its terms, would certainly include one of the African race who had
been manumitted.” This excerpt is an instance that suggests that despite Chief Justice Taney’s
strong hegemonic opinions of “negroes,” he admitted that some were considered “free
inhabitants,” which was tantamount to aliens with nationality. Unfortunately, there was
insufficient data available from these findings to explore who Judge Taney considered exactly
“free inhabitants.”
Scott v. Sandford (1857)-Justice Curtis’ dissenting opinion. In the first hegemonic
transcript extract, Justice Curtis offered his dissenting opinion in Scott v. Sandford (1857) by
noting that delegates of the Articles of Confederation moved to amend the fourth article “by
inserting after the word “free,” and before the word “inhabitants” the word “white,” so that the
privileges and immunities of general citizenship would be secured only to “white persons.” This
finding is consistent with some of the efforts taken by the founding fathers to conceal who could
claim citizenship, which I described in my literature review. This finding also revealed how
racial differences, specifically by using the racialized name “white,” were maintained through
legal discourse. In other words, the racialized name “white” not only became synonymous with
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“free,” it represented someone who enjoyed and benefitted from full and protected rights under
the law as opposed to “negroes.” In contrast, the counter-hegemonic discourse offered by Justice
Curtis specified:
At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation,
all free native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina,
though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of
those states, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications
possessed the franchise of electors, on equal terms with other citizens;
and as free colored persons were then citizens of at least five States,
and so in every sense part of the people of the United States, they were
among those for whom and whose posterity the Constitution was ordained
and established.
These findings suggest that Justice Curtis in his recount of historic events considered that these
same former “African slaves” were citizens under the United States Constitution. Moreover, the
counter-hegemonic narratives offered by Justice Curtis illustrated how he contested the
hegemonic outcome in Scott v. Sandford (1857) that concluded that descendants of Africa in the
United States were never intended to become citizens.
Scott v. Sandford (1857)-Justice McLean’s dissenting opinion. While referencing
historical accounts of slavery in the British colonies, Justice McLean noted in his dissenting
opinion that:
Slavery was introduced into the colonies of this country by
Great Britain at an early period of their history, and it was
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protected and cherished, until it became incorporated into the
colonial policy. It is immaterial whether a system of slavery
was introduced by express law, or otherwise, if it have the
authority of law. There is no slave State where the institution is
not recognized and protected by statutory enactments and judicial
decisions. Slaves are made property by the laws of the slave States,
and as such are liable to the claims of creditors; they descend to their
heirs, are taxed, and in the South they are a subject of commerce.
In this hegemonic passage, Justice McLean’s legal opinion on slavery corresponded to some
previous hegemonic findings illustrated earlier in this section. For example, in State v Manuel
(1838), Judge Gaston averred that “slaves were not in legal parlance persons, but property.”
Also, Justice McLean marked how slaves in the South were treated like commerce and could be
inherited or passed on to heirs. As a result, the historical references offered by Justice McLean
revealed how the hegemonic legal discourse of the past constructed and maintained racial
differences and hierarchy in law.
Contrastingly, the counter-hegemonic piece offered by Justice McLean, noted that:
Our independence was a great epoch in the history of freedom;
and while I admit the Government was not made especially for
the colored race, yet many of them were citizens of the
New England States, and exercised the rights of suffrage when
the Constitution was adopted.
I considered this piece counter-hegemonic because Justice McLean emphasized that many
descendants of Africa living in the New England states were citizens who possessed the right to
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vote. This counter-hegemonic finding appeared consistent with the previous counter-hegemonic
narrative presented by Justice Curtis that showed that while racial differences in law existed
between “negroes” and “whites,” Justice McLean rejected the hegemonic notion that all
descendants of Africa in the United States were presumed slaves.
The Use of Racialized Names in Contemporary United States Supreme Court Legal Texts
In this section, I present my findings as they relate to how some contemporary legal
actors use racial differences today and describe their hegemonic and counter-hegemonic
narratives. Through my analysis of eight United States Supreme Court legal texts from 19862017, I identified a line of diverse racialized names and summarized them in Table 4.
Table 4.
Racialized Names in Contemporary Legal Texts- 1986-2017
Date

Title of Document

Racialized Names

1986

Batson v. Kentucky

Negro, blacks, whites, white men, black
persons, black jurors, black defendants, white
persons

1987

Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji

Arabs, Caucasians, white citizens, white
persons, black, Mongolian, negro, European

1992

United States v. Fordice

White students, black students, white persons,
black youth, black teachers, white school, negro
school, negroes

2000

Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier

Blacks, negro applicants, white applicants,

Parish School Board

black voter, black parent, African American
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2003

Virginia v. Black

Blacks, African American, niggers, whites,
southern whites, negroes, freed blacks, white
supremacy, black Americans

2006

Parents Involved in Community

white, non-white, non-white students, black,

Schools v. Seattle School District

African American, negro, black school children

No. 1
2013

Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,

African American, whites, black office holders,

Attorney General, et al.

black population, white voters, aborigines,
white district, black district

2015

Texas Dept. of Housing and

Black, black inner city, white suburban

Community Affairs v. Inclusive

neighborhood, white families, Caucasian

Communities Project, Inc.

neighborhood

First, the findings in the identified list pointed to some similarities with the historic legal
texts in the use of certain racialized names in contemporary legal texts. For example, the use of
the designation “negro” and “black” appeared more frequently within the contemporary legal
texts. These findings are consistent with my literature review, which revealed that prior to 19851986, “negro” and “black” were the common designations for many descendants of Africa in the
United States. This finding pointed to two potential explanations for the continued use of
“negro” and “black” in the contemporary legal texts. First, these racialized terms have become
embedded within our society through repetition and custom, and second, revealing
intertextuality, the United States Supreme Court justices relied on legal precedent that used these
racialized terms. Later, in the discussion chapter of this exploratory study, I offer some

109

CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY
perspective on how CRT and Post-Colonialist theory view how racial names become embedded
and the positive and negative consequences of the doctrine on stare decisis.
Second, another finding that emerged from my analysis of the eight contemporary legal
texts is the consistent use of the racialized name “white” for descendants of Europe in the United
States. Although the term “Caucasian” was used once in the eight contemporary legal texts, it is
reasonable to assume that the designation “white” has also become deeply embedded in our
society and within the legal discourse. Also, I found that while racial descriptors such as “black
defendants,” “black jurors,” “white citizens,” and “black office holders” were also used because
the rulings found in the legal texts were related to race, the use of racial descriptors tell us that
race is omnipresent and even pervasive in law today. However, relying solely on exploring what
racialized names appeared in the eight contemporary legal texts, does not reveal how and in what
context legal actors create, maintain, or disrupt racial differences in modern times. As a result,
these findings led me to the next section where I introduced the hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourse that emerged from the eight contemporary legal texts.
Hegemonic and Counter-Hegemonic Discourses in the Contemporary Legal Texts
In this section, I explore the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse found in the
eight contemporary United States Supreme Court legal texts from 1986-2017. These legal texts
consisted of United States Supreme Court decisions related to jury selection, employment,
housing discrimination, intimidation, voting rights, and education that used racialized names.
Batson v. Kentucky (1986). In this case, the appellee (Batson) averred that he was
denied equal protection under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because during the jury
selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the
venire, which resulted in a jury composed of all whites. As a result of the composition of the
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jury, Mr. Batson was convicted of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. Upon
hearing the facts of the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor’s actions violated the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Notably, the Court relied on two
previous Supreme Court decisions-Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama
(1965). In Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) the Court offered their counter-hegemonic narrative
when they ruled that barring any citizen from jury service:
Is practically a brand upon them, affixed by law; an assertion of
their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others.
Also, in Swain v. Alabama (1965), the United States Supreme Court advanced their counter hegemonic discourse when they decided that:
Even if a State’s systematic striking of [Negroes] in selecting trial
juries raises a prima facie case of discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the record here is insufficient to establish such a systematic
striking in the county. Total exclusion of [Negroes] from venires by state
officials creates an inference of discrimination, but this rule of proof
cannot be applied where it is not shown that the State is responsible
for the exclusion of [Negroes] through peremptory challenges.
The findings in Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama (1965) illustrated how
legal actors disrupted the historic view that descendants of Africa in the United States could be
legally excluded from jury service.
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However, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting from the majority opinion, which ruled that
it was unconstitutional to exclude “blacks” from jury service opined that:
I cannot subscribe to the Court’s unprecedented use of the Equal
Clause to restrict the historic scope of the peremptory challenge, which
has been described as “a necessary part of trial by jury.” In my view,
there is simply nothing “unequal” about the State’s using its peremptory
challenges to strike blacks from the jury in cases involving black defendants,
so long as such challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases
involving white defendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic
defendants, Asians in cases involving Asian defendants, and so on. This
case-specific use of peremptory challenges by the State does not single
out blacks, or members of any other race for that matter, for discriminatory
treatment. Such use of peremptories is at best upon seat-of-the-pants
instincts, which are undoubtedly crudely stereotypical and may in many
cases be hopelessly mistaken. But as long as they are applied across-theboard to jurors of all races and nationalities, I do not see-and the Court
most certainly has not explained-how their use violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
I considered the Chief Justice’s opinion hegemonic because it is unusual that “whites” are
excluded from jury service. Also, the Chief Justice did not refer to any historic or modern legal
texts in which any other races or nationalities were peremptorily challenged, except “blacks.”
Therefore, this hegemonic narrative by Chief Justice Rehnquist shows the rather subtle and

112

CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY
crafty way that he omitted the actual legal state of affairs that “blacks” appear to be excluded
from jury service rather than “whites.”
In the first counter-hegemonic extract, Justice Powell rendered his majority opinion
decision by stating:
while we recognize, of course, that the peremptory challenge occupies
an important position in our trial procedures, we do not agree that our
decision today will undermine the contribution the challenge generally
makes to the administration of justice. The reality of practice, amply
reflected in many state-and-federal opinions, shows that the challenge
may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate against
black jurors. By requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the
mandate of equal protection and furthers the ends of justice. In my view
of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we
ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.
This counter-hegemonic narrative illustrated how contemporary legal actors use judicial review
to shatter centuries of racial discrimination, specifically in the exclusion from jury service.
In another counter-hegemonic extract, Justice Marshall offered his analysis of peremptory
challenges noting that:
our criminal justice system requires not only freedom from any
bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against the
prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly

113

CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY
held. We can maintain that balance, not by permitting both prosecutor
and defendant to engage in racial discrimination in jury selection,
but by banning the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors and
by allowing the States to eliminate the defendant’s peremptories as well.
This counter-hegemonic narrative demonstrated how contemporary legal actors use their judicial
powers to address and redress years of racial discrimination. The findings in Batson v. Kentucky
(1986) illustrated how some contemporary legal actors often strictly applied prior legal decisions
that used hegemonic discourse and racialized names, while other legal actors used counterhegemonic discourse to achieve a counter-hegemonic outcome. Consequently, in Batson v.
Kentucky (1986), the final ruling contested the existing hegemonic notion that “blacks” or
“negroes” could be systematically excluded from jury service by offering several counterhegemonic narratives that helped disrupt a legacy of racial injustice in jury selection.
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji (1987). In this case, Al-Khazraji, a professor at
Saint Francis College, filed suit against the college for denying him tenure because of his
Arabian race. The Supreme Court ruled that persons of Arabian ancestry were protected from
racial discrimination under the Title 42 Section 1981 of the United States Code, in favor of
Professor Al-Khazaji. In the first hegemonic excerpt, Justice White stated that:
Under current racial classifications Arabs are Caucasians;
It was not until the 20th century that dictionaries began referring
to the Caucasian, Mongolian, and Negro races, or to race as involving
divisions of mankind based upon different physical characteristics.
Although, the reason for classifying Arabs as Caucasians was not clear from the data, it may be
related to an older United States Supreme Court ruling Dow v. United States (1915), which was
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based on the United States Naturalization Act (1790). In Dow v. United States (1915), the
justices essentially ruled on the “whiteness of the applicant” by noting that Syrians and Arabs
inhabit a portion of Asia who were classified as “white persons” (Haney-Lopez, 2006). This
hegemonic narrative pointed to how “whites” manipulated social, geographic, and political
power to create and sustain racial classifications and differences that are then used by some legal
actors to perpetuate these distinctions in law.
In contrast, in the first counter-hegemonic excerpt, Justice Brennan expressed his
sentiments regarding racial differences by noting that separating individuals based exclusively on
ancestry are in opposition to the doctrine of equality. This counter-hegemonic excerpt by Justice
Brennan illustrated how he attempted to disrupt racial differences by acknowledging that it is
unconstitutional and violates the principles of fairness in the United States.
The findings in Saint Francis College v. Al-Kharraji (1987) demonstrated how some
contemporary legal actors still apply “sociopolitical” racial classifications in legal deliberations,
while other contemporary legal actors use their judicial powers through counter-hegemonic
discourse to dismiss these extreme views.
United States v. Fordice (1992). In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the
State of Mississippi did not meet its affirmative duty under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause to eliminate its racially divided public university system. Essentially, in favor
of descendants of Africa in the United States, the Supreme Court ruled that Mississippi failed to
remove its segregative admissions policies. In the first hegemonic extract, Justice Scalia stated:
I reject, however, the effectively unsustainable burden the Court imposes
on Mississippi, and all States that formerly operated segregated universities,
to demonstrate compliance with Brown I.
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This hegemonic perspective suggests that dismantling a remnant that fostered segregation over
thirty-eight years since Brown v. Board (1954) would somehow create a hardship on Mississippi.
It illustrates how some legal actors have used their strict interpretation of the Constitution, in this
instance States right, to ignore and legally contest means for redressing racial discrimination.
Additionally, this hegemonic extract offered by Justice Scalia points to how this contemporary
legal actor fell short of disrupting racial inequities and how his opinion contributed to
perpetuating inequality.
Contrastingly, in her counter-hegemonic narrative, Justice O’Connor affirmed that:
In my view, it also follows from the State’s obligation to prove
that it has taken all steps to eliminate policies and practices traceable
to de jure segregation, that, if the State shows that maintenance of
certain remnants of its prior system is essential to accomplish its
legitimate goals, then it still must prove that it has counteracted
and minimized the segregative impact of such policies to the extent
possible. Only by eliminating a remnant that unnecessarily continues
to foster segregation, or by negating insofar as possible its segregative
impact, can the State satisfy its constitutional obligation to dismantle
the discriminatory system that should, by now, be only a distant memory.
In this counter-hegemonic narrative, Justice O’Connor debunked Justice Scalia’s absolution of
Mississippi’s “constitutional obligation to dismantle” its archaic segregative educational policies
and practices. This finding demonstrates how one contemporary legal actor singled out a State’s,
in this case Mississippi, unconstitutional maintenance of educational policies and practices that
not only sustain racial difference, but were remnants of slavery and Jim Crow segregation.
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Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Board (2000). In this case, the
Attorney General Janet Reno sought redress from a District Court’s ruling that permitted Bossier
Parish, Louisiana to pass into law changes in voting qualification, specifically redistricting,
without first obtaining preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The latter section
prohibits Bossier Parish from implementing any change in their voting qualification standards
and practices without first receiving preclearance from the Attorney General or the District
Court.
For the hegemonic discourse in this case, I found Justice Scalia’s majority opinion an
example of textual silence and omission, and a rather skillful legal technique of splitting an issue
without discussing race and voter discrimination. To illustrate, Justice Scalia declared that:
It makes no sense to suggest that a voting practice “abridges” the right
to vote without some baseline with which to compare the practice.
In section 5 preclearance proceedings—which uniquely deal only
and specifically with changes in voting procedures—the baseline
is the status quo that is proposed to be changed. If the change “abridges
the right to vote” relative to the status quo, preclearance is denied, and
the status quo, however discriminatory it may be, remains in effect.
In this hegemonic excerpt, Justice Scalia appeared to be aware that certain changes to the voting
practice in Bossier Parish may continue vestiges, or as he stated, “the status quo,” of
discriminatory voting schemes that existed prior to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Therefore, I considered Justice Scalia’s textual silence and omission as it relates to calling out
remnants of voter discrimination targeting descendants of Africa in the United States, an
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example of hegemonic discourse because his lack of response seems like he is ignoring current
efforts to make voting difficult for many descendants of Africa in the United States.
In contrast, the counter-hegemonic extract presented by Justice Souter’s dissenting
opinion recognized that:
The legal issue here is the meaning of “abridging” in the provision of
Section 5 that preclearance of a districting change in a covered jurisdiction
requires a showing that the new plan does not “have the purpose…of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color…”
In each context, it is clear that abridgement necessarily means something
more subtle and less drastic than a complete denial of the right to cast
a ballot, denial being separately forbidden….The behavior of Bossier Parish
is a plain effort to deny the voting equality that the Constitution just
as plainly guarantees. The point of Section 5 is to thwart the ingenuity
of the School Board’s effort to stay ahead of challenges under Section 2.
Its object is to bring the country closer to transcending a history of
intransigence to enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. Now, however,
the promise of Section 5 is substantially diminished. Now executive and
judicial officers of the United States will be forced to preclear illegal and
unconstitutional voting schemes patently intended to perpetuate
discrimination. The appeal to federalism is no excuse.
In this passage, Justice Souter contested Justice Scalia’s earlier opinion in which he seemed to
excuse Bossier Parish by deconstructing the word “abridge” and granting them the
“preclearance” or authorization to change voting patterns. Instead of remaining silent like
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Justice Scalia, Justice Souter used his judicial platform to offer a counter-hegemonic narrative to
these issues of States Right federalism and voter discrimination.
Despite the counter-hegemonic narratives offered by four of the five Justices, the
Supreme Court ruled that Section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan passed
into law with a discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose. In other words, under this
Supreme Court ruling, districts may receive preclearance for changes voting measures that
apparently continue discrimination based on racial differences.
Virginia v. Black (2003). In this case, three “white” men were convicted for violating
the Commonwealth of Virginia’s cross-burning statute when they attempted to burn a cross on
the yard of an African American family. This Virginia statute forbids the burning of a cross with
the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons.
In the first hegemonic extract, Justice O’Connor stated that a review of history
demonstrated that:
As a factual matter it is not true that cross burners direct their
intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious minorities;
as the history of cross burning indicates, a burning cross is
not always intended to intimidate. Rather, sometime the cross
burning is a statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity.
While in the second hegemonic extract, Justice Thomas added, “but the perception that a burning
cross is a threat and a precursor of worse things to come is not limited to blacks.” It is important
to add to the background of this case that several months before, Mr. Black had led a Ku Klux
Klan rally in Virginia. Taken together, these findings suggest that despite some historical
references that cross-burnings were used in a movie (Mississippi Burning) and in a novel (Lady
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of the Lake), the Justices overlooked the overwhelming historical accounts that cross-burnings in
the United States was directed almost exclusively at “blacks,” some of the Supreme Court
Justices opined that cross-burnings may have different motives. For this reason, I consider the
above excerpts examples of hegemonic narratives because of the historical legacy and trauma
cross-burnings have for many descendants of Africa in the United States.
In the first counter-hegemonic extract, Justice Stevens stipulated that “cross burning with
an intent to intimidate unquestionably qualifies as the kind of threat that is unprotected by the
First Amendment.” While in the second counter-hegemonic extract, Justice Souter noted:
To be sure, that content often includes an essentially intimidating
message, that the cross burner will harm the victim, most probably
in a physical way, given the historical identification of burning crosses
with arson, beating, and lynching. But even when the symbolic act is
meant to terrify, a burning cross may carry a further, ideological
message of white Protestant supremacy. The ideological message not only
accompanies many threatening uses of the symbol, but is also expressed when a
burning cross is not used to threaten but merely to symbolize the supremacist
ideology and the solidarity of those who espouse it.
This passage by Justice Souter represented a counter-hegemonic narrative in which he clearly
pointed to the historical legacy of hate, fear, and racism that cross-burnings represented for many
descendants of Africa in the United States. Also, this counter-hegemonic narrative by Justice
Souter represents one of the few instances in which a sitting United States Supreme Court Justice
recognized the ideology known as “white supremacy.” Additionally, these counter-hegemonic
narratives represent one Justice’s efforts to disrupt racial intimidation based on racial differences.
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Ultimately, in a seven-to-two decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
Virginia’s cross-burning statute infringed upon the appellant-Black’s (who burned the cross)
First Amendment right to free speech. Although two Justices dissented with the majority, the
decision was hegemonic because it granted “whites” First Amendment protection to burn a cross
on the property of virtually any descendant of Africa in the United States, so long as the act is
not intended to intimidate. Lastly, I believe this hegemonic ruling represented a major step
backwards in terms of some of the historic and courageous efforts made during the Civil Rights
movement to challenge and disrupt “white supremacist” acts of intimidation and violence
targeting many descendants of Africa in the United States.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2006). In this
case, Parents Involved in Community Schools (hereinafter Parents), a non-profit organization,
sued the Seattle School District because they used a “racial tiebreaker” to decide which school a
student would attend when a district became oversubscribed. In other words, the Seattle School
District used racial factors in their admission procedures. The United States Supreme Court
ruled in a 4-1-4 decision that the District’s efforts to desegregate the Seattle school district was
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CRT scholars described Chief Justice Roberts’ legal discourse in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2006) as an attempt to dismiss or negate this
country’s racist past, which they coined “color-blind” rhetoric (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Romero,
2015), To illustrate, Chief Justice Roberts declared that:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and
could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school
districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of
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demonstrating that we should allow this once again [against
White plaintiffs]-even for very different reasons. The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race.
I considered this passage nuanced because it reveals how Chief Justice Roberts while recounting
the essence of Brown v. Board, seemed to have trivialized the legacy of racial discrimination in
the educational system based on racial differences. In other words, instead of allowing the
Seattle school district to desegregate based on prior years of racial discrimination, Justice
Roberts dismissed their efforts by stating in a rather simple way, just stop racial discrimination.
However, in the swing vote, Justice Kennedy emphasized that:
To be forced to live under a state mandated racial label is inconsistent
with the dignity of individuals in our society and government
classification that command people to march in different directions
based on racial typologies, assigned to individuals can cause new
divisiveness….No sense of stigma may already become the fate
of those separated out by circumstances beyond their immediate
control. But to this the replication must be: Even so measures other
than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals first
must be exhausted.
This quoted passage illustrated how Justice Kennedy used counter-hegemonic discourse to
spotlight that racial labels and racial typologies are not only dehumanizing, but remain divisive,
stigmatizing, and should be eradicated.
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Perhaps, in one of the strongest counter-hegemonic opinions delineated by a
contemporary legal actor, Justice Breyer denounced what he called the “color-blind” analysis of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1 (2006). In his seventy-seven page dissent, Justice Breyer applied a
thorough description of history, particularly as it relates to Brown v. Board (1954), and
assembled “four basic considerations” to reach his counter-hegemonic perspective. First, that
school districts should essentially be permitted to desegregate their schools as they rectify some
of the errors of the past. Second, how children interact in this nation, often influences racial
matters. In other words, Justice Breyer believed that if this country’s schools work consistently
to bring “unity among our children,” then we may be able to improve how we deal with race.
Third, the Seattle School District is working to make their schools racially equitable. Last,
Justice Breyer declared that the Court’s plurality decision that the Seattle School District’s
desegregation attempts violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
would place this Nation and its law in jeopardy. Justice Breyer exemplified his counterhegemonic narrative in the following excerpt:
Today, almost 50 years later, attitudes towards race in this Nation
have changed dramatically. Many parents, white and black alike,
want their children to attend schools with children of different races.
Indeed, the very school districts that once spurned integration now
strive for it. The long history of their efforts reveals the complexities
and difficulties they have faced. And in light of those challenges,
they have asked us not to take from their hands the instruments they
have used to rid their schools of racial segregation, instruments that
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they believe are needed to overcome the problem of cities divided by
race and poverty. The plurality would decline their modest request.
The plurality is wrong to do so. The last half-century has witnessed
great strides toward racial equality, but we have not yet realized the
promise of Brown. To invalidate the plans under review is to threaten
the promise of Brown. The plurality’s position, I fear, would break
that promise. This is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come
to regret.
These counter-hegemonic narratives demonstrate how two legal actors can use strong discourse
to call out racial differences and “divisiveness” that continues to plague this country. Thus, the
findings in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2006)
revealed how nuanced legal discourse that contains hegemonic and counter-hegemonic narratives
results in a hegemonic decision.
Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al. (2013). In this case, Shelby
County, Alabama averred that Section 5 and Section 4(b) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act was
unconstitutional. It is worth noting that Section 5 prevents eligible districts from authorizing
changes to their election laws and procedure without obtaining preclearance. While Section 4(b)
referred to those districts that had voting tests prior to the Voting Rights Act. These districts were
also required under Section 4(b) to verify that the proposed changes would not adversely affect
any citizen the right to vote on account of their race or minority status.
In reaching the majority decision, Chief Justice Roberts concluded his opinion by stating:
Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial
discrimination in voting found in Section 2. We issue no holding on
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Section 5 itself, only on the coverage formula. Congress may draft
another formula based on current conditions. Such a formula is an initial
prerequisite to a determination that exceptional conditions still exist
justifying such an “an extraordinary departure from the traditional course
of relations between the States and the Federal Government.” Our country
has changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much,
Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem
speaks to current conditions.
This quoted passage demonstrates another form of what CRT scholars call “color-blind” rhetoric
(Bonilla-Silva, 2014) that acknowledges that much in “our country has changed” as it relates to
“racial discrimination in voting,” but ignores that some States have now adopted more discreet
tactics to discourage minority voters, specifically descendants of Africa in the United States,
from uninterrupted access to the voting process. The a-historic, “color-blind” approach is
particularly disturbing when today in some Republican-controlled states voter access to polls is
being cut, strict voter identification requirements are being implemented, and gerrymandering
strategies to redistrict areas to their favor is rampant (ACLU, 2017). Additionally, this form of
“color-blind” rhetoric was further illustrated in Justice Thomas’ opinion when he noted that:
Today, our Nation has changed. The conditions that originally
justified Section 5 no longer characterize voting in the covered
jurisdictions. Voter turnout and registration rates now approach parity.
Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare.
And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.
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In this example, Justice Thomas, the only Justice who is a descendant of Africa in the United
States, missed an opportunity to acknowledge that while certain things have changed, raciallymotivated tactics to suppress voting remains a serious problem in the United States (ACLU,
2017).
In contrast, Justice Ginsburg offered a more definite analysis in her dissenting opinion
when she indicated that:
In truth, the evolution of voting discrimination into more subtle secondgeneration barriers is powerful evidence that a remedy as effective as
preclearance remains vital to protect minority voting rights and prevent
backsliding.
In this counter-hegemonic narrative, Justice Ginsburg clearly acknowledged that voter
discrimination has morphed and safeguards should remain because they protect vulnerable
citizens. This excerpt is an example of how one contemporary legal actor addressed her concern
over a potential return to discriminatory actions targeting minority voters if remedies are not
taken, revealing the role of law today in disrupting racial segregation.
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act placed an undue burden upon these voting districts and was therefore unconstitutional.
This case was significant to many descendants of Africa in the United States because States
identified with a history of discrimination prior to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act could now
make changes to election procedures and redistrict without prior approval from the Justice
Department. As a result, the hegemonic outcome in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney
General, et al. (2013) adversely impacts voters based on racial differences.
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Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project
(2015). In this case, the respondent, The Inclusive Communities Project, alleged disparate
measures were applied to tax credits offered to developments in minority neighborhoods, that
these tax credits were denied to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods, leading to a
cluster of low-income housing in minority neighborhoods, which sustained segregation in
violation of the Fair Housing Act.
Although the Justices used previous rulings that contained hegemonic discourse to reach
their respective legal opinions in this matter, several of them used racial descriptors to
distinguish one group from another. For example, Justice Kennedy used racial descriptors like
“white neighborhoods” versus “black neighborhoods,” and “white suburbs” versus “black inner
cities.” While the Justices did not use direct hegemonic narratives in their legal discourse, the
continued use of racial descriptors and identifiers represented how some contemporary legal
actors maintain racial distinctions in law today. For example, for the majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy offered the following perspective:
Much progress remains to be made in our Nation’s continuing
struggle against racial isolation. In striving to achieve our historic
commitment to creating an integrated society, we must remain
wary of policies that reduce homeowners to nothing more than
their race. But since the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968
and against the backdrop of disparate-impact liability in nearly
every jurisdiction, many cities have become more diverse.
The FHA must play an important part in avoiding the Kerner
Commission’s grim prophecy that “our Nation is moving

127

CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY
toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal.”
The Court acknowledges the Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in
moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.
In this quoted passage, Justice Kennedy advanced his counter-hegemonic narrative in a manner
that I believe accomplished a dual role: preserving the integrity of the Fair Housing Act’s
disparate treatment claim and taking a more active posture of impugning racial differences.
In contrast to Justice Kennedy’s strong position on racial discrimination in housing, Justice Alito
assumed a rather cautious tone when he indicated that:
At last I come to the “purpose” driving the Court’s analysis: The
desire to eliminate the “vestiges” of residential segregation by race.
We agree that all Americans should be able to buy decent houses without
discrimination. But this Court has no license to expand the scope of
the FHA to beyond what Congress enacted.
While Justice Alito’s legal discourse did not sustain nor create racial differences, it shows a
rather tepid counter-hegemonic narrative demonstrating the rather strict approach some legal
actors maintain as it relates to ameliorating the legacy of racial discrimination in the United
States.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs violated the disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act. This ruling
was significant to many descendants of Africa in the United States because the disparate impact
assertion prevents discriminatory practices in housing, particularly racial bias and masked
discrimination tactics.
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Intertextuality and Summary of the Findings
In this next section, I applied intertextuality (Fairclough, 2003) as a means of comparing
what similarities and differences arose from the legal discourse in the historic and contemporary
legal texts. I used intertextuality as I explored the counter-hegemonic narratives that became
visible in the historic and contemporary legal texts. Also, this section includes a summary of my
findings.
As I explored and compared the six historic legal texts, the findings that emerged showed
that between 1705-1857, the racialized names “negro,” “black,” and “white” were legally
constructed to create clear racial differences. One of the findings in the historic legal texts point
to racial differences based on skin color such as those found in Hudgins v Wright (1806) in
which Judge Roan noted that a person who looks like a “negro” is deemed a slave, while
someone “white” is free. Findings in earlier historic legal texts such as those found in an act
concerning servants and slaves in Virginia (1705) and an act for the better ordering and
governing negroes and other slaves in the province-South Carolina (1740) indicated that an
enslaved person was essentially synonymous with the use of the name “negro.” These findings
point to how some historic legal actors discursively constructed racial differences, specifically as
they related to many descendants of Africa in the United States, based not only on skin color, but
also on racial designation and identity.
Another finding that emerged from the historic and contemporary legal texts was the use
of racial descriptors in legal matters. The continued use of racial descriptors today may suggest
that while society casually uses racialized names and racial descriptors, when legal actors apply
them, racial names and descriptors are validated in law. Although some legal actors used legal
precedent that contained racial names and descriptors because the case related to race, their
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continued use points to one of the ways that contemporary legal discourse still maintains racial
distinctions in law today.
Although the majority of historic legal actors discursively created racial differences, other
historic legal actors constructed counter-hegemonic legal provisions that allowed some
descendants of Africa in the United States to clarify their legal status. Other legal actors went
even further in their counter-hegemonic narratives to recognize that prior to and even subsequent
to the ratification of the United States Constitution, some Africans had been considered citizens.
These findings pointed some similarities between two historic legal texts demonstrating that at
some point, a number of descendants of Africa in the United States were considered citizens on
equal terms with “whites.”
As I applied intertextuality to the historic and contemporary legal texts to explore the
continuity and shifts in the use if racialized names, the racialized name “white” remained a
constant legal and racial designation through the explored time for all descendants of Europe in
the United States, while the designation for many descendants of Africa fluctuated, being
“white” seems to bestow a superior legal position of power and privilege over all other races, and
“black” people in particular.
Also, six legal actors in the six historic legal texts used very strong hegemonic narratives
to create racial differences, such as those found in an act concerning servants and slaves in
Virginia (1705), an act for the better ordering and governing negroes and other slaves in the
province-South Carolina (1740), and those articulated by Chief Justice Taney in Scott v.
Sandford (1857). In contrast, my intertextual analysis of the eight contemporary legal texts
revealed more diverse, complex, and nuanced discourse that related to race than those found in
the six historic legal texts. Like those found in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
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School District No. 1 (2006) and Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al
(2013).
Lastly, many of the narratives found in the eight contemporary legal texts pointed to the
Justice’s use of stare decisis or previous rulings of the past and recount of history, which
included hegemonic narratives, many contemporary legal actors employed counter-hegemonic
narratives to chip away at the prevailing dominant discourses that have maintained some of these
vestiges of slavery. I also uncovered through my intertextual, comparative analysis of legal texts
that some historic and contemporary legal actors strove to challenge the conventional and
dominant hegemonic discourse with counter-hegemonic narratives.
In the following chapter, I discuss the meaning and implications of these findings in
relation to my research questions. Also, I explored how exactly was and is racial discrimination
perpetuated by law, what was and is the role of law in creating, maintaining, or disrupting
hegemony, and why are racial terms like “negro,” “black,” and “white” still used today. I also
share the limitations of my research, my contributions to the existing literature, and my
recommendations for future research and action.
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Chapter VI: Discussion, Implications, and Conclusion
In this chapter I discuss what I discovered in the six historic and eight contemporary legal
texts as they relate to the use of racialized names and to the construction and disruption of race
and racial differences in legal discourse. I arranged this chapter by first recapitulating the
purpose and findings of my exploratory study, its relationship with previous research, the
limitations of my research, its implications, recommendations, and conclusion.
To restate, I proceeded to find answers to the following research questions: (1) what
legal discourse did legal actors use during 1705-1857 to create racial differences in the United
States and what similarities and differences exist during 1986-2017? and (2) what are the
counter-hegemonic narratives that sought to disrupt vestiges of slavery and racial differences in
the historic and modern legal texts? In terms of research goals, the aim of my exploratory study
was: (1) to explore the role of law and legal discourse in constructing racial names and racial
differences through time and to compare historic and contemporary legal discourse; (2) to
examine the link between historic and contemporary use of racialized names in legal discourse;
(3) to explore how the use of racial names and racial differences influenced legal treatment; and
(4) to explore counter-hegemonic narratives in historic and contemporary legal texts as tools for
dismantling vestiges of slavery.
I begin this section of the chapter by discussing the legal discourse used by legal actors in
the six historic and eight contemporary legal texts to create racial differences in the United
States. I discuss my findings by substantiating them with existing literature on racial differences,
racialized names, and their cultural and legal significance. I discuss what differences and
similarities emerged, any new discoveries, and how my study contributed to the existing
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research. I also discuss how I examined my findings through my theoretical frameworks of
Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Post-Colonialist Theory.
Historic Legal Discourse and the Creation of Racial Differences in the United States
Through my data analysis, I found that in the six historic legal texts from 1705-1857,
legal actors used authoritative and racially explicit, discriminatory hegemonic discourse to
construct and maintain racial differences. Specifically, these hegemonic narratives used
racialized names and racial identifiers that seemed to have produced and reproduced purposeful
ideological precepts in law, such as the creation of a racial hierarchy, based not only on skin
pigmentation, but also rooted in religious differences. Ultimately, some of these ideological
precepts appear to have influenced the legitimization of inferiority of the descendants of Africa
in the United States. Also, these ideological precepts shaped the concept of slave as property and
slave-holder as property owner, which was legally sanctioned and enforced, and indeed created a
distinct legal status for those classified as “negro,” “colored,” “black,” as opposed to “white.”
Racial hierarchy. One specific ideological precept that emerged from the legal
discourse found in the six historic legal texts was a clear racial hierarchy between descendants of
Africa and Europe in the United States with “whites” at the top and “blacks” at the bottom. To
illustrate, in an act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia (1705) the law-making body of
Virginia codified into law that slaves were clearly distinguished from “whites” not only based on
physical traits such as skin color, but also using the racialized name “negro.” Also, this same
Virginia act, used the racialized name “white” to not only differentiate those who were not
slaves, but also who were in control of the slaves. I found that this Act not only influenced many
of the subsequent slave codes enacted into law in early colonial United States, it may have
introduced the social construct known as “white supremacy” and “black inferiority” in law. This
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Virginia act is particularly significant because it represented one of the first laws concerning race
and racial differences during the formative years of jurisprudence in the United States.
Consequently, these findings are broadly in line with those of researchers such as
Bonilla-Silva (1997; 2014), Morning (2011), and the work of Jefferson (1785), who noted that
one of the main reasons why racial differences and a racial hierarchy was created and maintained
was to ensure the economic enterprise of slavery while preserving the “white” ruling elite class
and maintaining the “negro” and “black” slave status. Notably, the legitimization of racial
hierarchy rested not only upon skin color, but also on the religious and spiritual belief that
Christianity was superior.
Religion and Civilized/Uncivilized. The second ideological precept that emerged from
the six historic legal texts also had religious connotations, which helped to reinforce the
emerging divide between “white superiority” and “black inferiority.” To illustrate, in an act
concerning servants and slaves in Virginia (1705), slaves who were distinguished by the name
“negro” were also categorized as non-Christian. I believe this religious distinction is an
important finding because it dovetails the work of Smedley & Smedley (2005) where they noted
that the creation of racial differences and racial hierarchy also had religious implications, which
were all imperative for maintaining “white” hegemony over those classified primarily as “negro”
and “black.”
Additionally, the works of Higginbotham (1996) and Jordan (2012) pointed to another
element which helped further this ideology of “white supremacy” and “black inferiority.” Both
authors indicated that the main reason Christians could morally support the enslavement of
another human being was to view and create the image of the African as a heathen, barbarian,
and savage. This notion of the uncivilized African, some “thing” so inferior and animal-like,
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required a name, a label, and a mark that would correspond with their demoted status: hence the
use of the racialized name “negro” and “black.” Prior to the 15th century, Europeans did not use
those Portuguese and English terms to refer to any people who were inhabitants of Africa
(Moore, 1960). The racialized names “negro,” “black,” and “white,” as my findings revealed,
appeared to have been sanctioned and codified through law during the birth of the United States.
In other words, the creation of racial differences by legal actors in the United States seems to
have been literally sown into the very fabric of this nation. As a result, these findings are also
consistent with some of the key principles of CRT.
Concept of property. The third ideological precept that emerged from the legal
discourse found in the six historic legal texts was the concept of property. Specifically, the idea
that another human being, in this case “negroes,” could be converted physically and legally into
property, and that “whites” could do as they pleased with “their” property was sanctioned by
law. This became possible through the process of othering, which I described in my theoretical
framework, that descendants of Africa were deemed inferior because of their skin color and
religious/spiritual beliefs. Slave-holders legally transferred their property, which included slaves,
to their children and heirs. Consequently, these findings are consistent with the work of Harris
(1993), a CRT scholar and lawyer, who introduced the theory of “whiteness as property.” She
revealed that through “white” identity, the law constructed and delineated the terms of
“whiteness” as those whose “superior” status bestowed an unmatched amount of privilege,
power, and legal authority over all property, including the enslaved “negro.” Essentially, this left
many descendants of Africa in the United States in a socially and legally tenuous position.
Legal status. The last ideological precept, a result of the previous three precepts that
emerged from the legal discourse found in the six historic legal texts was a diminished legal
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status for many descendants of Africa in the United States. As several of the findings illustrated,
the legal construction and maintenance of racial differences in the six historic legal texts pointed
clearly to “white” hegemonic power and domination over all groups, especially over those
legally categorized and classified as “negro” and “black.” Several excerpts from my findings
helped affirm the legally superior status of “whites” over the inferior legal status of “blacks”.
Specifically, starting with an act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia (1705) and
culminating in Scott v. Sandford (1857), my findings revealed that a legally inferior status was
imposed upon many descendants of Africa in the United States. This legally inferior status
designated many descendants of Africa in the United States to a juristic person or an artificial
person. In other words, a nonhuman entity that is created by law, is legally different owning its
own rights and duties (Black, 2009), and also relates to a “non-person” someone whose
personhood has been legally expunged (Webster, 2002).
Moreover, these findings parallel the works of Brown (2009); Cacho (2012); Dayan
(2011); and Patterson (1985), in which they noted that the law ascribed a legal identity or status
to the enslaved descendants of Africa in the United States that acknowledged, to a certain degree,
their physical body, but, one dispossessed of all civil rights. Patterson (1985) named this
condition “social death,” which fundamentally deprived many descendants of Africa in the
United States of their human and civil rights.
Contrastingly, this legally inferior status that was based on racial differences replaced the
concept of nationality. Many descendants of Africa in the United States who were forcibly
stripped of their nationality and forgot their national descent names (Drew Ali, n.d; 1928;
Pimienta-Bey, 1995; 2002) used the racialized names “negro” and “black,” which was created in
law as a substitute by the slave-holders, who directly benefitted from the slave industry. As my
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literature review demonstrated, prior to the late 15th century, Europeans did not use the terms
“negro” or “black,” to refer to any people, which included inhabitants of Africa (Moore, 1960).
It was only after the racialization of slavery that the racial categories “white,” “negro,” and
“black” replaced nationality. As a result, starting with the findings in an act concerning servants
and slaves in Virginia (1705) and ending in Scott v. Sandford (1857), descendants of Africa in
the United States who were classified as “negro” or “black” in law were presumed to be slaves,
the property of “white” slave-holders, and having “no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.” For these reasons, the findings in the six historic legal texts seem to suggest that the use
of the racial names “negro” and “black” appear to resemble legal masks (Noonan, 1976) because
they suppressed and dehumanized many descendants of Africa in the United States within the
legal process.
To understand how legal discourse constructs and sustains racial differences,
discrimination, and hegemony today, and how, if at all it, it is linked to the past, in the next
section, I explore and discuss the findings that emerged from my analysis of the eight
contemporary legal texts.
Contemporary Legal Discourse and Racial Differences in the United States
Through my data analysis of the legal discourse contained in the eight contemporary
legal texts during 1986-2017, I discovered that legal actors, specifically United States Supreme
Court justices, often used nuanced, discreet, and much less explicit hegemonic legal discourse in
relation to race. The vague, sometimes unexpressed or implied, hegemonic language revealed
the complex role of legal actors in the modern era. Despite the often cryptic language used in
their hegemonic legal discourse to perpetuate racial differences and racial discrimination in
contemporary law today, several contemporary legal actors used counter-hegemonic narratives to
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disrupt it through their discourse. In this section, I discuss my findings related to the way
contemporary legal actors relied upon the legal concept of stare decisis or prior legal decisions
and textual silence in the form of “color-blind” rhetoric to maintain and perpetuate racial
differences and racial discrimination today. As well, I discuss the counter-hegemonic narratives
that emerged from the legal texts.
Reliance on legal precedent. First, I found that four contemporary legal actors relied on
prior legal precedent and a recount of history that often used explicit, racially discriminatory
legal discourse to sustain and perpetuate racial differences. To reiterate, stare decisis is an
abbreviation of the Latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere, meaning “to stand by
decisions and not to disturb settled matters” (Black, 2009). Further, Cardozo (2009) emphasized:
If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect
the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate
cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me
yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment
today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement,
material and moral, of my rights. Adherence to precedent must then be
the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the
even-handed administration of justice in the courts (p. 33-34).
However, viewed through a CRT lens (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014), the language of racism that
often has been fixed in legally binding precedent may influence and possibly control future
decisions of the Court. While it is true that Batson v. Kentucky (1986), United States v. Fordice
(1992), and Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
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Project (2015) cases involved matters pertaining to race, and two were ruled in favor of
descendants of Africa in the United States, the legal discourse contained some hegemonic
language from prior rulings. To quote Williams & Smith (2010) “we know that in the flux of life
all the facts of a case will never recur, but the legally material facts may recur and it is with these
that the doctrine [stare decisis] is concerned” (p. 67-68). That is to say, while the race of the
litigants in the above mentioned contemporary legal texts was a material fact, the Justices, by
virtue of their power under judicial review, could have replaced the use of the racialized names
“negro” and “black,” especially after 1985, when “African American” became the more
acceptable name for descendants of Africa in the United States. Instead, these Justices chose to
cite the racialized names verbatim. It is safe to say, that this rather simple act by the Justices
would not have changed the outcome of their rulings or violated the sacred doctrine of stare
decisis, so why continue to perpetuate racially insensitive names that allude to slavery and racial
differences in modern law?
Also, while the use of the racialized name “colored” appears to have naturally lost appeal
among descendants of Africa in the United States, the use of the term “negro” persists. Notably,
the Journal of Blacks in Higher Education (herein after the JBHE Foundation) (1997) revealed
that despite overwhelming opposition to the continued use of the racialized term “negro” as a
designation for many descendants of Africa in the United States, the New York Times and the
United States Supreme Court still use “negro” as a legal designation for this group. Specifically,
the JBHE Foundation (1997) discovered that even though many descendants of Africa in the
United States preferred the term “African American” starting in 1985, the word “negro” was
used in close to 400 U.S. Supreme Court opinions since 1821. In fact, the JBHE Foundation
(1997) noted that “as of January 1, 1997, Justices Antonin Scalia (now deceased), Anthony M.
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Kennedy, and David H. Souter had never written an opinion in which they used the term African
American” (p. 14). Although the JBHE Foundation did not indicate if the other Justices used
African American, it is reasonable to assume that they did use the term.
Interestingly, the research by the JBHE Foundation (1997) did not delve into the actual
legal discourse of many of these United States Supreme Court decisions and how these opinions
may have contributed to the creation and maintenance of racial differences in legal discourse
through time. Hence, the research by the JBHE Foundation (1997) prompted my interest in
further exploring some specific United States Supreme Court opinions starting from 1986-2017
that still used the racialized name “negro” in reference to many descendants of Africa in the
United States.
Notably, the use of the term “negro” was just recently dropped from the United States
census in 2013 (PBS.org, 2016). Also, in 2016, former President Barack Obama signed into law
the House Resolution (H. R.) 4238 (U.S. Congress, 2016). This law modernized the terms used
by the Department of Energy to categorize “minorities” (U.S. Congress, 2016). H.R. 4238
specifically considered the racialized term “negro” to be insensitive and antiquated. Although
these recent efforts should be commended, other public institutions, such as all governmental
agencies, educational, and legal should all re-evaluate the continued use of these vestiges of
slavery and work to abandon them entirely.
First, van Dijk (2004) noted that racist discourse, in this case use of racialized names,
takes on the structure of discriminatory social practice that is exhibited in “text, talk, and
communication” (p. 351). However, discourses, especially racist discourse, can take on a life of
its own. In other words, as van Dijk (2004) stated:
Racist societies and institutions produce racist discourses, and
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racist discourses reproduce the stereotypes, prejudices and ideologies
that are used to defend and legitimize white dominance (p. 354).
Consequently, the language that the United States Supreme Court (as the highest and
most powerful court in the land) uses may influence how some lower courts judges and other
legal actors, such as police, may unintentionally, treat many descendants of Africa in the United
States. These unintended consequences may lead to different treatment in criminal processing
(Miethe & Moore, 1986); in courtroom juror perceptions (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000); in
implicit criminal association (Eberhardt et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2015); racial disparities in
sentencing (Abrams et al., 2012; ACLU, 2014); and in police charging decisions (Sommers &
Marotta, 2015). Therefore, CRT scholars suggest that stare decisis may represent a potential
threat to minority rights because even if the legal precedent did not intentionally contain a
malicious purpose, a judge who is pressed to administer the doctrine of stare decisis may sustain,
in an indistinct manner, a legal system of racial disparity and discrimination (Bonilla-Silva,
2014; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012).
Textual silences/omissions and color-blind rhetoric. My analysis of the legal
discourse found in the eight contemporary legal texts revealed that a few contemporary legal
actors resorted to textual silence, omission, and “color-blind” rhetoric (Bonilla-Silva, 2014) as
they relate to racial differences in law. To reiterate, according to Huckin (2002), textual silence
is the omission of some germane information for a text or discourse. He separated textual
silence into five groupings: speech-act, pre-suppositional, genre-based, discreet, and
manipulative silences.
As I explored the contemporary legal texts, I uncovered that three legal actors used
discreet silence where they seem to avoid discussing sensitive topics such as the history of cross-
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burnings targeting descendants of Africa in the United States. Although, these examples of
textual silence were used by Huckin (2002) to discuss and explore the discourse on
homelessness, they can also be used to understand the power of silence in normalizing and
perpetuating race and racial differences in law today. Viewed through a CRT lens, discreet
silence minimizes the impact of structural racism and conceals “white” hegemony in law
(Bonilla-Silva, 2014). Consequently, when textual silences are not uncovered and deconstructed,
they may perpetuate hegemonic legal discourse in law today.
Additionally, Bonilla-Silva (2014, p. 26-30) described “color-blind” racism as possessing
four frames. The first frame involves abstract liberalism to explain racial matters. Abstract
liberalism entails the use of abstract ideas like equal opportunity and individualism to justify
racial issues. The second frame incorporates naturalization. In other words, naturalization
permits “whites” to rationalize racial matters by indicating they are natural circumstances. The
third frame covers cultural racism, which means using culture or culturally-based disputes to
promote stereotypes. The last frame embraces minimization of racism. Essentially,
minimization of racism implies that discrimination is not a primary aspect in the lives of non
“whites” because of progress that has been made.
My findings revealed that four Justices appeared to have used color-blind rhetoric in their
legal discourse. For instance, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1 (2006), I considered Chief Justice Roberts’ legal discourse an example of how an
influential legal actor engages in color-blind rhetoric and uses their platform to minimize racism.
In Batson v. Kentucky (1986), Justice Rehnquist’s color-blind rhetoric did not see that “whites”
are rarely, if ever, excluded from jury selection. In Virginia v. Black (2003), both Justices
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O’Connor and Thomas appeared to use color-blind rhetoric when they neglected to consider that
historically descendants of Africa in the United States were the prime victims of cross-burnings.
As a result, textual silences and “color-blind” rhetoric not only obscure centuries of
structural racism created and maintained in law (Bonilla-Silva, 2014), but also deemphasize and
eschew the historic dynamic of oppression and racial discrimination as “something of the past”
(Allen, 2005). Therefore, when contemporary legal actors engage in textual silence and “colorblind” rhetoric, they fail to take advantage of their persuasive platform to offset centuries of
hegemonic, racist legal discourse that perpetuates racial differences.
In summary, the hegemonic and complex findings that emerged from my critical
discourse analysis of the contemporary legal texts revealed several factors. First, even though
contemporary legal actors used previous legal rulings and recounted history that seem to
maintain racial differences in law, they often reached a counter-hegemonic decision. Second,
when some contemporary legal actors remain silent by using discreet speech or adopt a “colorblind” stance, particularly as it relates to centuries of racially-constructed and maintained legal
inequalities, their silence and unawareness seems to obscure the impact of racism in law today.
Last, as arbiters of law and occupiers of the highest court in the land, United States Supreme
Court justices can play a decisive and influential role in perpetuating centuries-old racial
distinctions and racial names when they act as reluctant, almost exclusively male, “white” legal
actors.
Moreover, this middle-of-the-road, ahistorical stance taken by four contemporary legal
actors appear to subtly perpetuate a neo-colonialist form of legal control (Allen, 2005). In a way,
when some contemporary legal actors act indifferent, they fail to consider many of the past
historical mistakes made by some legal actors and possibly disregard the current legal condition
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facing many descendants of Africa in the United States. From a Post-Colonialist theoretical
perspective, many of the modern forms of legal control confronting many descendants of Africa
in the United States represent post-colonialist tactics to maintain “white” dominance.
Consequently, when some of these contemporary factors of racial differences discrimination
within the United States legal system are coupled with the historical efforts that “de-civilized the
colonized” and “deformed them in discourse” (Cesaire, 2000), as revealed from the findings in
the six historic legal texts I analyzed, inferences may be made that the continued use of the
racialized names “negro,” “black,” and “white” appear to have some consequences and remain
vestiges of slavery that require further investigation.
Counter-Hegemonic Narratives Used by Legal Actors
In this section, I explore the legal discourse that emerged from the six historic legal texts
from 1705-1857 for examples of counter-hegemonic narratives. I discovered that three historic
legal actors either constructed legal provisions for enslaved persons to prove their legal status,
reproduced prior decisions that maintained and upheld these legal venues to freedom, or pushed
back on the prevailing notion that all Africans were slaves by establishing in law that many were
citizens.
Counter-hegemonic narratives in historic legal discourse. Through CDA, I uncovered
from the six historic legal texts instances in which some legal actors carved out space for
marginalized groups to specify their legal status. Some of these counter-hegemonic narratives
sought to disrupt the image and perception of the “negro,” like in an act for the better ordering
and governing negroes and other slaves in this province (1740) and in Hudgins v. Wright (1806)
respectively, in which legal actors acknowledged that descendants of Africa in the United States,
by way of petition or motion produce proof of their right to freedom.
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These counter-hegemonic legal provisions were indeed used by some formerly enslaved
Moors in South Carolina who sought clarification of their legal status (South Carolina Council
Journal, 1753; The State Records of South Carolina, 1790). For example, in 1753 two prisoners
of war were captured in battle by the Portuguese off the Barbary Coast and sold into slavery in
South Carolina (South Carolina Council Journal, 1753). Shortly after hearing that they would be
sold off, these captured and enslaved Moors petitioned the authorities for clarification of their
legal status or nationality by establishing their allegiance to the Moroccan Empire. As a result,
these Moors were freed and later compensated by the British Government (Pimienta-Bey, 2002).
In another example, four formerly enslaved Moors and their wives petitioned the South
Carolina House of Representatives (The State Records of South Carolina, 1790). Notably, as a
pre-emptive measure, these Moors felt compelled to clarify their legal status or nationality to
make clear to the community at-large that if they should commit some future offense or crime,
that they should be treated as Moorish Nationals and not as “negroes” under the “Negro Act”
officially known as an act for the better ordering and governing negroes and other slaves in this
province-South Carolina (1740).
Although my research did not produce more examples of these types of petitions, they
may offer some insight into counter-hegemonic discourse. First, CRT acknowledges that the
experiences and stories of marginalized, oppressed people represents a unique moment in history
to challenge hegemonic myths of race (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Moreover, from a PostColonialist theoretical perspective, these counter-hegemonic spaces allowed former colonized
people to reframe their narrowly constructed history from being captured and subdued, to
liberated and in control of their destiny (Allen, 2005). Additionally, the counter-hegemonic legal
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spaces provided former colonized people the right to disrupt the legally imposed inferior status
as non-human entities.
In another example of counter-hegemonic narratives, some historic legal actors argued
against the belief that all “negroes” imported into this country (An act concerning servants and
slaves in Virginia, 1705). To illustrate, Justices Curtis and McLean in their dissenting opinion
asserted that when the Articles of Confederation was ratified, many descendants of Africa in the
United States were citizens of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and
North Carolina (Scott v. Sandford, 1857). These two Justices noted that these free descendants
of Africa in the United States had the right to vote (Scott v. Sandford, 1857). The counterhegemonic narratives offered by Justices Curtis and McLean demonstrated how legal actors
utilized their judicial position and platform to challenge the static paradigm that all Africans
were slaves. From a CRT perspective, these counter-hegemonic narratives contest the
hegemonic discourses put forward by many historic legal actors by insisting that an alternative
history exist (Bonilla-Silva, 2014). Ultimately, these counter-hegemonic narratives found in the
historic legal texts pointed to how three historic legal actors strove to disturb the construction
and maintenance of racial differences in law.
Counter-hegemonic narratives in contemporary legal discourse. Through CDA of
the eight contemporary legal texts, I found that during 1986-2017 approximately half of the legal
actors used counter-hegemonic narratives as they sought to interrupt the unbroken line of historic
hegemonic discourse that exists in law today. While no contemporary legal actor directly
contested the historic legally constructed images of the “superior white person” and “inferior
black person,” many United States Supreme Court justices used their judicial role to call out and
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oppose racial discrimination in matters related to jury due process, employment, education, and
access to housing.
CRT recognizes that when legal actors contest racism at its source, in this case the law,
by using counter-hegemonic narratives they work towards equality under the law for all
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Informed by CRT, these findings correspond with how counterhegemonic narratives reconstruct reality by arguing against persistent racial discrimination and
its lasting effects (Bonilla-Silva, 2014).
In summary, these historic and contemporary counter-hegemonic narratives illustrate how
some legal actors put forward unconventional and often controversial accounts that contest the
prevailing hegemonic discourse. Additionally, these findings, particularly the contemporary
counter-hegemonic narratives, were a surprise to me because they showed that legal actors using
their powerful and influential position can resist the historic impulse to continue the status-quo of
preserving racial differences and racial discrimination. In the next sections of the chapter, I
share the limitations of my research, its implications to social work and contributions to the
literature, and my recommendations and conclusion.
Limitations
My research contained several limitations that are important to share. First, to reiterate,
the sample size and analytic process were limited to CDA and much more in-depth analysis is
needed that incorporates a deeper exploration of the context, cross-comparison of discourse and
history, and many more texts from the centuries in-between. It is also important to disclose that
post-DSW, I plan to build on and expand extensively from this exploratory study. As a result,
my findings should not be taken as conclusive evidence that all legal actors used their platform to
create and maintain racial differences and racial discrimination in law.
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Second, I consider it a limitation that my exploratory study did not include the counterhegemonic stories of historically oppressed people, such as those found in the petitions made in
1753 and later in 1790 by several Moors in South Carolina. I did not find more legal petitions
like these during the limited time-frame to complete this study, nor was I able to verify if these
petitions had any impact under the law. Therefore, this limitation represents an area of future
research to determine to what extent, if any, did these counter-hegemonic narratives, in the form
of legal petitions, played a role in influencing the legal discourse and treatment of the
descendants of Africa in the United States.
Last, I should make clear that I am not an attorney nor am I trained in law. This is an
important limitation to disclose because the focus of my exploratory study was restricted to
exploring and analyzing legal texts from a CDA and critical social work perspective. Therefore,
my lack of legal knowledge and familiarity with the nuances of legal discourse and function of
law and jurisprudence potentially represents a gap in my analysis. While my exploratory study
contained several limitations, specifically the small sample size of fourteen legal texts and a
limited historic period, I believe useful inferences may be made on the role of law and legal
discourse in creating, perpetuating, as well as disrupting racial differences and injustices in law.
Implications for Social Work
My exploratory study intentionally focuses on the historic and contemporary role of law
in constructing, maintaining, and perpetuating racial differences from a social justice paradigm.
The Council of Social Work Education (CSWE) outlined in the Educational Policy and
Accreditation Standards (EPAS) that:
Social work’s purpose is actualized through its quest for social
and economic justice, the prevention of conditions that limit
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human rights, the elimination of poverty, and the enhancement
of the quality of life for all persons (2008, p. 1).
However, social justice necessitates the critical analysis of ideologies and discourses that support
structures and systems of inequity. Therefore, my exploratory study appears to support the need
for exploring further how exactly was and is racial discrimination perpetuated by law, and more
importantly, exploring ways to disrupt and dismantle these racist discourses (van Dijk, 2004) as a
matter of social and racial justice. Moreover, the findings of my exploratory study represents a
potentially ripe area for research and activism for social workers to engage in tilting the scale
towards equal justice under the law for all.
In addition, my study corresponds with a critical social work paradigm that seeks ways to
disrupt the status-quo in a manner that advances a society without racial discrimination,
oppression, and hegemony (MacKinnon, 2009). From a macro social work perspective, my
study showed that racialized names “white,” particularly in the historic legal texts, explicitly and
implicitly meant someone who is “superior.” While the use of the term “negro” or “black” when
applied to a person explicitly and implicitly meant someone who is “inferior” and “uncivilized.”
Hegemonic discourse that is seemingly maintained and reinforced in law, represent more than
just words, may influence how other institutions like law enforcement treat descendants of Africa
in the United States. From a Post-Colonialist standpoint, racist discourse, specifically in the
form of racialized names, supports and reinforces the dominant power colonists have over the
colonized (Allen, 2005; van Dijk, 2004). Therefore, my exploratory study supports the need for
exploring ways to challenge the remaining vestiges of hegemonic discursive practices
perpetuated in law today by identifying, amplifying, and developing more counter-hegemonic
discourse and practices that disrupt and dismantle these remnants of slavery.
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I believe my research contributed to existing literature by demonstrating that combining
CRT with a CDA approach may enhance how social workers analyze the relationship between
race and power. Also, utilizing CRT with CDA may amplify how social workers study and
respond to the institutional injustices of racism. In addition to employing CRT as a theoretical
framework to issues related to race, racism, and power, I further suggest that implementing a
Post-Colonialist theory, as put forward by Allen (1990; 2005), may augment how social workers
examine the modern, more nuanced forms of racism today in the United States.
Lastly, the deep-rooted problem of racism, racial discrimination, and the ideology of
“white supremacy” in our society has significant implications for the social work profession. For
instance, from a macro social work perspective, the continued use of racial differences and
racialized names in law are likely to result in adverse legal outcomes for many descendants of
Africa in the United States, but they will almost certainly reinforce “white privilege” in law.
Therefore, I would advocate that social workers should learn the nuances of racialized names, so
they can be sensitive to what racial names to use with their clients.
Similarly, from a macro social work perspective, the continued use of racial differences
and racialized names in law appears to perpetuate structural racism and maintain institutionalized
barriers within the legal system. While social workers strive to eliminate hurdles to justice, they
may not be equipped to identify, deconstruct, and effectively challenge these complex and
entrenched societal problems (Gil, 1998; Ife, 2012; Kolivoski, Weaver, & Constance-Huggins,
2014; MacKinnon, 2009). Therefore, if the social work profession expects to disrupt the
destructive effects of racial injustice and the status quo of “white supremacy,” we should
consider a critical analysis and transformation of our social work educational curriculum.
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I suggest an example of what this transformation to our social work education curriculum may
look like in the recommendation section of this chapter.
In summary, even though some important changes have been made since the Civil Rights
movement, many descendants of Africa in the United States still appear to not enjoy equal and
fair treatment under the law. As a result, social workers should be aware that as legal actors have
sought to correct the wrongs that still exist, they may be able to work with judges to amplify
counter-hegemony.
Contributions to the Research
In addition to providing some direction for future research, my exploratory study
contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I believe the use of Critical Race Theory
(CRT) and Post-Colonialist Theory combined with a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
approach to the exploration of the role of law in creating, maintaining, and disrupting racial
differences in the historic and contemporary legal texts incorporates vast potential for future
research in this field of study. While several scholars have already demonstrated the value of
CRT to the study of law and legal discourse (Bell, 1992; Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado &
Stefancic, 2012) and education (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995), there is a paucity of the
application of CDA in social work (Rossiter, 2005). Therefore, social workers who engage in
studies that examine power, particularly as it relates to racism, may find CDA useful because,
from a social justice perspective, it may reveal how to critically analyze the relationship between
discourse, race, and power and find ways to deconstruct them.
Second, the use of Post-Colonialist theory proved to be very insightful, especially Allen’s
(1990; 2005) contribution, because it acknowledged and articulated the current situation of
historically colonized people in the United States: descendants of Africa in the United States.
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Additionally, using a Post-Colonialist stance, allowed me to move past the false narrative that we
live in a post-racial society. I believe that this research may bolster the literature on how the
legal actors who sanctioned legal decisions systematically dehumanized many descendants of
Africa in the United States (Coates, 2003: Higginbotham, 1996) and how many of the founding
fathers not only legally constructed race, particularly “white” (Haney-Lopez, 2006), but also
“negro” and “black.”
Additionally, this exploratory study advances Noonan’s concept of legal masks (1976) to
include and consider that not just slavery dehumanized many descendants of Africa in the United
States, but that the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” maintained the
process of dehumanization by virtue of their explicit meaning in law and for their implicit
cognitive effect in jury deliberations (Smith et al., 2015; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000).
Social Work and Law
I believe this dissertation breaks new ground by demonstrating that social workers can
engage in sophisticated transdisciplinary research (Kemp & Nurius, 2015), normally restricted to
attorneys who often specialize in human rights (Ife, 2016). I believe this exploratory study may
encourage social workers to assume a more active role in deconstructing hegemonic discourses
that create and maintain structural racism in our society, specifically in law and legal discourse.
Therefore, this study suggests that exploring historical and contemporary legal texts can be a
legitimate topic for research in social work (Fisher & Dybicz, 1999), which may help to expand
social workers’ role in matters pertaining to law and social justice.
When social workers engage in work that intersects with law, it may enhance our
profession’s credibility within the social science community, because our clients and the
community at-large may see us as more than advocates, but as actors willing and able to work
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towards social justice. For instance, social workers may be able to collaborate with judges who
are also striving to contest hegemony and racial differences in law.
While the literature is replete with research on racial identity, perception of and attitudes
toward the racialized names, I explored the role of law and legal discourse in constructing racial
differences between 1705-1857 and 1986-2017, specifically using the racialized names “negro,”
“colored,” “black,” and “white.” Although other researchers explored the use of racialized
names “white” (Haney-Lopez, 2006)“negro,” “colored,” and “black” in law from a historical
viewpoint (Pimienta-Bey, 1995; 2002), my exploratory study compared six historic and eight
contemporary legal texts for its use in constructing and maintaining racial differences through
1705-1857 and 1986-2017. Additionally, my study uncovered ways in which some legal actors
used counter-hegemonic narratives to disrupt the prevailing hegemonic discourse in law and
begin to repair the errors of the past.
Recommendations for Social Work Research, Education, Leadership, and Action
In this section, I submit my recommendations as they relate to social work research,
social work education, and social work leadership and action.
Social work research. As I previously indicated, one limitation of my study was the
narrow time-frame and geographic regions of the analyzed documents for this exploratory study.
The fact that my findings only provide a glimpse into how racial differences and racial
discrimination were created, maintained, perpetuated, and disrupted in a small data sample is not
enough to offer any definite conclusions into this complex role of law and legal actors.
Therefore, to gain a more thorough perspective of how the law influences racial differences and
treatment, I recommend that it is necessary to significantly expand the data sample to include the
thirteen original colonies, as well as the centuries not included in this study. Additionally, my
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findings revealed that many of the legal texts were produced by law-makers and often endorsed
by executive officials in government. Thus, a recommendation for future research would be to
include exploring the role of the other branches of government in constructing, sustaining, and
disrupting racial differences and discrimination.
Second, as I disclosed previously in the limitation section of this chapter, my lack of legal
expertise may have unintentionally overlooked specific legal details that only a trained legal
professional would detect and explain. These analytic gaps in my exploratory study represent a
unique opportunity to develop and engage in transdisciplinary collaborative efforts. Therefore, I
recommend that future research into this area of study should include social workers, attorneys,
and historians, committed to eliminating racial differences and restoring social justice in society,
to explore further the intersection of racism, law, and social justice.
Third, I recommend that future research should explore the counter-hegemonic narratives
of historically oppressed descendants of Africa in the United States, especially as it relates to
how racial differences and racial discrimination are perpetuated in law. While my small data
sample incorporated the counter-hegemonic discourse of historic and contemporary legal actors,
providing the direct counter-stories of the oppressed and marginalized may help shed light on
how they were emotionally, cognitively, and physically affected by legally constructed racism.
Therefore, I would also suggest that scholars interview descendants of Africa in the United
States as well, to obtain their perspectives on the nexus between law and racial differences and
discrimination, particularly in light of the findings in the contemporary legal texts.
Social work education. Despite being advocates for social and racial justice, social
workers may find themselves unprepared to properly identify and effectively challenge structural
racism and the disparities that adversely impact the lives of many of our clients. As a doctoral
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student and social work educator, I recognize that social workers are not prepared through their
college education to critically analyze, deconstruct, and systematically address these complex
and entrenched societal problems. In a way, this lack of knowledge may cause social workers to
feel frustrated in helping clients understand and cope with structural barriers to inequality.
Therefore, the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) should consider implementing a
course to educators and students on critical social work in society that specifically focus on
oppression and racism (Tishman & Clarendon, 2018). I envision that this course would be
offered at the Baccalaureate, Master’s, and Doctorate levels of social work education. This
course would introduce students to CRT, Post-Colonialist theory, CDA, Gramsci’s concepts of
hegemony (1971), and embraces international social work perspectives because some
international social workers like Jim Ife (2012) have worked with the legal community to disrupt
hegemonic practices in Australia. Additionally, this course should encourage social work
students to engage in transdisciplinary research and learn how to collaborate with other
disciplines such as health, psychiatry, law and politics, and history to understand how to analyze
and solve complex social problems such as racism that impacts virtually every aspect of life.
Social work leadership and action. Lastly, social workers cannot remain silent or
neutral while some legal actors seek to disrupt hegemony and racial differences in law today.
Therefore, for future action I recommend that social workers collaborate with local and national
organizations to help educate descendants of Africa and Europe in the United States on the
historic and legal meanings of the racialized names “negro,” “black,” and “white.” Ultimately,
the goal of this proposed recommendation is to call for social work leaders, scholars, and
educators at-large to consider the significant role the can play in the elimination of the use of
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these racialized names and replacing them with more historically and legally accurate names that
promote equality.
In addition, social work leaders should collaborate with historians and scholars like Dr.
Jose Pimienta-Bey in order to learn more about the Moors because of their historic contributions,
and consider using Moorish American because of its legal relevance in the United States and
internationally (Drew Ali, n.d.; 1928; Pimienta-Bey, 1992; 1995; 2002; South Carolina Council
Journal, 1753; The State Records of South Carolina, 1790). Finally, I recommend that social
workers who are descendants of Europe in the United States and concerned about how racial
differences are maintained in law today, should denounce the continued use of the name “white”
(Haney-Lopez, 2002) because these first steps may demonstrate an awareness of and willingness
to take action in addressing the centuries of “white” privilege attached to the name “white”.
Conclusion
Today, there is no question that our country has made some positive changes, specifically
in terms of racial differences and legal discourse. My exploratory study revealed that the harsh
and racially discriminatory legal language from the past has been replaced with more subtle,
nuanced, and complex legal discourse. Also, I discovered that many United States Supreme
Court justices used their judicial platform to present counter-hegemonic narratives as they sought
to disrupt centuries-old discriminatory legal discourse and practices. As scholars committed to
social and racial justice, social workers should applaud and support their courageous efforts by
taking action to work with others in this struggle equality and justice. Unfortunately, I found
through my analysis of cases that some legal actors today also adopt neutral, color-blind, and
even silent position as it relates to racial matters. Therefore, social science scholars and social
workers committed to social justice for all cannot remain silent as discourses of racial differences
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still linger in our institutions. It is possible that the continued use racial differences and silence
may be one of the reasons that our nation continues to be divided along racial lines.
In conclusion, I was pleased to find that many historic and contemporary legal actors
have used their influential platform to contest the prevailing hegemonic and racist legal discourse
that created and sustained racial differences and racial inequality in the United States. The
counter-hegemonic narratives delivered by contemporary legal actors illustrated the nexus
between law and social justice. However, clearly more needs to be done to rectify the centuries
of racial injustice in the United States. Finally, I remain optimistic when I saw concerned,
conscious descendants of Africa and Europe in the United States unite to remove Civil WarConfederate statutes from public spaces because their counter-hegemonic efforts may have
opened a future space for a civil dialogue and discourse on how to eliminate and dismantle the
vestiges of slavery and racial differences that are deeply engrained into the fabric of the United
States.
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